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I met Inge Bouwhuis (1980 – 2009) in my final year as an 
undergraduate at Leiden University. We teamed up for our 
Master’s thesis project and together we collected, scored, 
and analyzed large quantities of psychophysiological data. 
After graduation, she moved away to start her PhD project at 
the University of Groningen. 
Inge was super smart, dedicated, and kind. 
She never got to finish her dissertation, and so 





























Social inequality breeds suffering. Who people are, as 
defined by the social groups they belong to (e.g., men, 
women, Whites or Blacks), partly determines their social 
status and access to important resources such as education 
and income, thereby affecting wellbeing and quality of life 
(Western, Dwan, & Kebonang, 2005). For example, if you 
live in Australia, and you are of indigenous descent, on 
average you will live about 18 years shorter than a non-
indigenous Australian (Australian Institute of Health and 
Welfare, n.d.). If you live in the US, and you are gay, you 
are prohibited from marrying your partner in a vast majority 
of the fifty states. And if you are a woman, working 
anywhere on the planet, you are likely being paid less than a 
male colleague doing the same work. Thus, structural factors 
that lie beyond an individual’s control, such as ethnicity, 
sexual orientation, and gender, determine access to valued 
social resources resulting in social inequality (Dwan & 
Western, 2003).  From this perspective, social inequality is 
at odds with principles of justice and fairness. The central 
goal of the research outlined in the pages that follow is to 
identify an effective psychological intervention to increase 




The reduction of inequality requires social change; it 
requires support for, and the implementation of, actions and 
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policies aimed at ‘leveling the playing field’ between social 
groups in important areas such as health, education, and 
employment. Members of dominant groups (e.g., Whites) 
may oppose social change because the allocation of social 
status is often viewed as a zero-sum situation, in which 
improvement of one group implies relative losses for the 
other group (Esses, Dovidio, Jackson, & Armstrong, 2001). 
Social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) posits that 
people are motivated to protect the relative status of their 
ingroup because they derive part of their self-esteem from 
the groups with which they identify. Members of dominant 
groups experience social identity threat when their group’s 
relatively high status is at stake (Scheepers & Ellemers, 
2005). Such threat may result in resisting the advancement 
of minority groups.  
Indeed, previous research has shown that threats to 
social identity lead members of high status groups to 
derogate outgroup members (Ellemers & Bos, 1998), for 
example through sexual harassment (Maass, Cadinu, 
Guarnieri, & Grasselli, 2003). Members of dominant groups 
also tend to oppose policies designed to increase equal 
opportunities between groups, such as affirmative action 
(Lowery, Unzueta, Knowles, & Goff, 2006; O’Brien, Garcia, 
Crandall, & Kordys, 2010; Wilson, 2006).  At the same time, 
the fact that majority groups often have more power than 





of the former group potentially valuable allies in the struggle 
toward more equality.  
I argue that dominant group members’ opposition to 
increased equality can be mitigated by presenting the fair 
and equal treatment of subordinate outgroups as a strategy 
toward enhancing the identity of the ingroup – in terms of 
morality. I theorize that if redressing inequality becomes a 
way for dominant group members to boost their group’s 
value, resistance to social change among these group 
members will decrease.  
 
The Morality of Equality 
Appeals to morality are used in everyday life to 
emphasize the importance of specific actions, situations or 
attitudes. In politics for example, when a given issue is 
explicitly labeled as a ‘moral issue’, this indicates that one’s 
attitude toward the issue is not a matter of personal 
preference, but instead either moral or immoral. For 
instance, in recent years, there has been a heated debate in 
the US between Democrats and Republicans about the extent 
of Federal government’s required evolvement with regard to 
health care. To emphasize the need for health care reform, 
US President Barack Obama pointed out that providing 
universal health care is the Nation’s moral obligation 
(Zeleny & Hulse, 2009). In doing so, President Obama 
communicates that it is immoral not to provide such care. 
Most recently, during the first 2012 US presidential debate, 
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governor Mitt Romney indicated that reducing the deficit of 
the US is “not just an economic issue”, but “a moral issue”, 
and that spending more than you take in is “simply not 
moral” (First Obama-Romney Debate, 2012). As illustrated 
by these two examples, appeals to morality are often focused 
on obligation and/or avoiding immorality. Such appeals 
communicate not only the importance of a certain stance or 
action, but also, and perhaps most importantly, communicate 
that alternative, opposing stances or actions are immoral.  
Research in moral psychology indeed suggests that 
framing an issue as a moral one might be an effective 
strategy to render support and/or compliance. Morality has 
been identified as one of the most important regulators of 
human behavior (Shavell, 2002; Skitka, Bauman, & Sargis, 
2005), and cross-cultural inquiry has demonstrated that 
moral values are among the most important principles that 
guide individuals’ lives (Schwartz, 1992). Furthermore, 
attitudes that are held with moral conviction (i.e., the strong 
and absolute belief that something is wrong or right) 
compared to otherwise strong but nonmoral attitudes are 
more potent in predicting behavior (Skitka et al., 2005). 
What is more, the comparative importance and weight given 
by people to morality generalize to the group level. Namely, 
a group’s perceived morality has been found to be more 
important than its perceived competence or sociability for 
group members’ positive evaluation of and level of 





2007). In a related vein, it has been demonstrated that a 
norm pertaining to morality has greater impact than a norm 
pertaining to competence on group members’ decision to 
work for group rather than individual status improvement 
(Ellemers, Pagliaro, Barreto, & Leach, 2008). Taken 
together, these findings demonstrate that people greatly 
value morality at the personal as well as at the group level, 
and are more motivated by appeals to morality than appeals 
to competence or sociability. Does it follow then that 
presenting equality as the dominant group’s moral obligation 
is an effective way to motivate dominant group members to 
redress inequality? 
The answer to this question is yes and no. Indeed, the 
more members of dominant groups perceive their ingroup as 
relatively advantaged compared to other groups, the more 
they consider the ingroup to be unjustly privileged (Leach, 
Iyer, & Pedersen, 2006). In addition, when dominant group 
members are confronted with the fact that inequality benefits 
their group, they report experiencing guilt (Powell, 
Branscombe, & Schmitt, 2005), which is a moral emotion. 
Experiences of group-based guilt have been found to predict 
support for compensatory policies and financial restitution 
for perceived harm done by the ingroup (Doosje, 
Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 1998; Iyer, Leach, & 
Crosby, 2003; Swim & Miller, 1999). However, there are 
also limitations to focusing dominant group members’ on 
their group’s unjustly privileged position.  
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First, guilt has been characterized as a self-focused 
emotion that triggers action primarily aimed at relieving 
one’s own negative state of feeling guilty rather than at 
helping the ones who have been harmed. As such, group-
based guilt predicts dominant group members’ support for 
restitution by means of compensatory policy, but it does not 
predict support for equal opportunity policy (Iyer et al., 
2003). Whereas the former serves to alleviate the negative 
psychological state of guilt, the latter does not, which is why 
experiences of guilt are unlikely to result in social change 
beyond restoration.  
Second, for dominant group members, the 
acknowledgment that the ingroup benefits from a system 
that oppresses other groups, may undermine the ingroup’s 
identity as moral (Branscombe, Doosje, & McGarty, 2002). 
To avoid feelings of collective guilt and threats to (moral) 
self-esteem, members of dominant groups may deny 
inequality (Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 2002), deny the 
existence of racism (Applebaum, 1997), or justify their 
group’s privileges (Harth, Kessler, & Leach, 2008). Such 
reactions may be aimed at perpetuating the ingroup’s 
privilege and power, but may also reflect dominant group 
members’ genuine desire to perceive the self as a moral 
agent (Applebaum, 1997). Thus, it is important to consider 
these types of reactions, and ways to circumvent them, when 
thinking about interventions that stress dominant group 






In contrast to prior work focusing primarily on the 
antecedents and consequences of collective guilt in members 
of dominant groups, I aim to examine the effect of a moral 
frame of equality that does not stress obligation or 
immorality – i.e., a moral ideal frame. Framing equality as a 
moral obligation versus a moral ideal is in line with 
regulatory focus theory (Higgins, 1997, 1998) which 
distinguishes between desired end-states pertaining to 
responsibilities (prevention focus) and those pertaining to 
aspirations (promotion focus). Furthermore, recent work has 
identified two distinct forms of moral regulation: 
Prescriptive and proscriptive morality (Janoff-Bulman, 
Sheikh, & Hepp, 2009). Whereas proscriptive morality is 
associated with concerns about what one should not do, 
prescriptive morality is associated with concerns pertaining 
to what one should do. Furthermore, proscriptive morality 
has been characterized as mandatory, focused on 
transgressions, and based in duty. In contrast, prescriptive 
morality has been characterized as more discretionary, 
focused on good deeds, and aside from duty, it can also be 
based in desire (Janoff-Bulman et al., 2009).  
Based on the knowledge that individuals are not only 
motivated to avoid doing the “wrong thing”, but are also 
driven to do the “right thing”, the research outlined in this 
dissertation is aimed at delineating the effect of such distinct 
moral frames on advantaged group members’ attitudes and 
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motivation toward equality. Namely, I predict that framing 
social equality as a moral ideal (in line with promotion 
focus; Higgins, 1997, and prescriptive morality; Janoff-
Bulman et al., 2009) will be more effective in eliciting 
support for social change than when it is framed as a moral 
obligation (in line with prevention focus; Higgins, 1997, and 
proscriptive morality; Janoff-Bulman, et al. 2009). 
With respect to motivating dominant group members, 
research suggests that it is critical to frame the implications 
of equality in terms of the outcomes of the dominant ingroup 
(rather than subordinate outgroups). Prior research on 
inequality framing suggests that in order for dominant group 
members to be affected by a confrontation with inequality, 
they have to perceive inequality as pertaining to the ingroup 
(e.g., Lowery & Wout, 2010). For example, it has been 
shown that academic inequality framed as disadvantaging 
the minority group (i.e., women and ethnic minorities) 
causes disengagement from academic outcomes among 
minorities, but inequality framed as advantaging the 
majority group (i.e., men and Whites) does not. Namely, it 
was found that minorities (i.e., ethnic minorities and women) 
who were exposed to a minority disadvantage frame of 
academic inequality indicated that they cared less about 
performing well academically compared to minorities who 
were exposed to a majority advantage frame. The opposite 
was found among majority group members. Namely, among 





was observed when academic inequality was framed as 
advantaging the majority group, but not when it was framed 
as disadvantaging the minority group (Lowery & Wout, 
2010). Furthermore, framing racial inequality as White 
advantage rather than Black disadvantage triggers self-
regard concerns in Whites, thereby increasing their support 
for redistributive policies (Lowery, Chow, Knowles, & 
Unzueta, 2012). Taken together, these findings suggest that 
individuals’ responses to inequality are shaped by whether 
or not inequality is framed with regard to the ingroup.  
Considered in tandem with the work delineating the 
comparative importance of morality, it follows that framing 
social equality in terms of the dominant group’s morality 
will be more effective in motivating dominant group 
members than when it is framed in terms of competence or 
sociability (Leach et al., 2007; Ellemers et al., 2008). 
However, as I outlined above, framing inequality in terms of 
morality can also have suboptimal effects, such as when 
dominant group members become defensive or merely 
concerned with restitution rather than social change, more 
broadly. Based on the self-regulation literature (e.g., 
Higgins, 1997) and prior work distinguishing between two 
different types of morality (Janoff-Bulman et al., 2009), I 
propose that presenting equality as the ingroup’s moral ideal 
rather than obligation will improve dominant group 
members’ attitudes and motivation toward social change. I 
hypothesize that presenting equality as a moral ideal versus 
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obligation can render social change more likely, because it 
poses less threat to dominant group members’ social identity 
and inspires more positive intergroup attitudes and behavior. 
To test this prediction, I examine the effect of morality 
framing on dominant group members in three research lines, 
in which I focus on: (1) Intergroup attitudes, (2) 
Physiological responses and goal attainment strategies, and 
(3) Physiological and behavioral responses during intergroup 
contact. I will now outline the examination of morality 
framing within each of these lines, and indicate how these 
areas pertain to social change.  
 
Intergroup Attitudes 
In this first research line, I examine whether the moral 
ideal frame is indeed less threatening to dominant group 
members’ social identity than the moral obligation frame. I 
also aim to shed light on how morality framing shapes 
dominant group members’ attitudes toward different aspects 
of social change, such as positive attitudes toward cultural 
diversity and support for affirmative action targeting 
subordinate group members. For social change research, 
there are at least two reasons to focus on the intergroup 
attitudes of dominant group members. 
First, increasing social equality between minority and 
majority groups includes advancing the number of minorities 
in important areas of society - such as politics and academia 





dominant group members hold negative attitudes toward 
cultural diversity, it seems plausible to assume that they will 
not be motivated to increase social equality. Thus, creating 
more positive attitudes toward diversity may facilitate 
support for social change among dominant group members. I 
expect that presenting a culturally diverse environment as 
offering opportunities to attain moral ideals, such as 
tolerance and equal treatment of minorities, will induce more 
positive attitudes toward diversity in dominant group 
members than when the focus lies on meeting moral 
obligations (e.g., of non-discrimination). I base this 
prediction on regulatory focus theory (Higgins, 1997), which 
posits that when a goal is construed as an ideal (promotion 
focus) individuals become sensitive to the presence/absence 
of positive outcomes. In contrast, when a goal is construed 
as an obligation (prevention focus) individuals become 
sensitive to the presence/absence of negative outcomes. It 
follows that the moral ideal rather than obligation frame will 
inspire advantaged group members to focus on the benefits 
of cultural diversity, thereby potentially increasing their 
commitment to redress inequality.  
Secondly, social change becomes more likely if 
dominant group members endorse policies that are designed 
to proactively reduce inequality, such as affirmative action. 
The American Psychological Association (APA) defines 
affirmative action as “voluntary and mandatory efforts 
undertaken by federal, state, and local governments; private 
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employers; and schools to combat discrimination and to 
promote equal opportunity in education and employment for 
all” (APA, 1996, p. 2; as cited in Crosby, Iyer, Clayton, & 
Downing, 2003). For example, in 2004 the Netherlands 
Organization for Scientific Research (i.e., NWO) launched 
the “Mosaic program”, an academically highly selective 
program targeting ethnic minority candidates aspiring to 
scientific careers. Up until its termination in 2012, the 
Mosaic program provided ethnic minority laureates with 
funding for a four-year period of doctorate research at a 
Dutch University. Thus, the Mosaic program served as a 
corrective step toward leveling the playing field for ethnic 
minorities in Dutch academia. The justification for 
affirmative action is based on two main premises: a) subtle 
and not-so-subtle forms of discrimination and prejudice 
persist and hamper minorities’ societal advancement, and b) 
compared to other practices, affirmative action is the most 
efficient and effective means for reducing discrimination at 
the aggregate level (Crosby et al., 2003; Crosby, Iyer, & 
Sincharoen, 2006).  
Dominant group members generally tend to oppose 
affirmative action (Crosby et al., 2006; O’Brien et al., 2010). 
In addition, it has been demonstrated that dominant group 
members’ attitudes toward affirmative action depend not on 
whether the policy helps disadvantaged outgroups, but on 
whether the policy is perceived to harm the advantaged 





magazine Elsevier published a news item about the Mosaic 
program on its website, many reactions were posted by the 
magazine’s readers opposing the program. One such reader 
posted that the Mosaic program is a form of “very malicious 
discrimination on the basis of race”, adding that “all those 
hard studying, White Dutch students who do not receive 
180.000 euro for free can’t help it that nonnatives are so 
uninterested in studying” (Elsevier, 2008). Indeed, 
opposition toward affirmative action can result in the 
stigmatization of beneficiaries of affirmative action. 
Namely, it has been found that negative attitudes toward 
affirmative action predict negative evaluations of affirmative 
action beneficiaries’ qualifications, regardless of their actual 
qualifications (Resendez, 2002).  
Although opposition to affirmative action has been 
linked to individual-level factors such as higher degrees of 
sexism, racism, and political conservatism (for a review see 
Iyer et al., 2003), research has also shown that framing can 
have powerful effects on attitudes toward affirmative action 
(Fine, 1992; Gamliel, 2007; Lowery et al., 2006; 2012). I 
will examine the effect of morality framing on dominant 
group members’ attitudes toward affirmative action, as their 
endorsement is a critical step toward the broad 
implementation of such policies, thereby facilitating social 
change. I predict that the moral ideal frame of equality will 
elicit more support for affirmative action in dominant group 
members than the moral obligation frame. This research, 
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consisting of four experimental studies among both student 
and employee populations, is outlined in Chapter 2. 
 
Motivation toward Equality 
Beyond examining intergroup attitudes, the aim of this 
second research line is to examine the effect of morality 
framing on dominant group members’ motivation to increase 
equality. When presenting equality as a moral ideal rather 
than an obligation, does this shape dominant group 
members’ perceptions of and motivation toward equality? 
Inspired by the literature on self-regulation and coping, I 
examine whether morality framing predicts distinct 
motivational and behavioral responses in dominant group 
members when they consider actions they can take to 
increase equality. Regulatory focus theory (Higgins, 1997) 
posits that whether people perceive a goal (promoting 
equality) as an ideal or as an “ought” determines the way 
they pursue the goal: With either eagerness or vigilance, 
respectively. Furthermore, outcome framing has been found 
to affect people’s motivational states during potentially 
stressful situations, indicated by distinct patterns of 
cardiovascular reactivity (Seery, Weisbuch, & Blascovich, 
2009). Namely, when a task is framed as holding potential 
gains (versus losses) and as something which one can take 
on (versus must do), this induces cardiovascular reactivity 
consistent with psychological “challenge” rather than 





Ernst, 1997). In light of the distinct motivational strategies 
associated with the ideal/ought distinction (Higgins, 1997) 
and physiological responses induced by gain/loss framing 
(Seery et al., 2009) outlined above, I predict that morality 
framing of equality will shape dominant group members’ 
motivational responses in similar ways. To test this 
prediction, I examine dominant group members’ behavior in 
terms of vigilance relative to eagerness (Higgins, 1997), and 
their cardiovascular (CV) reactivity in terms of relative 
“threat” and “challenge” responses (Blascovich & Tomaka, 
1996; Blascovich, Mendes, Tomaka, Salomon, & Seery, 
2003).  
I am interested in examining if morality framing shapes 
the extent to which Whites feel they can cope with the 
demands of redressing inequality, as prior work has 
demonstrated that perceived efficacy is an important 
predictor of improved intergroup attitudes and 
antidiscrimination behavior (Stewart, Latu, Branscombe, & 
Denney, 2010). The biopsychosocial model (BPS model) 
posits that individuals’ motivational states result from their 
evaluations of situational demands (e.g., perceived effort, 
uncertainty, danger) compared to their personal resources 
(e.g., skills, support). When appraised resources outweigh 
the demands, “challenge” arises, but when the appraised 
demands outweigh the resources this results in “threat”. The 
psychological states of challenge and threat are associated 
with distinct patterns of cardiovascular responses, indexed 
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by four cardiovascular markers. The BPS model posits that 
in a goal-relevant situation - such as when one has to give a 
speech about equality in moral terms - heart rate (HR), and 
ventricular contractility (VC) increase. Significant increases 
in these markers indicate engagement and goal relevance, 
which are the prerequisites for distinguishing CV reactivity 
in line with threat and challenge. Cardiac output (CO; the 
amount of blood in liters pumped by the heart per minute), 
and total peripheral resistance (TPR; an index of net 
constriction versus dilation in the vascular system) are the 
two CV markers indexing threat versus challenge responses. 
Namely, higher CO and lower TPR reveal relatively greater 
challenge, and thus lesser threat.  
I predict that having to give a speech about increasing 
equality in terms of moral ideals rather than obligations will 
decrease the perceived situational demands, in terms of less 
psychological danger, in Whites. Consequently, the moral 
ideal frame will induce in Whites cardiovascular responses 
associated with greater relative challenge than the moral 
obligation frame. In addition, I expect that when redressing 
inequality is appraised as more challenging and less 
threatening, dominant group members will exhibit a goal 
attainment strategy indicative of greater eagerness. 
Assessing CV reactivity allows me to reliably examine the 
effect of morality framing unobtrusively and in real-time. 
Because the cardiovascular markers outlined above are 





determine the online process of motivation in dominant 
group members while they are considering equality in moral 
terms. More specifically, in the study that is outlined in 
Chapter 3, I examine CV reactivity and speech rates of 
Whites while they talk about ways in which they can 
contribute to attaining the moral ideal versus meeting the 




In the previous research line, I was interested in 
examining the effect of morality framing on dominant group 
members’ motivational responses when they consider 
equality in an abstract sense - i.e., giving a speech about 
equality as a moral ideal versus obligation. In the current 
research line, I examine how morality framing impacts on 
dominant group members’ motivational states when they are 
faced with equality in a concrete sense: During interaction 
with a subordinate group member. Does morality framing 
shape dominant group members’ motivational states and 
behavior during intergroup contact? How do Whites’ 
intergroup attitudes, such as their attitudes toward cultural 
diversity, relate to their CV reactivity in terms of threat and 
challenge, when they interact with Blacks? These are the 
questions I aim to answer in this third line of research. 
I am interested in studying intergroup interactions 
because, in line with intergroup contact theory (Allport, 
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1954), it has been argued that more positive intergroup 
interactions may result in prejudice reduction, thereby 
promoting social change over time. At the same time, 
research shows that intergroup contact is often anxiety-
provoking, threatening, and depleting (Mendes, Blascovich, 
Lickel, & Hunter, 2002; Trawalter, Richeson, & Shelton, 
2009). Indeed, it has been argued that compared to an 
intragroup interaction, the perceived demands of an 
intergroup interaction in terms of uncertainty, danger and/or 
required effort may be higher (Mendes et al., 2002). 
According to the biopsychosocial model (BPS model; 
Blascovich & Tomaka, 1996), such an increase in perceived 
demands may result in a “threat” response if individuals 
perceive them to outweigh their personal resources (e.g., 
knowledge and abilities). Indeed, prior research has shown 
that Whites who interacted with a Black (vs. White) 
confederate exhibited CV reactivity consistent with threat 
rather than challenge. This supports the argument that the 
perceived demands of an intergroup interaction are higher 
than those of an intragroup interaction (Mendes et al., 
2002). In the current research line, I examine if morality 
framing shapes the extent to which Whites appraise 
intergroup contact as threatening. 
Whereas prior work has examined the effect of positive 
experiences during intergroup contact on individuals’ 
attitudes toward redressing inequality (Saguy, Tausch, 





attitudes toward equality affect experiences during 
intergroup contact. I examine this by considering the 
interplay between morality framing, intergroup attitudes, and 
CV reactivity of Whites during an interaction with a Black 
confederate. Do more positive intergroup attitudes lower the 
perceived demands of intergroup contact for dominant group 
members, resulting in greater relative challenge responses 
and/or more positive nonverbal expressions? Or, 
alternatively, do more positive attitudes ‘raise the stakes’ 
during contact with subordinate group members, resulting in 
greater relative threat and more negative nonverbal 
expressions in dominant group members? In Chapter 4, I 
examine these processes in two studies containing an 
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We live in a world that is still marked by inequality 
between social groups (e.g., Whites vs. Blacks, men vs. 
women). It has been argued that an effective means for 
establishing a more equal society is by the use of affirmative 
action (i.e., policies aimed at increasing the entrance of 
disadvantaged group members in educational and/ or 
professional settings; Crosby, Iyer, & Sincharoen, 2006). 
The success of affirmative action is partly determined by the 
endorsement of such programs by currently advantaged 
groups (e.g., Whites, men). However, support for policies 
that promote equality is often the lowest among advantaged 
group members (e.g., Nieman & Dovidio, 1998). Previous 
work has aimed to increase support for affirmative action by 
focusing advantaged group members on moral wrongdoings 
committed by their group (e.g., colonialism and slavery). We 
argue that this approach may be suboptimal. The current 
research aims to demonstrate that a moral incentive 
presented in terms of ideals (a focus on approaching positive 
moral outcomes) rather than obligations (a focus on avoiding 
negative moral outcomes) stimulates more favorable 
attitudes among advantaged group members toward social 
equality issues, including affirmative action. 
 
Opposition to Social Equality and Group Position 
Displays of ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation 
are most common among members of advantaged rather 





Sidanius, Pratto, Martin, & Stallworth, 1991). Even though 
legislative changes in recent history have given rise to the 
social consensus that discrimination is morally objectionable 
(Plant & Devine, 1998), more subtle, indirect forms of 
discrimination and implicit prejudice are still widespread in 
society (Dovidio, Kawakami, & Gaertner, 2002; Pettigrew & 
Meertens, 1995; Swim, Aikin, Hall, & Hunter, 1995; Smith-
McLallen, Johnson, Dovidio, & Pearson, 2006). 
Consequently, inequality in terms of economic and political 
power, physical health outcomes and opportunities for social 
advancement persists and ascribes meaning to the distinction 
between advantaged groups (e.g., Whites, men) and 
disadvantaged groups (e.g., Blacks, women) within a given 
society (Saguy, Dovidio, & Pratto, 2008; Saguy, Tausch, 
Dovidio, & Pratto, 2009; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999).  
In addition to exhibiting more discriminative behavior 
than disadvantaged group members, members of advantaged 
groups are more likely to oppose changes in the social 
system (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Tajfel & Turner, 1979), 
and measures that promote equality (Crosby et al., 2006; 
Nieman & Dovidio, 1998) as they tend to view increases in 
equality as ingroup losses rather than societal gains (Eibach 
& Keegan, 2006; Ellemers, Scheepers, & Popa, 2010). The 
notion of a more equal society can constitute a threat to 
members of the advantaged group as they become concerned 
about the relative loss in status and unwarranted privileges 
of their group (Schmitt, Miller, Branscombe, & Brehm, 
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2008). For example, Whites' support for affirmative action 
policies is determined more by perceptions of how these 
policies affect their own group's outcomes rather than how 
they affect the outgroup's outcomes (Lowery, Unzueta, 
Knowles, & Goff, 2006). Moreover, recent findings reveal 
that even in a minimal group paradigm, high status group 
members exhibit physiological threat responses when they 
are confronted with the potential status loss of their group at 
the benefit of a lower status group (Scheepers & Ellemers, 
2005). In contexts of status instability advantaged group 
members' resistance to equality measures becomes even 
more pronounced (Morrison, Fast, & Ybarra, 2009).  
It has been proposed, and substantial social changes 
throughout history illustrate, that recognizing the existence 
and injustice of systematic intergroup inequality is a vital 
prerequisite for the effective improvement of the position 
and outcomes of disadvantaged groups (Saguy et al., 2009). 
Yet, for members of advantaged groups the recognition of 
inequality entails a confrontation with the ingroup's 
unwarranted privileges, which may lead these group 
members to downplay existing status differences (Van 
Knippenberg, 1984), justify their group privileges (Harth, 
Kessler, & Leach, 2008), or deny inequality altogether 
(Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 2002). An important question 
thus is how advantaged group members can be confronted 
with their group's unjust privileges and be motivated not to 





Social Equality as a Moral Issue 
The current research examines the impact of moral 
incentives on social equality attitudes among Whites. 
Examining advantaged group members' attitudes toward 
equality from the perspective of morality can be particularly 
fruitful because it has been argued that morality is one of the 
most important regulators of human behavior (Shavell, 
2002; Skitka, Bauman, & Sargis, 2005). Indeed, cross-
cultural research has shown that people deem moral values 
such as fairness and trustworthiness to be among the most 
important guiding principles in their lives (Schwartz, 1992). 
For example, recent findings by Ellemers, Pagliario, Barreto, 
and Leach (2008) demonstrate that a moral norm (i.e., ‘the 
right thing to do’) has greater impact than a competence 
norm (i.e., ‘the smart thing to do’) on disadvantaged group 
members' decision to work for group rather than individual 
status improvement. Also, the dilemma to work for either 
group or individual status improvement is more quickly 
resolved when people are faced with a moral (vs. 
competence) norm (Ellemers et al., 2008). In addition, how 
people evaluate groups and the degree to which they identify 
with groups has been found to be primarily based on 
perceptions of a group as moral (e.g., honest and 
trustworthy) rather than on perceptions of a group as 
competent (e.g., intelligent and skilled) or sociable (e.g., 
friendly and likeable; Leach, Ellemers, & Barreto, 2007). 
Taken together, these findings underline the importance and 
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impact of moral concerns in the interpersonal and intragroup 
domains. The current works aims to further our 
understanding of the functionality of morality as a guide to 
intergroup attitudes.  
Prior work has demonstrated that attitudes that are held 
with moral conviction compared to otherwise strong but 
nonmoral attitudes are superior in predicting interpersonal 
behavior (Skitka et al., 2005) and have unique consequences 
unaccounted for by nonmoral characteristics of attitude 
strength (Bauman & Skitka, 2009). Nevertheless, very little 
is known about the impact of morality framing on attitudes 
in general, and on intergroup attitudes in particular. Based 
on the evidence of the relationship between moral conviction 
and strong motivations and justifications for action (Skitka 
et al., 2005), we argue that framing equality in terms of 
moral values can have a large impact on advantaged group 
members' commitment to redressing inequality. Being 
mindful of the distinction in the literature between 
examinations of situations that theoretically fit definitions of 
morality and situations that subjectively hold moral 
relevance (e.g., Bauman & Skitka, 2009), it is important to 
note that the current work aims to examine the impact of 
morality framing on social equality attitudes rather than 
addressing interpersonal differences in the perceived moral 
value of equality.  
One way in which morality has previously been 





equality is by confronting members of advantaged groups 
with past injustices committed by their group. This work has 
shown that when advantaged group members are confronted 
with the illegitimate advantages their group holds over other 
groups, they can experience collective guilt, which threatens 
perceptions of their own group as moral and good 
(Branscombe, Doosje, & McGarty, 2002). For example, 
collective guilt has been shown to motivate European 
Americans to support compensatory affirmative action 
programs targeting African Americans (Swim & Miller, 
1999), and native Dutch to support financial compensation 
to a former colony (Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & 
Manstead, 1998). However, collective guilt has been 
characterized as a self-focused emotion (in contrast to other-
focused emotions like sympathy), and as such, has been 
found to only predict advantaged group members' narrow 
concern for restitution (e.g., compensatory affirmative action 
programs) but not for support for policies aimed at 
promoting social equality more broadly (Iyer, Leach, & 
Crosby, 2003). This distinction is relevant because 
restorative, symbolic action may not be sufficient to redress 
inequality (Thomas, McGarty, & Mavor, 2009).  
Because people are generally motivated to avoid 
feelings of collective guilt (Branscombe & Miron, 2004) a 
confrontation with ingroup transgressions may raise 
defensive reactions. Specifically, previous work found that 
people may distort or deny injustices committed by their 
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group (Dresler-Hawke, 2005), relegate past injustices 
committed by the ingroup to ‘ancient history’ (Peetz, Gunn, 
& Wilson, 2010), or even blame victims of disadvantage for 
their own hardship (Furnham & Gunter, 1984). In sum, 
previous work has shown that advantaged group members' 
responses to a confrontation with the ingroup's unwarranted 
privileged position can be categorized as either defensive or 
aimed at narrow restoration. Importantly, both categories of 
responses are suboptimal in creating support for broader 
social change toward equality (Iyer et al., 2003).  
We aim to expand the inquiry in moral motivation by 
examining the impact of moral incentives on advantaged 
group members' commitment to mitigate inequality. To this 
aim, we will contrast the preceding work's emphasis on the 
advantaged group's moral obligations (i.e., non-
discrimination and restoration) and potential negative 
outcomes (i.e., being prejudiced and unjust) with an 
emphasis on the advantaged group's moral ideals (i.e., equal 
treatment) and potential positive outcomes (i.e., being fair 
and just). We posit that the latter is more likely to create 
favorable attitudes among advantaged group members 
toward social equality and cultural diversity. 
 
The Persuasive Impact of Emphasizing Moral Ideals vs. 
Moral Obligations  
The central prediction of the current work is that a focus 





establishing favorable attitudes of advantaged group 
members toward social equality and cultural diversity more 
generally. We base this prediction on the consistent evidence 
for a duality in motivational orientations (i.e., approach vs. 
avoidance, inhibition vs. activation, promotion vs. 
prevention). Although different terms are used, the literature 
distinguishes between avoiding negative outcomes, punitive 
end-states and meeting obligations on the one hand, vs. 
approaching positive outcomes, reward end-states and 
pursuing ideals on the other (e.g., behavioral inhibition 
system [BIS] vs. behavioral activation system [BAS], Carver 
& Scheier, 1998; prevention focus vs. promotion focus, 
Higgins, 1997).  
Most recently, this distinction in self-regulation has 
been extended to moral regulation (Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh, 
& Baldacci, 2008; Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh, & Hepp, 2009). 
Namely, evidence of distinct motivational underpinnings in 
the moral domain has given rise to the distinction between 
two different forms of morality. On the one hand there is 
prescriptive morality, associated with concerns pertaining to 
what one should do. On the other hand there is proscriptive 
morality, associated with concerns in terms of what one 
should not do. Similar to the duality outlined in the self-
regulation literature, proscriptive morality is avoidance-
based and sensitive to negative outcomes, and prescriptive 
morality is approach-based and sensitive to positive 
outcomes (Janoff-Bulman et al., 2009). Especially relevant 
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to the current research is the finding that individual 
differences in moral motives that are approach-based are 
positively related with positive attitudes toward equality-
based social issues (Janoff-Bulman et al., 2008). The current 
research aims to take this previous work an important step 
further by examining whether experimentally induced 
conceptions of morality in terms of ideals vs. obligations 
subsequently predict Whites' attitudes towards inequality 
and their support for measures that aim to redress such 
inequality (i.e., affirmative action). 
Based on the research outlined above, we hypothesize 
that when advantaged group members are confronted with 
the implications of inequality framed in terms of moral 
ideals this will induce activation action tendencies (‘which 
moral things to do’), whereas a focus on moral obligations 
will lead to inhibition action tendencies (‘which immoral 
things not to do’). Furthermore, we argue that the activation 
of action tendencies among advantaged group members is 
more advantageous than the inhibition of action tendencies 
in terms of promoting social equality. Although the 
inhibition of negative behavior (i.e., discrimination) is 
undoubtedly important in facilitating the societal 
advancement of ethnic minorities, attempts to inhibit such 
behavior may also cause ethnic majorities to avoid ethnic 
minorities and culturally diverse contexts altogether (Avery, 
Richeson, Hebl, & Ambady, 2009). For example, recent 





the risk of being perceived as biased they tend to opt out of 
cross-race decisions, even when this is materially costly. 
This inhibition tendency has been termed racial paralysis 
(Norton, Mason, Vandello, Biga, & Dyer, 2010). Indeed, 
previous work has demonstrated that in a situation where 
people can choose between a conservative option (status 
quo) and a new course of action (change), they are more 
likely to choose the latter when the focus lies on attaining 
ideals and approaching positive outcomes (Liberman, Idson, 
Camacho, & Higgins, 1999). In contrast, a fixation on the 
prevention of negative outcomes has been linked to 
resistance to change and political conservatism, both of 
which are negatively related to support for affirmative action 
(Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003). Thus, a focus 
on moral ideals is expected to elicit activation tendencies 
rather than inhibition tendencies, and we argue that the 
former is most beneficial in promoting support among 
advantaged group members for social change toward 
equality.  
The current work builds on previous findings by 
framing inequality in terms of the moral implications for the 
advantaged ingroup. Previous work on inequality framing 
has demonstrated that advantaged group members' 
perceptions of ingroup outcomes determine their attitudes 
toward affirmative action (Lowery et al., 2006). Yet, 
advantaged group members tend to regard inequality strictly 
as an outgroup disadvantage to avoid the psychological costs 
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associated with acknowledging ingroup advantage (Lowery 
& Wout, 2010). The latter can be seen as problematic as it 
exempts advantaged group members from the ‘moral 
demands associated with the knowledge that inequality 
benefits their group’ which, as we aim to demonstrate, are 
potentially influential in promoting advantaged group 
members' commitment to redress inequality (Lowery & 
Wout, 2010, p. 964). The current work builds on these 
findings by examining the effects of focusing Whites on the 
potential benefits of providing moral accomplishment (i.e., 
attaining moral ideals), vs. the potential cost of moral failure 
(i.e., not meeting moral obligations) for the ingroup. We 
predict that the former will lead to activation and broader 
support for social equality among advantaged group 
members as a means to boost, rather than redeem, the 
perception of the ingroup as fair and just. 
 
Overview of the Studies 
In order to test the differential impact of focusing on 
moral ideals vs. moral obligations, we will consider Whites' 
action tendencies and their attitudes toward social equality 
issues in three different studies. Study 2.1 tested whether a 
focus on moral ideals leads to activation action tendencies 
(i.e., what to do to promote equality) and a focus on moral 
obligations leads to inhibition action tendencies (i.e., what 
not to do to prevent inequality). In Study 2.2, we examined 





affirmative action among Whites compared to a focus on 
moral obligations. In Study 2.3.1, we examined the effects 
the moral ideals/obligations distinction on attitudes toward 
cultural diversity and equality in a field-experiment among 
White employees. This study also tested the hypothesis that 
a focus on moral obligations is more threatening to 
advantaged group members' social identity than a focus on 
moral ideals. Finally, in parallel to Study 2.3.1, the 
ideals/obligations distinction was applied to a relevant, but 
nonmoral domain (i.e., competence) in Study 2.3.2, to 




















Study 2.1 examined whether external framing of social 
equality in terms of moral ideals vs. moral obligations would 
lead to differences in activation vs. inhibition action 
tendencies of native Dutch. To this aim, participants were 
asked to indicate ways in which they could personally 
contribute to attaining the ideal (vs. meet the obligation) of 
tolerance and equality. Participants' answers were then 
coded for action tendencies in terms of constituting do's 




Participants. Forty-five native Dutch (male) students 
(Mage = 19.93, SD = 1.39) were randomly assigned to either 
the moral ideals or moral obligations condition. 
 
Procedure. After reading and signing the consent form, 
participants were seated in closed-off cubicles behind a 
computer where they were presented with a (bogus) 
newspaper article about a recent study done by the Central 
Bureau of Statistics (CBS). This was intended to emphasize 
the disparities between native Dutch and nonnative Dutch in 
the workforce. The article cited fictitious findings which 
showed that native Dutch with a Master's degree were 
systematically paid more and promoted more often in their 
jobs than nonnative Dutch with the same educational 





majority and minority employees were said to increase over 
time, and a graph illustrated the disparities in incomes over a 
10-year period. The article continued with a comment on 
these findings by a senior CBS researcher. A picture 
depicting a middle-aged, White male along with a traditional 
Dutch name was added to convey that he was native Dutch. 
The researcher explained how, as part of the study, hundreds 
of interviews were taken with native Dutch employees about 
the cultural diversity within their own organizations. In both 
conditions the disparities between nonnative and native 
Dutch employees were explicitly labeled as unfair. 
 
Manipulation of moral ideals vs. obligations.  
To manipulate a focus on either moral ideals or moral 
obligations, the senior researcher cited in the article 
elaborated on the key findings of the interviews and the 
moral implications of cultural diversity in terms of either 
ideals or obligations. In the moral ideals condition, the text 
mentioned ideals in terms of fairness and equal treatment of 
people with different ethnic backgrounds that might be 
attained in a culturally diverse environment. In the moral 
obligations condition, the text mentioned obligations in 
terms of fairness and preventing unequal treatment of people 
with a different ethnic background that may be met in a 
culturally diverse environment. Subsequently, participants 
were asked to imagine the future scenario of working in a 
culturally diverse organization themselves. In both 
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conditions participants were asked to describe how their 
behavior and decisions could lead to more equality and 
tolerance in a culturally diverse organization. In the moral 
ideals conditions participants were asked to describe how 
they could contribute to attaining the ideal of tolerance and 
equality. Participants in the moral obligations condition were 
asked to describe how they could contribute to meeting the 
obligation of tolerance and equality (for details see 
Appendix A). All of the participants indicated that they had 
believed that the CBS study was authentic. Participants were 
then debriefed and rewarded for their participation. 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
Content analyses.  To examine whether a focus on 
moral ideals vs. moral obligations induced different action 
tendencies, participants' responses to the open-ended 
question were scored by two independent coders who were 
blind to condition. Responses were coded in terms of do's 
and don'ts. Specifically, these categories distinguished 
between reported behaviors aimed at approaching equality 
and fair treatment of nonnative Dutch (do's) and behaviors 
aimed at avoiding inequality and unfair treatment of 
nonnative Dutch (don'ts). An example of a response 
indicating do's is the following: “I would talk to nonnative 
Dutch colleagues, to get to know them, understand them and 
their background, and become better able to respect certain 





following: “Make sure that you don't form groups […] When 
you're going to do something with people from work, make 
sure that nonnative Dutch don't feel left out […] And as a 
boss, I would not favor anyone in terms of promotion”. All 
responses were coded as either containing or not containing 
action tendencies in line with do's and don'ts, creating two 
independent dichotomous variables. In addition, the 
frequency of reported do's and don'ts were counted to 
examine whether it was indeed the quality of participants' 
motivation, rather than the quantity of examples generated 
that was influenced by condition (Deci & Ryan, 2000; 
Vansteenkiste, Sierens, Soenens, Luyckx, & Lens, 2009). 
The inter-coder reliabilities for both do's and don'ts were 
high (do's: Kappa = .84, p < .001; don'ts: Kappa = .77, p < 
.001), and differences in scores were subsequently discussed 
and resolved by the coders. 
 
Do's and don'ts. We expected condition to affect the 
quality of participants' motivation (i.e., avoidance vs. 
approach) rather than the quantity of their motivation (i.e., 
the number of do's and don'ts). As anticipated, there was no 
effect of condition on the number of do's or don'ts (both Fs < 
1) participants reported. This indicates that participants in 
both conditions were equally able to come up with concrete 
suggestions. In contrast, and as predicted, we found 
significant differences in the quality of participants' reported 
motivational strategies. In the moral ideals condition, 86% 
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of the participants reported do's (action tendencies aimed at 
promoting fair and equal treatment of nonnative Dutch), 
compared to 57% of the participants in the moral obligations 
condition, χ2 (1, 45) = 4.87, p = .03. In contrast, 61% of the 
participants in the moral obligations condition reported 
don'ts (action tendencies aimed at preventing discrimination 
and unfair treatment of nonnative Dutch), compared to 23% 
of participants in the moral ideals condition, χ2 (1, 45) = 
6.71, p = .01.  
From a regulatory focus perspective (Higgins, 1997), 
these findings demonstrate the distinction between moral 
ideals and obligations in terms of eagerness and vigilance 
concerns, respectively. As hypothesized, the results show 
that when equality is framed in terms of moral ideals (vs. 
moral obligations) participants were more inclined to report 
courses of action which promote equal treatment of 
nonnative Dutch, and were less inclined to report inhibition 
aimed at preventing discrimination. Thus, Study 2.1 
demonstrated that framing equality in terms of moral ideals 
vs. obligations substantially influences the quality of 












Study 2.1 confirmed the hypothesis that while a focus 
on moral obligations induces avoidance motivation, a focus 
on moral ideals induces approach motivation. In Study 2.2, 
we examined the impact of these two foci on Whites' support 
for affirmative action. As control variables, belief in present 
discrimination (Swim & Miller, 1999) and overall mood 
(e.g., ‘sad’, ‘happy’ [reverse coded]) were assessed. An 
alternative explanation for differences between conditions in 
support for affirmative action might be that focusing 
advantaged group members on moral obligations and 
potential negative outcomes might negatively affect their 
mood. Consequently, support for affirmative action may be 
lower than in the moral ideals condition—where a negative 
mood is less likely to arise. Belief in present discrimination 
was assessed to exclude the possibility that framing equality 
in terms of moral ideals (vs. obligations) and positive 
outcomes (vs. negative outcomes) undermines advantaged 
group members' perception of discrimination as a stringent 
societal problem, which would in turn affect levels of 




Participants. Forty-four (33 females) native Dutch 
students with an average age of 20.45 years (SD = 3.20), 
were randomly assigned to the moral ideals or moral 
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obligations condition. Participants were rewarded with 
course credits or money. 
 
Procedure. Participants followed the same procedure 
as in Study 2.1, but after reading the (bogus) CBS article 
participants were now asked which moral ideals (vs. 
obligations) related to equality and tolerance they could 
think of, and how they could optimize their efforts to meet 
those ideals vs. prevent not meeting those obligations (for 
details see Appendix B). To ensure that participants had an 
idea of what affirmative action entails, they were presented 
with a (bogus) example of selection practices in a two-year 
management traineeship at a well-known multinational 
organization prior to filling out the support for affirmative 
action scale. Participants read that due to the current gap 
between native Dutch and nonnative Dutch employees this 
traineeship was exclusively available for highly qualified 
nonnative Dutch college graduates. This way, we primed 
participants across conditions with a similar understanding 
of affirmative action (i.e., that it is a policy designed and 
implemented to promote the entrance of highly qualified 
disadvantaged group members and that in some cases it 
might entail excluding advantaged group members), thus 
minimizing effects of interpersonal differences in people's 
understanding of affirmative action policies (e.g., Unzueta, 





The following dependent variables were measured 
(using a 7-point Likert-type scale): support for affirmative 
action (3 items; “Affirmative action gives an opportunity to 
qualified nonnative Dutch which they might not have 
otherwise”, “Affirmative action ensures that organizations 
and institutions remain competitive in a culturally diverse 
society”, and “I think affirmative action is necessary to 
decrease the differences between nonnative and native 
Dutch”, Cronbach's α = .49), belief in present discrimination 
was measured with 5 items all beginning with the stem 
“How often do you think nonnative Dutch experience 
discrimination…” followed by “… by Native Dutch 
colleagues?”, “… by native Dutch supervisors and 
teachers?”, “… during their education?”, “… in the 
workforce?”, and “… in the form of racist slurs?”, 
Cronbach's α = .74; Swim & Miller, 1999).  
Finally, participants' negative mood (4 items) was 
measured by asking participants to indicate the extent to 
which the information provided made them feel sad, happy 
(reverse coded), discouraged, and insecure (Cronbach's α = 
.76). After completing the questionnaire participants were 
probed for suspicion, debriefed and remunerated. All of the 
participants indicated that they had believed that the CBS 
study and the affirmative action example were authentic. It 
was explained to participants that although disparities 
between native and nonnative Dutch exist, the data presented 
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in the CBS article, as well as the example of affirmative 
action they were presented with, were fictitious. 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
Support for affirmative action. As predicted, there 
was a significant effect of condition on support for 
affirmative action, F(1, 42) = 9.02, p = .004, ηp2 = .18. 
Participants in the moral ideals condition were more 
supportive of affirmative action (M = 5.48, SD = 0.79) than 
participants in the moral obligations condition (M = 4.76, SD 
= 0.82). 
 
Control variables. As anticipated, we found no 
significant differences between conditions on negative 
mood, F(1, 42) = 1.48, ns and belief in present 
discrimination, F(1, 42) < 1. These null effects disconfirm 
alternative explanations that levels in negative mood or 
belief in present discrimination accounts for the effect of 
moral frame on support for affirmative action. 
Taken together, results of Study 2.2 suggest that when 
the aim is to create support for affirmative action, it is more 
effective to do so by presenting equality in terms of the 
advantaged group's moral ideals rather than its moral 
obligations. Also, these results suggest that in doing so, 
advantaged group members' belief in present discrimination 
and their mood are unaffected. To examine whether 





diversity attitudes more generally, Study 2.3.1 examined the 
effect of condition on attitudes toward cultural diversity and 
equality in a different context and among a different 
population of participants. This allowed us to examine the 
robustness of these findings with slightly different 
manipulations and measures. Specifically, we excluded the 
mention of affirmative action, and its possible exclusionary 
consequences of affirmative action. This way, we were able 
to examine whether or not the observed effects of Study 2.2 
were due to mention of such exclusionary consequences or, 
in fact, due to our manipulation. 
Finally, although the first two studies revealed the 
beneficial effects of moral ideals compared to moral 
obligations, it remains unclear whether the focus on morality 
is a key part of this effect, or whether this results from 
targeting ideals vs. obligations more generally. Study 2.3.2 
was added to examine this possibility. This study was 
identical to Study 2.3.1, but contained two control conditions 
in which the ideals/obligations distinction referred to a 
relevant, but nonmoral domain (i.e., taking into account 
cultural diversity at work as an ideal vs. obligation in the 









Results of Study 2.1 and 2.2 demonstrate that a focus 
on moral ideals (vs. obligations) leads to more approach and 
less avoidance action tendencies and more support for 
affirmative action among native Dutch. Study 2.3.1 was 
done to further examine the attitudinal consequences of the 
two morality frames and the underlying process. Namely, 
beyond support for affirmative action we wanted to examine 
whether focusing on moral ideals (vs. obligations) increases 
the extent to which Whites actually give priority to fair and 
equal treatment of non-Whites over, for example, their own 
professional advancement or the organization's financial 
outcomes. Furthermore, to provide additional insight in the 
process by which the moral ideals/obligations distinction 
impacts Whites' attitudes toward equality, we examined two 
potential mediators: 1) positive attitudes toward cultural 
diversity, and 2) social identity threat. 
Prioritization of equality over professional or financial 
gain could be caused by a more positive attitude toward 
cultural diversity. It seems plausible that the moral 
ideals/obligations distinction influences the extent to which 
advantaged group members perceive cultural diversity as 
something positive. Regulatory focus theory (Higgins, 1997) 
posits that a focus on ideals (promotion focus) is linked to 
concerns about positive outcomes, whereas a focus on 
obligations (prevention focus) is linked with concerns about 





the moral ideals conditions will be more likely than those in 
the obligations condition to view a culturally diverse 
environment as an opportunity to achieve positive outcomes, 
and consequently report more positive attitudes. In turn, the 
extent to which people hold positive attitudes toward 
cultural diversity might predict the extent to which they 
prioritize equality. To examine this hypothesis, we assessed 
positive attitudes toward cultural diversity and tested 
whether this mediates the proposed effect of condition on 
prioritization of equality. 
Alternatively, previous work has demonstrated that 
advantaged group members may experience collective guilt 
(a threat to their social identity) when confronted with group 
based disparities (Branscombe et al., 2002; Doosje et al., 
1998). We hypothesize that when such disparities are 
presented in terms of yet to be attained moral ideals (vs. 
unmet moral obligations) of the ingroup, advantaged group 
members will experience less threat to their social identity. 
Therefore, we measured social identity threat to examine 
whether emphasizing moral ideals indeed lowers levels of 
social identity threat. In addition, we explored whether the 
effect of moral focus (ideals vs. obligations) on prioritization 
of equality is mediated by social identity threat. In light of 
previous work linking social identity threat to psychological 
withdrawal strategies such as disengagement (Walton & 
Cohen, 2007) and disidentification (Derks, Van Laar, & 
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Ellemers, 2006), it is possible that social identity threat is 
related to a decreased prioritization of equality. 
Finally, we included an additional measure to rule out 
an alternative explanation of our findings in terms of 
regulatory fit (Higgins, 2000). That is, one may argue that 
there is greater regulatory fit between the moral ideals 
condition and the types of measures we used to assess our 
main outcome variable than between moral obligations and 
these measures (i.e., affirmative action). Indeed, the value 
from fit model (Higgins, 2000) posits that people experience 
regulatory fit when the strategic manner of their goal pursuit 
suits their regulatory orientation (i.e., prevention vs. 
promotion). In the current context, it might be the case that 
people report more favorable attitudes toward measures that 
aim to promote diversity and equality, because, and unlike 
the participants in the moral obligations condition, they 
experience fit between those measures and the promotion 
orientation of the moral ideals condition. Therefore, the 
current study also included items to assess participants' 
support for retributive action against discrimination (i.e., a 
measure aimed exclusively at preventing negative 
outcomes). This will allow us to test whether a regulatory 
fit—which would predict more support for retributive action 
in the moral obligations (vs. ideals) condition can account 
for our data. 
To test these hypotheses, and to move beyond student 





an online questionnaire among a heterogeneous group of 
native Dutch employees from various organizations. Based 
on the findings of Studies 2.1 and 2.2, the manipulation of 
Study 2.3.1 induced participants to think about how to 
approach the ideal of tolerance toward nonnative Dutch 
colleagues vs. how to avoid not meeting the obligation of 
tolerance toward nonnative Dutch colleagues. By asking 
participants to imagine their own organization implementing 
diversity promoting policies, we aimed to enhance the 
accessibility of real-life consequences and implications of 




Participants. As part of their Bachelor thesis, 
undergraduate students from Leiden University recruited 
relatives, friends and acquaintances to participate in this 
online experiment. E-mail addresses were collected of 76 
people who agreed to take part in the study. Participants 
were randomly assigned to either the moral ideals or moral 
obligations condition. After assessing participants' ethnicity, 
nine participants were excluded from analyses because they 
indicated that their (or one of their) parents were born 
outside the Netherlands, and/or self-identified with an ethnic 
group other than native Dutch. This resulted in a sample of 
67 native Dutch employees (35 men) from different 
organizations. Ages ranged from 21 to 62 years (Mage = 
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41.24, SD = 11.92), and political party preferences varied 
across the political spectrum. Job levels varied from entry 
level to managerial level. As an incentive for participation, 
two 50 Euro gift coupons were awarded through a lottery. 
 
Procedure. Digital invitations were sent to participants 
with a link to the online study. Participants read that the 
current study focused on cultural diversity within Dutch 
organizations and were instructed to imagine that the 
management of their organization decided to increase the 
cultural diversity in their organization. Participants read that 
previous research indicated that changes in the cultural 
diversity of their organization would have certain 
implications for native Dutch employees. In the moral ideals 
condition, participants read that: “Native Dutch employees 
who make use of the opportunities to learn about the 
backgrounds of their nonnative Dutch colleagues indicated 
that this really helped them to meet their ideals concerning 
fairness and equal opportunities”. In the moral obligations 
condition participants read that: “Native Dutch employees 
who prevent discrimination by learning about the 
backgrounds of their nonnative Dutch colleagues indicated 
that this really helped them to meet their obligations 
concerning fairness and equal opportunities.” 
Subsequently, participants were asked to think of ways in 





(vs. avoid failing to meet the moral obligation) of equal 
treatment and tolerance of nonnative Dutch employees.  
Finally, the following dependent variables were 
measured (all of which were scored on 7-point scales): 
Positive attitudes toward cultural diversity (3 items; 
“Cultural diversity is an asset to my organization”, “Cultural 
diversity in my organization is unnecessary” [reverse 
coded], and “I resist cultural diversity”[reverse coded], 
Cronbach's α = .68); prioritization of equality (3 items; “I 
would treat nonnative Dutch colleagues fairly even if it 
means that I personally have to take a step back”, ” I think 
it's more important that my organization treats nonnative 
Dutch employees fairly and justly than that it performs well 
financially”, and “I would treat nonnative Dutch colleagues 
unfairly if it would benefit my advancement” [reverse 
coded], Cronbach's α = .61); social identity threat (assessed 
with two negative items from the private collective self-
esteem scale of Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992; see also Derks, 
Van Laar, & Ellemers, 2009, r = .42, p < .001; “I do not find 
that native Dutch are worthwhile” and “I regret that I am a 
member of the group of native Dutch”; support for 
retributive action (4 items taken from Pagano and Huo 
(2007) were adapted to fit the current context, “The Dutch 
government should do everything to ensure that native 
Dutch do not discriminate”, “Native Dutch who discriminate 
should be prosecuted at any cost”, “It is important to develop 
and uphold effective punishment methods for native Dutch 
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who discriminate”, and “Native Dutch who discriminate 
should be punished for it”; Cronbach's α = .91). Finally, we 
used the same control variables as those in Study 2.2: 
negative mood (Cronbach's α = .73) and belief in present 




Positive attitudes towards cultural diversity. There 
was a significant effect of condition on positive attitudes 
toward cultural diversity, F(1, 65) = 5.10, p = .03, ηp2 = .07. 
As predicted, it was found that participants in the moral 
ideals condition reported more positive attitudes towards 
cultural diversity than participants in the moral obligations 
condition (see Table 2.1). 
 
Prioritization of equality. There was a significant 
effect of condition on prioritization of equality, F(1, 65) = 
5.43, p =.04, ηp2 = .06. As predicted, participants in the 
moral ideals condition prioritized equality more than 
participants in the moral obligations condition (see Table 
2.1). 
 
Social identity threat. Results revealed a significant 
effect of condition on social identity threat (after assigning 
the maximum value within the normal distribution to two 
outliers), F(1, 65) = 3.98, p = .05, ηp2 = .06. As predicted, it 





condition reported higher levels of social identity threat than 
participants in the moral ideals condition (see Table 2.1). 
This finding confirms our hypothesis that framing social 
equality in terms of moral ideals (vs. obligations) is less 
threatening to the collective self-esteem of individuals 
belonging to advantaged groups. 
 
Support for retributive action. As anticipated, there 
was no effect of condition on support for retributive action, 
F(1, 65) = 1.18, ns, thus disconfirming the regulatory fit 
prediction that a focus on moral obligations would increase 
support for prevention focused retributive actions (see Table 
2.1). Further evidence against a regulatory fit explanation is 
that support for retributive action was significantly and 
positively correlated with prioritization of equality (see 
Table 2.2). 
 
Table 2.1. Means and (standard deviations) of the outcome 
variables in Study 2.3.1. 
 Moral 
 ideals  
Moral 
obligations 
Positive attitudes toward cultural 
diversity* 
5.57  (0.85) 4.99  (1.20) 
Prioritization of equality* 5.35  (1.16) 4.78 ( 1.10) 
Social identity threat* 1.82  (0.88) 2.26  (0.95) 
Support for retributive action 4.73  (1.50) 4.35  (1.44) 




Control variables. Similar to Study 2.2, there were no 
significant differences between the moral ideals and moral 
obligations conditions in participants' negative mood or their 
belief in present discrimination (both Fs < 1), ruling out 
mood effects and differential beliefs in discrimination as 
alternative explanations for our findings. 
 
Table 2.2. Pearson correlations between the outcome variables 
Study 2.3.1. 
 1 2 3 4 
1. Positive attitudes toward           
    cultural diversity 
-   .33* - .03  .27** 
2. Prioritization of equality - .02     .45* 
3. Social identity threat  -     .05 
4. Support for retributive action          - 
Note: * p <.05, two-tailed. ** p < .01, two-tailed. 
 
Mediation analyses. To determine whether differences 
in positive attitudes toward cultural diversity and social 
identity threat accounted for the effect of condition on 
prioritization of equality, we conducted mediation analyses. 
Bootstrapping analyses were conducted using methods 
described by Preacher and Hayes (2008) for estimating 
direct and indirect effects with multiple mediators. 
Prioritization of equality was entered as the dependent 
variable, condition as predictor, and social identity threat 
and positive attitudes toward cultural diversity were entered 





Preacher and Hayes for bootstrap analyses with multiple 
proposed mediators). Results revealed that the total effect of 
condition on prioritization of equality became nonsignificant 
when the mediators were included in the model. The specific 
indirect effects of the two proposed mediators showed that 
positive attitudes toward cultural diversity (point estimate of 
−.1736 and 95% BCa CI [Bias Corrected and Accelerated 
Confidence Intervals] of −.4932, −.0072), but not social 
identity threat (point estimate of .0390 and 95% BCa CI of 
−.0576, .2412) significantly added to the overall model. 
Thus, it was found that positive attitudes toward cultural 
diversity fully mediated the link between condition and 
prioritization of equality, whereas social identity threat did  

























   





































































































Taken together, results of Study 2.3.1 demonstrate that 
a focus on moral ideals (vs. obligations) leads advantaged 
group members to evaluate cultural diversity more favorably 
and to consequently prioritize the fair and equal treatment of 
disadvantaged group members over personal and financial 
gain to a greater extent. At the same time, it was found that 
advantaged group members reported less threat to their 
social identity when social equality was presented in terms 
of moral ideals compared to obligations. Although social 
identity threat was not related to attitudes toward cultural 
diversity nor prioritization of equality here (see Table 2.2), 
this finding suggests that a focus on moral ideals is an 
effective way to confront advantaged group members with 
group-based disparities without the epiphenomenon of 
eliciting a threat to their social identity, which might lead to 
defensive reactions. 
Furthermore, the finding that participants in the moral 
obligations condition were not more supportive of retributive 
action against discrimination compared to those in the moral 
ideals condition disconfirms a regulatory fit account of the 
observed effects. Additional evidence disconfirming a 
regulatory fit account is the observation that support for 
retributive action was positively correlated with positive 
attitudes toward cultural diversity and prioritization of 
equality, both of which were higher in the moral ideals 
condition. Finally, null effects on negative mood and belief 





explanation that these factors accounted for the effect of 





























Taken together, the consistent findings of the three 
studies reported above corroborate our central notion that 
Whites' support for social change toward equality is 
promoted by emphasizing moral ideals rather than moral 
obligations. We propose that it is the emphasis on ideals and 
positive outcomes (vs. obligations and negative outcomes) 
combined with the specific importance of morality at the 
group level (Leach et al., 2007) that accounts for the 
observed effects. To provide evidence for the argument that 
morality plays a key role in the processes outlined above and 
that the observed effects are not simply due to positive vs. 
negative framing per se—Study 2.3.2 was conducted. Based 
on previous work's emphasis on competence as the basis of 
positive evaluations at the group level (Ellemers, 1993), we 
chose to use competence as a valuable but nonmoral 
dimension to which we could apply the ideals/ obligations 
distinction. Study 2.3.2 thus examined the effect of 
competence ideals vs. competence obligations in relation to 
increasing cultural diversity on the same outcome measures 




Participants. Participants were recruited and rewarded 
in the same way as Study 2.3.1. We ensured that no 
participants from Study 2.3.1 participated in Study 2.3.2. 





organizations were randomly assigned to either the 
competence ideals or competence obligations conditions in 
this online field-experiment. Ages ranged from 21 to 63 
years (Mage = 38.77, SD = 12.03). Similar to Study 2.3.1, 
participants' political party preferences varied across the 
entire political spectrum from left to right and job levels 
varied from entry level to management. 
 
Procedure.  Participants followed the same procedure 
as in Study 2.3.1. However, in the current study the CBS 
article and manipulations differed in that the ideals/ 
obligations distinction was made in terms of competence 
(i.e., career success and competencies) appeals rather than 
moral ones. In the competence ideals (vs. obligations) 
condition, participants read that: “Native Dutch employees 
who make use of the opportunities to learn about the 
backgrounds of their nonnative Dutch colleagues indicated 
that this really helped them to achieve their ideals (vs. meet 
their obligations) concerning work related competencies and 
career success”. Subsequently, participants were induced to 
think of ways in which they could aim to further develop 
(vs. meet the required) competencies needed in a culturally 
diverse work environment. 
Finally, measurements of the same dependent variables 
as in Study 2.3.1 followed, namely positive attitudes toward 
cultural diversity (Cronbach's α = .65); prioritization of 
equality (Cronbach's α = .66); social identity threat (r = .56, 
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p < .001); support for retributive action (Cronbach's α = .86) 
and the control variables: Negative mood (Cronbach's α = 





Positive attitudes towards cultural diversity. As 
predicted, there was no effect of condition on positive 
attitudes toward cultural diversity, F(1, 60) < 1. 
 
Prioritization of equality. As predicted, there was no 
significant effect of condition on prioritization of equality, 
F(1, 60) = 1.88, ns. 
 
Social identity threat. As predicted, there was no 
effect of condition on social identity threat, F(1, 60) < 1. 
 
Support for retributive action. As predicted, there 
was no effect of condition on support for punitive action, 
F(1, 60) < 1. 
 
Control variables. Condition had no effect on 
participants' mood, F(1, 60) < 1, nor on their belief in 
present discrimination, F(1, 60) = 1.96, ns.  
 
Study 2.3.2 was conducted to examine whether morality 





were the case that Whites become more favorable toward 
social change by focusing them on ideals rather than 
obligations regardless of the domain to which this 
distinction is applied, we would expect the results of Study 
2.3.2 to be identical to those of Study 2.3.1. In parallel to the 
procedure of Study 2.3.1, the current study made the same 
distinction between ideals and obligations in terms of the 
implications of increasing cultural diversity at work. 
However, in Study 2.3.2 the distinction was applied to work-
related competencies, thus taking morality out of the 
equation. Results of Study 2.3.2 showed that, unlike the 
moral ideals/obligations manipulation used in Study 2.3.1, 
there was no significant effect of competence ideals vs. 
obligations on positive attitudes toward cultural diversity, 
prioritization of equality, or social identity threat.  
 
General Discussion 
By demonstrating that the challenge of a positive moral 
outcome (i.e., attaining moral ideals) rather than the threat of 
a negative moral outcome (i.e., failing to meet moral 
obligations) promotes Whites' commitment to redress 
inequality, the current work shows further implications of a 
dual moral motivation system (Janoff-Bulman et al., 2008, 
Janoff-Bulman et al., 2009) and constitutes the first step 
toward understanding the impact of morality framing on 
intergroup attitudes. Study 2.1 demonstrates that presenting 
the moral implications of inequality in terms of moral ideals 
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leads to activation-based tendencies, whereas a focus on 
moral obligations leads to inhibition-based tendencies. Study 
2.2 and Study 2.3.1 demonstrate the beneficial consequences 
of a focus on moral ideals compared to obligations on 
Whites' commitment to redress inequality, in terms of 
affirmative action support and the willingness to prioritize 
equality over personal and/ or financial gain. The null effects 
found in Study 2.3.2 support our central argument that the 
observed effects are specific to morality. 
Furthermore, Study 2.3.1 demonstrates that when 
advantaged group members are induced to think of cultural 
diversity in terms of moral ideals rather than obligations, 
they become more positive about cultural diversity, which 
consequently increases their motivation to prioritize equality 
and fair treatment of disadvantaged group members. This 
finding underlines our argument that in terms of creating 
support for equality, it is more effective to focus advantaged 
group members on approaching positive moral outcomes 
than on avoiding negative moral outcomes. Finally, the null 
effects on general mood (i.e., Study 2.2 and 2.3.1) as well as 
on support for retributive action (Study 2.3.1) allow us to 
exclude affective and regulatory fit accounts of the processes 
outlined above.  
Finally, the results of Study 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 corroborate 
our central argument that it is the focus on moral ideals—
and not on ideals per se — that promotes Whites' 





with previous work which has demonstrated that people care 
most about being moral (Schwartz, 1992), about having a 
moral ingroup (Leach et al., 2007), and about conforming to 
moral norms (Ellemers et al., 2008). We argue that 
presenting equality in terms of moral ideals may promote 
Whites' willingness to promote and value equality and 
cultural diversity in a way that is unparalleled by ideals-
based frames applied to nonmoral domains, such as 
competence. 
 
Implications for Intergroup Research 
The results of the studies reported here have a number 
of potentially interesting implications for theories of 
intergroup processes. Previous work has demonstrated that 
Whites are generally motivated to perceive inequality strictly 
in terms of outgroup disadvantage, as this exempts them 
from the psychological costs of facing their group's 
privileged position (e.g., Lowery, Knowles, & Unzueta, 
2007). The current findings suggest an alternative way for 
these group members to be confronted with the ingroup 
implications of inequality, without the cost of a lowered 
collective esteem. In this respect, framing the moral 
implications of inequality in terms of yet-to-be-attained 
ideals appears to be an effective way to confront Whites 
with their group's advantaged position without raising social 




It is important to note that we obtained this evidence 
also in the face of potential exclusion of Whites, as a result 
of affirmative action (Study 2.2). Even in this situation, 
Whites were still more supportive of affirmative action after 
being focused on moral ideals vs. obligations. Prior evidence 
has shown that Whites' support of affirmative action depends 
on the extent to which the policy is perceived as not harming 
the ingroup's outcomes (Lowery et al., 2007). This illustrates 
that a concern with the ingroup's material outcomes may 
lead to opposition towards equality. The current data extend 
these prior findings by demonstrating how an interest in the 
ingroup's moral outcomes can promote support for social 
change toward equality even in the face of material cost for 
the ingroup. Thus, in addition to making the distinction 
between ingroup vs. outgroup outcomes, the present data 
suggest that it is important to distinguish between different 
types of concerns about ingroup outcomes, namely in terms 
of their moral vs. nonmoral (e.g., material) implications. 
 
Implications for Morality Research 
The current findings also contribute to the 
understanding of moral motivation more broadly. There is a 
growing body of research providing evidence for the claim 
that moral motivation is distinct from nonmoral motivation 
in properties, intensity and predictive value (Bauman & 
Skitka, 2009; Ellemers et al., 2008; Leach et al., 2007; 





to examine how morality can be applied to alter attitudes or 
influence individuals' behavior. The current research 
expands the morality literature by examining the persuasive 
power of two distinct morality frames (i.e., ideals vs. 
obligations). Based on the observed effects, it can be argued 
that because of morality's importance to individuals, the 
distinction between a positive (i.e., ideals) and a negative 
(i.e., obligations) frame is of particular relevance. 
Furthermore, whereas the work of Janoff-Bulman et al. 
(2008) centers on delineating the differences between two 
types of morality (i.e., prescriptive vs. proscriptive) and 
examining correlations between individual differences in 
these motivations and attitudes toward social issues, such as 
affirmative action, our research builds on this prior work by 
showing the experimental effects of manipulating two 
different types of moral foci on attitudes toward social 
equality. This is a theoretically important addition, as it 
demonstrates that specific moral contexts and/or goals are 
not inherently proscriptive or prescriptive, but that the same 
moral goal can be framed both ways. In sum, the findings of 
the four studies outlined here demonstrate the impact of 
distinguishing between ideals vs. obligations framing of 
messages that appeal to moral (vs. nonmoral) values, and 







Although our current findings consistently demonstrate 
that a focus on moral ideals is more beneficial than a focus 
on moral obligations in promoting support for redressing 
inequality among Whites, we do not expect this process to 
be exempt from moderating factors. In particular, we expect 
that interpersonal differences in group dominance motives 
(Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) attitudes rooted in racism (Henry 
& Sears, 2002; Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995), or even moral 
convictions opposing social equality (Skitka et al., 2005), 
will reduce the persuasive impact of moral appeals for 
support for social equality. Nevertheless, even though we 
expect such factors to lessen the impact of emphasizing 
moral ideals (vs. obligations) on equality attitudes, we do not 
expect a change in direction. That is to say, in no case do we 
expect a focus on moral obligations to elicit more support 
for redressing inequality than a focus on moral ideals. In so 
far as presenting equality as a moral issue conflicts with the 
ideological and/or moral motives, attitudes and beliefs held 
by a given individual, we expect such a conflict to become 
most pronounced in a moral obligation frame, which can be 
seen as more strict and mandatory in nature compared to a 
moral ideals frame (Janoff-Bulman et al., 2009). It follows 
then, that the data reported here provide consistent evidence 
for an effective intervention. Presenting social equality in 
terms of moral ideals rather than obligations positively 





group members toward a more equal society beyond 
restoration: It induces these group members to value cultural 
diversity, prioritize equality, and support policies that 
actually improve the outcomes of disadvantaged groups. 
 
Conclusion 
Presenting equality as a moral issue increases its 
weightiness, which can be beneficial in terms of eliciting 
support for equality so long as the focus lies on ideals and 
positive outcomes. The data reported here demonstrate how 
advantaged group members' attitudes and motivational 
strategies can be influenced by moral incentives, regardless 
of whether individuals consider equality as a moral issue. 
Furthermore, demonstrating the effectiveness of this type of 
experimental manipulation in influencing Whites' support of 
affirmative action is also important from an applied point of 
view, as it offers scope for the development of concrete 
interventions that may enhance public support for 
affirmative action policies. From a theoretical perspective, 
the current studies provide the first evidence of the 
effectiveness of inducing—beyond assessing—different 








Appendix A. Study 2.1 instructions for open-ended 
question (examples generated by participants were 
retained and content analyzed) 
Imagine a future situation in which you work in a 
culturally diverse organization. How would you, through 
your actions and decisions, be able to achieve the ideal/meet 
the obligation of equality between native and nonnative 
Dutch? Please think of some concrete examples, and type 
them in the window below. 
 
Appendix B. Study 2.2 mindset instructions 
(participants did not register their responses to this 
instruction) 
Imagine a future situation in which you work in a 
culturally diverse organization. Think of specific 
ideals/obligations concerning the fair and just treatment of 
nonnative Dutch colleagues in this context. Please consider 
how your efforts could contribute to achieving these 
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Over the years, social norms have shifted toward 
egalitarianism—the social philosophy advocating the 
removal of inequalities among people—in the United States 
and most Western societies (Oyamot, Borgida, & Fisher, 
2006). However, the extent to which individuals consider 
racial equality as a central goal has been shown to depend, in 
part, on their group membership. Namely, compared to non-
Whites, Whites are significantly less likely to rate racial 
equality as an important personal goal (Eibach & Ehrlinger, 
2006). At the same time, research in intergroup interactions 
demonstrates that Whites are highly concerned with being 
seen as moral and non-prejudiced (Bergsieker, Shelton, & 
Richeson, 2010; Vorauer, 2006). Also, prior work has shown 
how presenting equality as a moral ideal (vs. obligation) 
improves Whites’ self-reported intergroup attitudes and their 
attitudes toward equality (Does, Derks, & Ellemers, 2011). 
Although morality frames of ideals versus obligations 
(Does et al., 2011) are both aimed at motivating advantaged 
group members toward social change, the ideals frame is 
more effective in shifting attitudes in favor of equality. It 
seems that emphasizing distinct moral incentives (i.e., 
attaining ideals vs. meeting obligations) elicits different 
types of motivation among Whites. Indeed, many recent 
studies demonstrate the importance of considering group 
members’ goal orientation and self-regulation in 
understanding intergroup processes and relations (e.g., 





Higgins, 2004; Vorauer & Turpie, 2004). Therefore, the 
current work tests the hypothesis that morality framing 
shapes Whites’ behavioral (i.e., eager vs. vigilant strategies 
to goal attainment; Higgins, 1997) and physiological (i.e., 
cardiovascular [CV] responses indicating psychological 
challenge vs. threat; Blascovich & Tomaka, 1996) 
responses. The central aim of the current research is to go 
beyond previous examinations of the impact of morality 
framing on Whites’ intergroup attitudes (Does et al., 2011), 
by illuminating the motivational processes elicited by moral 
ideals versus obligations.  
 
Inequality Framing: Affective and Attitudinal Outcomes 
There is a growing body of work outlining the 
implications of inequality framing for individuals’ attitudinal 
and affective responses to intergroup inequality. For 
example, it has been shown that describing inequality as 
White advantage as opposed to Black disadvantage leads to 
lower collective esteem, less prejudice, more collective guilt, 
and more support for redistributive policies among Whites 
(Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 1998; Iyer, 
Leach, & Crosby, 2003; Powell, Branscombe, & Schmitt, 
2005; Swim & Miller, 1999). Research focused specifically 
on the affective route of inequality framing has shown that 
when discrimination is framed in terms of the advantaged in-
group (i.e., discrimination by Whites) this increases 
collective guilt, whereas discrimination framed in terms of 
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the disadvantaged out-group (i.e., discrimination against 
Blacks) leads to increases in sympathy among Whites. 
Importantly, although sympathy and collective guilt both 
increase Whites’ support for compensatory policies, only 
sympathy leads to support for equal opportunity policies. It 
has been argued that this difference between these two 
emotions may be due to sympathy’s other-focused rather 
than self-focused nature (Iyer et al., 2003). Taken together, 
this work demonstrates how the psychological discomforts 
that are associated with the recognition of the in-group’s 
unwarranted advantages can motivate advantaged group 
members toward social change. 
However, these same discomforts can also motivate 
advantaged group members to avoid, oppose, and/or reject 
in-group frames of inequality. Indeed, there is work showing 
that framing inequality as dominant-group advantage can 
lead to opposition or defensive reactions among members of 
dominant groups. More specifically, when motivated to 
avoid negative psychological implications, such as collective 
guilt, members of advantaged groups may downplay existing 
status differences (Van Knippenberg, 1984), deny their 
group’s privileges (Lowery, Knowles, & Unzueta, 2007), or 
deemphasize inequality altogether (Ellemers, Spears, & 
Doosje, 2002), all of which make social change less 
probable. Most recently it has thus been theorized that it may 
be more advantageous to describe inequality in a way which 





redeem, the perception of the in-group as moral (Does et al., 
2011).  
 
Morality Framing: Motivational and Behavioral 
Outcomes 
The motivation to maintain a positive self-concept (e.g., 
being moral) can lead Whites to either want to restore (e.g., 
by supporting compensatory affirmative action policies; Iyer 
et al., 2003) or defend their group’s moral standing by 
denying or downplaying the illegitimate privileges of the in-
group (Lowery et al., 2007). However, Does and colleagues 
(2011) established that moral concerns do not necessarily 
lead to defensive or restorative reactions among Whites. 
Namely, their work shows that presenting equality as a 
moral ideal (vs. moral obligation) is less threatening to 
Whites’ collective self-esteem, increases their support for 
affirmative action, and elicits more favorable attitudes 
toward cultural diversity within organizations. In addition, 
the latter was found to increase Whites’ prioritization of 
equality. These findings demonstrate the effectiveness of 
moral incentives in establishing, beyond restoration and/or 
compensation, positive intergroup attitudes among Whites. 
Recent studies underline the importance of considering 
group members’ goal orientation and self-regulation in 
understanding intergroup processes and relations (e.g., Jonas 
et al., 2010; Shah et al., 2004; Vorauer & Turpie, 2004). In 
line with this trend, the current study examines the effects of 
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morality framing on motivational and behavioral responses 
of Whites. Namely, we hypothesize that morality framing 
will affect how Whites pursue the goal of social equality—
assessed by their choice of goal pursuit strategy (eager vs. 
vigilant). We base this prediction on regulatory focus theory 
(Higgins, 1997), which posits that the way individuals 
perceive a goal—as either an ideal or an ought—determines 
their type of goal pursuit as either eager or vigilant, 
respectively. Because the morality frames tap into the 
ideal/ought distinction outlined by Higgins (1997), we argue 
that they will affect Whites’ goal pursuit strategies 
accordingly. Indeed, it has been found that morality framing 
predicts Whites’ self-reported action tendencies in terms of 
do’s (approach) versus don’ts (avoidance; Does et al., 2011). 
However, the current research will be the first step in 
determining whether morality framing shapes the behavioral 
goal pursuit strategy Whites adopt with regard to equality. 
Furthermore, there may be an additional way in which 
the effect of morality framing on Whites is manifested: 
through physiological arousal. Indeed, moral values and/ or 
concerns are considered guiding principles in people’s lives 
and important regulators of human behavior (Ellemers, 
Pagliaro, Barreto, & Leach, 2008; Leach, Ellemers, & 
Barreto, 2007; Schwartz, 1992; Shavell, 2002). Due to the 
importance people ascribe to morality, framing equality in 
moral terms thus ‘‘raises the stakes.’’ Hence, morality 





who already have a heightened concern with being perceived 
as moral and unprejudiced in intergroup contexts 
(Bergsieker et al., 2010; Vorauer, 2006). Although we 
expect that both moral frames will increase Whites’ arousal 
(indicative of goal relevance), we hypothesize that the type 
of arousal, in terms of constituting threat or challenge, will 
differ across conditions. We base this prediction on literature 
describing how motivational states can be categorized along 
a bipolar continuum ranging from challenge to threat 
(Blascovich & Tomaka, 1996). It is argued that it is not the 
objective situation per se, but rather people’s subjective 
appraisals of the situational demands and available resources 
which eventually determine physiological responses in line 
with threat (i.e., vigilant approach) or challenge (i.e., eager 
approach). 
Furthermore, general framing effects have been 
observed in threat/ challenge responses during potentially 
stressful situations (Seery, Weisbuch, & Blascovich, 2009; 
Tomaka, Blascovich, Kibler, & Ernst, 1997). For example, 
when a task is framed as holding potential gains (vs. losses) 
and is something one can take on (vs. must do), this leads to 
challenge (vs. threat)-related appraisals (Seery et al., 2009; 
Tomaka et al., 1997). Based on the above, we hypothesize 
that presenting equality as a moral ideal (vs. obligation) will 
elicit experiences of challenge (vs. threat) among Whites. 
Namely, we argue that the obligations frame will constitute a 
threat to the self, because of this frame’s emphasis on duties 
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and thus potential negative outcomes (e.g., being perceived 
as prejudiced or biased). In contrast, we expect that the 
ideals frame will constitute a positive challenge, because of 
this frame’s emphasis on ideals and thus potential positive 
outcomes (e.g., being perceived as fair). 
To examine these motivational responses to morality 
framing, we assess indicators specified by the 
biopsychosocial (BPS) model of arousal regulation 
(Blascovich & Tomaka, 1996). This model identifies 
specific patterns of CV responses associated with 
psychological challenge and threat. According to the BPS 
model, both threat and challenge are marked by activation of 
the sympathetic adrenal medullary (SAM) axis, enhancing 
cardiac performance and decreasing systemic vascular 
resistance. However, in the case of threat, there is an 
increased activation not only of the SAM axis, but also of 
the hypothalamic–pituitary–adrenal (HPA) axis, which 
inhibits decreases in systemic vascular resistance. Thus, 
while challenge is marked by enhanced cardiac performance 
and decreased systemic vascular resistance, threat is marked 
by enhanced cardiac performance and increased systemic 
vascular resistance. The use of these CV measures allows for 
an innovative examination of morality framing’s effect on 
how Whites experience equality goals—as either 








To determine whether morality framing shapes Whites’ 
motivational responses, participants are asked to give an oral 
presentation addressing equality in terms of moral ideals or 
obligations. Videotapes of participants’ presentations are 
coded for behavioral cues of eagerness versus vigilance. 
Throughout, we examine changes in cardiac output (CO: 
The amount of blood pumped by the heart per minute) and 
total peripheral resistance (TPR: The amount of overall 
vasoconstriction or vasodilatation occurring in the 
periphery). Because CV measures are less sensitive to 
deliberate distortion than self-report data (Mendes, 
Blascovich, Lickel, & Hunter, 2002), these measures provide 
a valuable addition to earlier work that focused on the (self-
reported) attitudinal consequences of morality framing 




Participants and Design 
After excluding three participants,1 the sample 
consisted of 37 native Dutch students (11 males, Mage = 
21.24, SDage = 2.20) who were randomly assigned to the 
moral ideals or moral obligations condition. 
Procedure 
                                                          
1 One participant was excluded due to failure to deliver a speech, 
one due to suspicion, and one due to misreading the manipulation 
as indicated by comments she made during her speech. 
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Upon arrival in the University’s psychophysiological 
laboratory, participants were asked to read and sign a 
consent form, which stated that physiological as well as 
video data would be gathered and that participation could be 
terminated at any time during the experiment. After granting 
their informed consent, participants were seated behind a 
computer in a closed off cubicle. To measure the impedance 
cardiographic signals (ICG) and electrocardiographic signals 
(EKG), six electrodes were placed on participants’ torsos by 
the experimenter. Two sensors were placed on the chest 
(approximately at the level of the heart) and ribs, two at the 
back of the neck, and two on participants’ upper backs. The 
blood pressure wristband was attached to participants’ 
nonpreferred hand. After reading a short overview of the 
experiment, participants were instructed to sit very still for 
six minutes in order to assess baseline CV levels. A clock 
appeared on the screen, which counted down the six 
minutes. However, in order to prevent the inclusion of 
participants’ anticipation of the final minute (e.g., 
physiological arousal) in the baseline measurements, the 
baseline assessment stopped after five minutes. 
Following the baseline period, self-esteem was assessed 
using the 12 items of the core self-evaluations scale (CSES; 
Judge, Erez, Bono, & Thoresen, 2003), and each item scored 
from 1 (absolutely disagree) to 7 (absolutely agree; e.g. ‘‘I 
generally succeed when I try to do something’’; Cronbach’s 





for these dispositional differences in the analyses of 
threat/challenge responses. Next, participants were asked to 
carefully read a (bogus) newspaper article about a study 
done by the Central Bureau for Statistics (CBS; see also 
Does et al., 2011), which they would later be requested to 
answer some questions on via webcam. The newspaper 
article stated that a recent study by CBS showed that native 
Dutch employees with a master’s degree are systematically 
paid more and are promoted more often at their jobs than 
nonnative Dutch employees with the same educational 
background. The article included a graph showing the 
increasing differences in salary over a 10-year period 
between native and nonnative Dutch employees with the 
same educational level. The article also contained a picture 
depicting a middle-aged, White male as the fictitious senior 
CBS researcher. The article included paraphrases from the 
CBS researcher who stated—in both conditions—that these 
intergroup disparities were unfair and unjust and stated that 
(depending on condition): ‘‘Working in a culturally diverse 
organization can help native Dutch employees to attain (vs. 
meet) their ideals (vs. obligations) in terms of fairness and 
equality.’’ 
 
Speech task. To create a motivated performance 
situation as specified by the BPS model (Blascovich & 
Tomaka, 1996), participants were asked to give an oral 
presentation via webcam about equality in terms of ideals 
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(vs. obligations), and how they could personally contribute 
to attaining the ideal (vs. meeting the obligation) of social 
equality. Participants were able to end the recording of their 
presentation by clicking the ‘‘next button’’ which was made 
available two minutes into the presentation. The speech time 
was automatically ended after three minutes. After 
completion, all physiological recording devices were 
removed by the experimenter. Finally, participants were 





CV measures. CV measures were assessed 
continuously and noninvasively following accepted 
guidelines (Sherwood et al., 1990) utilizing a BIOPAC 
MP150 system (BIOPAC Systems Inc, CA). EKG and ICG 
recordings provide continuous measures of cardiac 
performance. ICG was assessed utilizing the NICO100c 
module, together with four spot electrodes (two of which 
were placed at the back of the neck and two on the back) to 
record basal transthoracic impedance (Z0) and the first 
derivative of basal impedance (dZ/dt). The EKG signals 
were detected using an ECG100 module and a Lead I 
electrode configuration. A NIBP100a module, equipped with 
a wrist sensor that was placed over the radial artery of the 
participant’s nonpreferred hand, measured the pulse wave 





physiological data were recorded with AcqKnowledge 
software (BIOPAC Systems Inc). Scoring of the data was 
performed blind to condition, utilizing ambulatory 
monitoring system (AMS) software (Free University, 
Amsterdam, the Netherlands). Taken together, ICG and 
EKG recordings allowed for computation of heart rate (HR), 
ventricular contractility (VC), and CO. The addition of 
blood pressure recordings allowed for computation of TPR 
(TPR = mean arterial pressure x 80/CO; Sherwood et al., 
1990). For analyses of each CV marker, we calculated the 
reactivity scores by subtracting the last minute of baseline 
from the first minute of the speech task, as is common 
practice in CV analyses (e.g., Mendes et al., 2002). 
 
Behavioral coding. We coded the videotapes of 
participants’ presentations for behavior indicative of goal 
pursuit strategies in terms of vigilance versus eagerness 
(Higgins, 1997). We expected that White participants 
addressing equality in terms of obligations would be more 
vigilant (i.e., careful not to say anything prejudiced), engage 
in more self-monitoring, and thus be slower in their 
presentation (Monteith, 1993) compared to those addressing 
equality in terms of ideals. We reasoned that heightened 
speech monitoring should cause more disfluencies such as 
word lengthening, pauses, or fillers like ‘‘uh’’ (Arnold, 
Tanenhaus, Altmann, & Fagnano, 2004; Bell et al., 2003; 
Fox Tree & Clark, 1997), resulting in a decreased speech 
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rate (Monteith, 1993). To test our hypothesis, we counted 
the number of words, excluding the disfluencies outlined 
above, in each participant’s videotape (M = 223.18, SD = 
97.25). We calculated the ratio variable speech rate (M = 
1.98, SD = 0.38) by dividing the number of words by speech 
time (in seconds; M = 112.32, SD = 42.37). Calculation of 
this ratio variable allowed us to determine the effect of 
morality framing on speech monitoring, while controlling 




Videotapes of three participants were not recorded 
and/or saved due to technical problems. Thus, there are 





Goal relevance. Separate univariate tests contrasting 
HR and VC reactivity scores to zero were conducted to 
determine goal relevance (Blascovich, 2008). We observed 
significant increases in HR and VC in both conditions (ps < 
.001–.016). As expected, there were no significant effects of 
morality framing on HR or VC reactivity (both Fs < 1), 





Threat and challenge during speech delivery.2 As 
predicted, CV responses differed significantly between 
conditions. CO was higher among participants in the moral 
ideals condition (M = 0.27) than among participants in the 
moral obligations condition (M = 0.12), F(1, 34) = 5.56, p = 
.02, p
2 = .14. Moreover, participants in the moral ideals 
condition exhibited lower TPR (M = -193.07) compared to 
participants in the moral obligations condition (M = 283.75), 
F(1, 34) = 4.81, p = .04, p
2 = .12. Combined, these findings 
indicate that when giving a speech about equality, the moral 
ideals frame elicited greater relative challenge in Whites 




As predicted, there was a significant effect of morality 
framing on participants’ speech rate, F(1, 32) = 4.31, p < 
.05, p
2 = .12. Participants in the moral obligations condition 
spoke significantly slower (M = 1.86, SD = 0.31) than those 
in the moral ideals condition (M = 2.12, SD = 0.42), in line 
                                                          
2 Self-esteem - a variable known to influence threat/challenge 
responses (e.g., Blascovich, 2008) - was entered as a covariate in 
the CV analyses; cardiac output (CO): F(1, 34) = 6.11, p < .05, p2 
= .15; total peripheral resistance (TPR): F(1, 34) = 23.37, p < .001, 
p
2 = .41. Self-esteem was assessed with the CSE scale (Judge et 
al., 2003) prior to the manipulation, and there was no effect of 
condition on CSES, F(1, 35) < 1, confirming a successful 
randomization of participant assignment to conditions. 
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with the predicted increase in self-monitoring. Combined 
with the results on the CV reactivity responses outlined 
above, these results show that among Whites, addressing 
equality in terms of ideals (vs. obligations) leads to less 
vigilant behavior, and more appraisals related to relative 
challenge as indicated by its CV correlates. 
 
General Discussion 
Previous work has shown that presenting equality as a 
moral ideal versus obligation elicits positive intergroup 
attitudes among Whites (Does et al., 2011). The findings 
reported here provide support that the positive intergroup 
attitudes found in earlier work (Does et al., 2011) are not 
mere lip service, but instead, manifestations of a genuine 
shift caused by morality framing. By demonstrating that the 
moral ideals frame elicits more relative challenge 
(Blascovich & Tomaka, 1996) and less vigilant (Higgins, 
1997) responses than the moral obligations frame, the 
current research provides evidence that morality framing 
could be an effective way to not only impact on positive 
intergroup attitudes (Does et al., 2011) but also significantly 
shape Whites’ motivational strategies to goal attainment. 
 
Potential Underlying Mechanism 
Although the current examination does not provide 
direct evidence of this, it seems plausible to assume that the 





1997), which in turn affect appraisals of relative challenge 
versus threat. Namely, it is likely that the focus on moral 
ideals may cause participants to become focused on attaining 
potential gains associated with equality, and a focus on 
moral obligations likely causes participants to become 
concerned with avoiding losses associated with equality. 
Consequently, these distinct goal orientations and their 
associated goal pursuit strategies of eagerness versus 
vigilance result in CV responses consistent with relative 
challenge versus threat, respectively. This rationale is 
supported by the work of Seery and colleagues (2009) which 
shows similar CV patterns in examining outcome framing 
(i.e., potential for gain vs. loss). Furthermore, these authors 
argue that from a functional perspective, the CV pattern of 
challenge (i.e., increased blood flow) is aimed at potential 
physical activity that might be necessary for eager goal 
pursuit, and the CV pattern of threat (i.e., decreased blood 
flow) is aimed at inhibition of action or even potential 
withdrawal (Seery et al., 2009). 
 
Directions for Future Research 
In addition to providing more direct evidence of the 
theorized underlying mechanism outlined above, future 
research might illuminate the effects of morality framing on 
intergroup interactions. Certainly, the current findings 
brought us closer to understanding how morality framing 
impacts Whites’ motivational states when asked to consider 
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egalitarian beliefs. Yet, the next important step is to examine 
how morality framing affects Whites’ responses during an 
inter-racial interaction, requiring them to act in accordance 
with those beliefs. If, in line with the current findings, the 
ideals (vs. obligations) frame also leads to less vigilant 
responses in intergroup interaction, then, based on the 
literature, these responses will likely be associated with less 
(vs. more) anxiety, avoidant behavior (Plant & Devine, 
2003), and a greater (vs. lesser) quality of the interaction 
(Plant & Butz, 2006). 
 
Conclusion 
In recent years, there has been a ‘‘major paradigm 
shift’’ in research on intergroup relations (Gaertner & 
Dovidio, 2011, p. 242). Whereas the traditional focus has 
been on intergroup antipathy and prejudice (e.g., Allport, 
1954), novel approaches in intergroup research have 
established the importance of understanding and finding 
meaningful ways to establish positive intergroup relations 
(e.g., Mallett & Wilson, 2010; Page-Gould, Mendoza-
Denton, Alegre, & Siy, 2010). Study 3 suggests means for 
the latter as it demonstrates that Whites can be encouraged 
to approach and view equality as more of a challenge than a 
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Traditionally, the central focus of intergroup research 
has been on prejudice and outgroup antipathy (Allport, 
1954). However, recent years have given rise to a paradigm 
shift in which researchers have begun to examine and 
identify the factors that contribute to positive intergroup 
relations (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2011). As society is 
becoming increasingly diverse and norms have substantially 
shifted toward egalitarianism, research on the factors that 
can impede intergroup anxiety and promote positive 
intergroup contact is more relevant than ever (e.g., Avery, 
Richeson, Hebl, & Ambady, 2009; Page-Gould, Mendoza-
Denton, & Tropp, 2008). At the same time, as large 
socioeconomic and health disparities continue to exist 
between social groups (e.g., Black and Whites), much social 
psychological research has aimed to identify factors that 
promote social change. Such work includes examinations of 
contextual variables that shape dominant group members’ 
attitudes toward equality and equality-promoting policies 
such as affirmative action (Lowery, Unzueta, Knowles, & 
Goff, 2006; Does, Derks, & Ellemers, 2011). For example, it 
has been shown that framing social equality as a moral ideal 
that can be attained rather than a moral obligation that 
should be met elicits more support for affirmative action and 
greater commitment to social change among Whites (Does et 
al., 2011). Considered in tandem, recent work has advanced 





contact on the one hand, and greater commitment to social 
change on the other.  
Yet, still little is known about the interplay of these 
different components of (positive) intergroup relations. With 
the current research, we aim to fill this void by examining 
the effect of morality framing—presenting equality as a 
moral ideal versus a moral obligation—on Whites’ 
intergroup and equality attitudes, as well as on their 
behavioral and physiological responses during an intergroup 
interaction. Prior work has established that among Whites, 
the moral ideal frame elicits more positive attitudes toward 
cultural diversity and affirmative action than the moral 
obligation frame (Does et al., 2011). Also, Whites exposed 
to the moral ideal frame exhibited physiological responses 
consistent with greater “challenge” – and thereby less 
“threat” - when giving a speech about equality compared to 
those exposed to the moral obligation frame (Does, Derks, 
Ellemers, & Scheepers, 2012). Indeed, these findings hint at 
the promising potential of a moral ideal rather than an 
obligation frame to establish attitudinal change among 
dominant group members with regard to social equality. But 
how does morality framing influence Whites’ behavior and 
motivational responses during intergroup interactions? 
Based on the findings of prior work as outlined above, it 
seems plausible to expect that the moral ideal frame will 
elicit similar physiological responses and more positive 
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behavior among Whites during an intergroup interaction 
than the moral obligation frame. 
However, research on the interplay between intergroup 
attitudes and behavior has yielded mixed findings, 
suggesting that egalitarian attitudes are not always 
associated with more favorable outcomes during intergroup 
interactions. For instance, low-bias Whites are sometimes 
evaluated more negatively by Blacks during an interaction, 
because they appear more relaxed than high-bias Whites 
who appear more engaged (Shelton, Richeson, Salvatore, & 
Trawalter, 2005). It has been argued that high-bias Whites 
may be perceived as more engaged because compared to 
low-bias Whites, high-bias Whites are more concerned with 
regulating their behavior during intergroup interactions so as 
not to appear prejudiced (Shelton et al., 2005). Furthermore, 
it has been found that even individuals who explicitly 
endorse egalitarian values may still exhibit bias on measures 
designed to detect more automatic and implicit forms of 
racial bias (Devine, Plant, Amodio, Harmon-Jones, & 
Vance, 2002). Importantly, such implicit forms of racial bias 
may leak through in Whites’ nonverbal behavior during 
intergroup contact, which may subsequently be interpreted 
by Blacks as intentional and explicit prejudice (Dovidio, 
Kawakami, & Gaertner, 2002). Thus, the relationship 
between egalitarian attitudes and the experiences and 
behavior of Whites during intergroup interactions is not self-





relationship, as we examine the interplay between intergroup 
attitudes, physiological and behavioral responses during 
intergroup contact as a function of distinct morality frames. 
 
The Nature of Intergroup Contact 
As described above, intergroup interactions are often 
experienced as anxiety-provoking and depleting (Trawalter, 
Richeson, & Shelton, 2009). With the current research, we 
aim to examine how morality framing influences Whites’ 
threat responses and behavior during intergroup contact. 
Previous findings show that framing equality in terms of 
moral ideals vs. obligations is beneficial for Whites’ 
attitudes toward cultural diversity and affirmative action 
policies (Does et al., 2011) and elicits less relative threat 
responses when Whites give a speech about equality—
indicated by patterns in Whites’ cardiovascular reactivity 
(Does et al., 2012). Based on these findings, we could 
predict that exposing Whites to the moral ideal (vs. 
obligation) frame may lead to approach-like, challenge 
responses during contact with an outgroup member.  
However, it may also be the case that the moral ideal 
frame raises the stakes of intergroup contact for Whites 
compared to the moral obligation frame, resulting in more 
avoidance-like, threat responses during contact with an 
outgroup member. This reasoning is supported by 
Blascovich’s (2008) explanation of the hierarchical structure 
of goals. Namely, Blascovich (2008) argues that in order to 
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achieve a desirable superordinate goal (e.g., increased social 
equality) individuals may be required to approach a series of 
subordinate goals (e.g., engage in intergroup interaction). 
These subordinate goals can prove threatening when they 
entail a situation in which perceived demands outweigh the 
perceived resources. However, because the superordinate 
goal is perceived as desirable, individuals will still approach 
the threatening subordinate goal. In this light, the moral ideal 
(vs. obligation) frame can be seen as increasing the 
desirability of the superordinate goal—social equality—as 
indicated by Whites’ increased support for affirmative 
action, greater prioritization of equality, and more positive 
attitudes toward cultural diversity (Does et al., 2011). Thus, 
engaging in an intergroup interaction (subordinate goal) may 
be more threatening for Whites after exposure to the moral 
ideal frame than the obligation frame because the perceived 
demands (e.g., perceived effort, uncertainty) of such an 
interaction are increased.  
According to the biopsychosocial model (BPS model; 
Blascovich & Tomaka, 1996), such an increase in perceived 
demands may result in a “threat” response if individuals 
perceive them to outweigh their personal resources (e.g., 
social support). Namely, the BPS model posits that 
individuals’ motivational states result from their evaluations 
of situational demands compared to their personal resources 
to cope. When appraised resources outweigh the demands, 





outweigh the resources this results in “threat”. It has been 
argued that compared to an intragroup interaction, the 
perceived demands of an intergroup interaction in terms of 
uncertainty, and/or required effort are higher (Mendes, 
Blascovich, Lickel, & Hunter, 2002). If exposure to the 
moral ideal frame indeed increases the perceived demands of 
an intergroup interaction compared to the moral obligation 
frame, this will thus result in even greater threat among 
Whites. 
The psychological states of challenge and threat are 
associated with distinct patterns of cardiovascular responses, 
indexed by four cardiovascular markers. The BPS model 
posits that when engaged in a situation that is relevant to the 
self—such as an intergroup interaction— heart rate (HR), 
and ventricular contractility (VC; the force with which the 
left ventricle contracts) increase. Significant increases in 
these two markers indicate engagement and goal relevance, 
which are the prerequisites for distinguishing cardiovascular 
(CV) reactivity in line with threat and challenge. Cardiac 
output (CO; the amount of blood in liters pumped by the 
heart per minute), and total peripheral resistance (TPR; an 
index of net constriction versus dilation in the vascular 
system) are the two CV markers indexing threat versus 
challenge responses. Namely, higher CO and lower TPR 
reveal relatively greater challenge, and thus relatively less 
threat. Prior research has shown that Whites who interacted 
with a Black (vs. White) confederate exhibited 
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cardiovascular reactivity consistent with threat (vs. 
challenge), supporting the argument that the perceived 
demands of an intergroup interaction are higher than those of 
an intragroup interaction (Mendes et al., 2002). By assessing 
the cardiovascular markers outlined above, we are able to 
determine in real-time how morality framing shapes Whites’ 
responses during an intergroup interaction in terms of threat 
versus challenge.  
In sum, prior work has demonstrated how morality 
framing shapes Whites’ intergroup attitudes (Does et al., 
2011) and physiological responses (Does et al., 2012) when 
giving a speech about equality. The moral ideal frame has 
been found to elicit more positive attitudes toward 
affirmative action, cultural diversity (Does et al., 2011), and 
cardiovascular reactivity consistent with greater relative 
challenge (vs. threat) when giving a speech about equality 
(Does et al., 2012). Similar effects may arise during 
intergroup interaction, such that exposure to the moral ideal 
frame induces more approach-like, challenge responses 
among Whites as indexed by their cardiovascular reactivity. 
However, it may also be the case that exposure to the moral 
ideal frame increases the perceived demands of an 
intergroup interaction compared to a moral obligation frame, 
thereby eliciting cardiovascular reactivity consistent with 
greater threat in Whites. Thus, the current research is aimed 





cardiovascular and behavioral responses during intergroup 
contact.  
 
Overview of the Current Work 
We conducted three studies among White university 
students to examine the effects of morality framing on CV 
reactivity indicative of threat vs. challenge (Blascovich & 
Tomaka, 1996; Does et al., 2012) and nonverbal behavior—
indicating hostility and discomfort—during intergroup and 
intragroup contact. In all three studies, participants were 
exposed to either the moral ideal or the moral obligation 
frame of equality. In Study 4.1, we examined the effect of 
morality framing on participants’ CV reactivity before and 
while they introduced themselves to a Black confederate via 
webcam. Afterwards, we assessed their explicit evaluations 
of the Black confederate, and implicit bias (with an Implicit 
Association Test; IAT; Greenwald, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003). 
We included the IAT to examine whether morality framing 
influences Whites’ implicit bias, as such implicit 
associations have been found to affect individuals’ behavior 
during intergroup interactions (e.g., Dovidio et al., 2002). In 
Study 4.2, we expanded the intergroup interaction by having 
participants not only introduce themselves to the Black 
confederate, but also give a speech about their thoughts on 
affirmative action while addressing the Black confederate. 
This allowed us to examine whether interaction topic 
influences CV reactivity during intergroup contact either 
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directly, or by moderating the effect of morality framing. 
The video recordings of participants’ speeches were rated by 
independent judges in terms of nonverbal behavior 
indicating discomfort and hostility. In Study 4.3, we tested 
whether the patterns observed in Study 4.1 and Study 4.2 
were indeed due to morality framing within the context of an 
intergroup interaction, by examining CV reactivity and 
nonverbal behavior in an intragroup interaction—i.e., with a 
White confederate. Self-reported intergroup attitudes were 
assessed in all three studies. Taken together, these measures 
allowed for the examination of the interplay between explicit 
intergroup attitudes, CV reactivity during intergroup contact, 



















Method Study 4.1 
 
Participants 
Sixty-three undergraduate students (46 females) with an 
average age of 20.52 years (SD = 2.15) were randomly 
assigned to either the moral ideals or moral obligations 
condition and rewarded with course credit or money. 
 
Procedure 
A White female experimenter recruited participants to 
take part in an experiment focused on ‘the examination of 
societal issues’. At no point prior to the experiment were 
participants notified that the experiment included an 
interaction with a fellow-participant. Upon arrival at the 
psychophysiological laboratory, participants were asked to 
read and sign a consent form. In the form, it was explained 
that physiological and video data would be gathered during 
the experiment, all of which would be handled 
anonymously. After obtaining informed consent, participants 
were seated in front of a computer in a closed-off cubicle, 
and all sensors required to measure CV reactivity were 
attached by the experimenter. The experimenter then left the 
cubicle, and all following instructions were given via 
computer. Participants were instructed to sit very still for six 
minutes in order to assess baseline levels of blood pressure 
and heart rate. A clock appeared on the screen, which 
counted down the six minutes, but to prevent participants’ 
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anticipation of the final minute (i.e., physiological arousal) 
from biasing the baseline measurements, the baseline 
assessment stopped after five instead of six minutes.  
 
Moral ideal versus moral obligation frame. 
Participants were asked to carefully read a bogus newspaper 
article about differences in salary and promotions between 
college-level native and nonnative employees in the 
Netherlands based on findings of the Central Bureau for 
Statistics (CBS; see also Does et al., 2011). In both 
conditions, the current disparities between native and 
nonnative Dutch were labeled as unjust. Depending on 
condition, a fictitious researcher of CBS who was depicted 
as a middle-aged White male, stated in the article that 
working in a culturally diverse organization can help native 
Dutch employees to attain the moral ideal versus meet the 
moral obligation of equality (see also Does et al., 2011; 
2012). 
 
Pre-interaction speech: Consideration of moral 
ideals vs. obligations. After reading the CBS article 
participants were asked to give a speech via webcam on how 
they could contribute to the moral ideal versus moral 
obligation of social equality, depending on condition 
(similar to the speech task used in Does et al., 2012). After 





clicking the ‘next’ button’ or the recording was 
automatically ended after three minutes.  
 
Interaction speech: (Unexpected) introduction to 
Black confederate. At this point in the study, participants 
were informed that they would now discuss the findings of 
the CBS study with a fellow-participant. It was stated that 
participants would first get a chance to introduce themselves 
to their interaction partner via webcam. Participants were 
instructed to state their name, age, study major, and to 
indicate their ethnic background as native or non-native 
Dutch. Participants were told that after clicking the ‘next’ 
button a connection would be made with the computer in the 
next cubicle, and that whoever was first to reach this point in 
the experiment would begin by making an introduction 
video for his/her partner via webcam.  
After clicking ‘next’, all participants were told that their 
interaction partner was already waiting, and that they would 
thus first see their partner’s introduction video. They were  
shown a prerecorded video of a Black female confederate 
who was trained to be neutral in terms of affect, and to use 
the filler ‘um’ in her speech to signal moderate nervousness. 
The video of the confederate was recorded using a webcam 
angled similarly to the one used in the experiment. 
Furthermore, the confederate was placed in a cubicle 
identical to the ones used in this experiment, and was visibly 
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attached to the same type of sensors as participants. The 
scripted message was as followed: 
 
“Um, okay… So we’re going to talk about the CBS article in 
a minute. Um, I thought the differences between native and 
non-native Dutch were pretty big. And I feel like um that 
also sort of reflects on my opportunities in the workforce. 
Um, I’ll introduce myself. Hi! My name is Shurendy, and I’m 
21 years old. I live in Leiden and I study Psychology here. 
Originally, I am from Curaçao3 um so I am nonnative Dutch. 
I’ve been living in the Netherlands for almost 10 years 
now.” 
 
After viewing the video of the Black confederate, 
participants recorded their own introduction video, which 
would ostensibly be transferred to their interaction partner. 
Participants had three minutes for their introduction, but 
could end the recording after one minute by pressing the 
‘next’ button. After completing the introduction speech, 
participants were asked to evaluate the Black confederate on 
categories such as friendliness and intelligence. 
  
Implicit association test (IAT; Greenwald et al., 
2003). Next, participants were informed that they were about 
to complete a computer task which was ostensibly designed 
                                                          






to assess individuals’ ability to meet the moral obligation 
versus attain the moral ideal of equality, depending on 
condition. In reality, the computer task was the IAT, which 
required participants to, as quickly as possible, classify 
native or nonnative names and positive or negative words 
(derived from https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/demo/) by 
pressing one of two response keys. In the congruent block, 
participants had to press the same response key for native 
names and positive words, and another key for nonnative 
names and negative words. In the incongruent block, 
participants had to press the same response key for native 
names and negative words, and another key for nonnative 
names and positive words. The blocks were counterbalanced 
in order and participants received no feedback regarding 
their scores during or after the blocks. After completing the 
IAT, participants were debriefed and probed for suspicion. 





Physiological measures. All CV measures were 
recorded noninvasively and in accordance with 
psychophysiological guidelines (Sherwood et al., 1990). To 
measure impedance cardiographic signals (ICG) and 
electrocardiographic signals (EKG), six sensors were placed 
on participants’ torsos by the experimenter. Two sensors 
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were placed on the chest (approximately at the level of the 
heart) and ribs, two at the back of the neck and two on 
participants’ upper backs. A finger-cuff was attached to 
participants’ ring or index finger of the non-preferred hand 
to assess blood pressure. Identical to the procedures in De 
Wit, Scheepers, and Jehn (2012), Acqknowledge software 
(Biopac Systems, Goleta, CA) was used to record and store 
the physiological data. EKG and ensemble-averaged ICG 
recordings were scored using Matlab software (MATLAB, 
Mathworks Inc., Natick, MA).  
Taken together, ICG and EKG recordings allowed for 
computation of heart rate (HR), ventricular contractility 
(VC), and cardiac output (CO). The addition of blood 
pressure recordings allowed for computation of total 
peripheral resistance (using the formula: TPR = mean 
arterial pressure X 80/CO). Considering that cardiac 
habituation can occur fairly quickly, we focused on the first 
30 seconds of both speech tasks. For each speech task and 
for each CV measure (i.e., HR, VC, CO, and TPR) we 
calculated a reactivity score by subtracting the mean scores 
of the final 30 seconds of the baseline from the mean scores 
of the first 30 seconds of each speech task.  
Finally, and in line with prior work (e.g., Seery, 
Weisbuch, & Blascovich, 2009), TPR and CO reactivity 
scores were converted into z-scores and combined in a single 





zTPR. Thus, lower scores on the TCI are consistent with 
greater relative threat.   
 
Self-reports4. After having given the introduction 
speech, participants evaluated the Black confederate, using a 
7-point scale (1 = very little, 7 = very much) on the 
following categories: intelligence, kindness, approachability, 
and unfriendliness (reverse coded; Cronbach’s α = .67). 
Including these ratings allowed us to examine whether 
morality framing would influence, either through its effect 
on CV reactivity or directly, participants’ explicit 
evaluations of the Black confederate post-interaction. 
 
IAT. To analyze the IAT data, we used the guidelines 
and scoring algorithm as described in Greenwald et al. 
(2003). Thus, positive IAT scores are consistent with greater 
implicit preference for native over nonnative Dutch names.  
                                                          
4 Prior to the interaction, we assessed self-reported positive 
attitudes toward cultural diversity (3 items; Cronbach’s α =.64), 
and support for affirmative action (5 items; Cronbach’s α =.76). In 
line with prior work (Does et al., 2011), participants exposed to the 
moral ideal frame scored higher on these self-reports than those 
exposed to the moral obligation frame, but these effects did not 
reach significance. Post-interaction, we assessed self-reported 
personal efficacy (3 items; Cronbach’s α =.79) and collective 
efficacy (3 items; Cronbach’s α =.77). Participants exposed to the 
moral ideal frame reported higher collective efficacy than those 
exposed to the obligation frame, but the effect of condition did not 







Twenty participants expressed suspicion about the 
realness of the interaction, independent of condition, χ 2(1, N 
= 63) = 2.37, p = .125, and three participants indicated they 
were nonnative Dutch. We excluded these participants from 
all analyses resulting in a total sample of 40 native Dutch 
participants (27 females, 13 males) with an average age of 
20.48 years (SD = 2.21).  
 
Physiological Measures 
Prior to analyses, outliers (i.e., data points more than 
1.5 times the interquartile range below the first quartile or 
above the third quartile) were assigned the value of the 
nearest data point that was not an outlier. Separate univariate 
tests contrasting HR and VC reactivity scores to zero were 
conducted to determine sufficient engagement and goal 
relevance (Blascovich, 2008). For both speeches and across 
conditions, we observed significant increases in HR and VC, 
all ps < .001, indicating significant task engagement and 
                                                          
5 Based on these participants’ comments and remarks upon 
completion of the experiment, participants were mostly suspicious 
due to the fact that the interaction was unexpected. Because no 
attention was given to the dyadic nature of the experiment upon 
recruitment, in terms of scheduling of participants, participants 
indicated suspicion about the realness of the dyadic interaction. 
This issue did not play a role in Study 4.2, because there we 





goal relevance. As no effect of morality frame was observed 
on HR or VC, all Fs < 1, we could conclude that there was 
equal engagement and goal relevance across conditions 
during both speeches.  
 
Threat/challenge index during the pre-interaction 
speech. We observed no significant effect of morality 
framing on the TCI, F(1, 33) = 1.97, p = .17. Thus, 
participants’ CV reactivity during the pre-interaction speech 
was not significantly influenced by whether participants 
gave a speech about social equality in terms of moral ideals 
or obligations. 
 
Threat/challenge index during the interaction 
speech. We observed a significant effect of morality frame 
on the TCI, F(1, 28) = 4.13, p = .05, ηp2 = .13. Participants 
exposed to the moral ideal frame exhibited CV reactivity 
consistent with greater relative threat (M = -0.64, SD = 1.74) 
than those exposed to the moral obligation frame (M = 0.64, 
SD =1.69). 
 
Self-Reported Evaluations of Black Confederate 
We observed no significant effect of morality frame on 
participants’ evaluations of the Black confederate, F(1, 38) < 
1. In both conditions, participants provided highly positive 
ratings of the Black confederate (both Ms = 6.01). 
Furthermore, there was no direct relationship between CV 
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reactivity during the interaction speech and self-reported 
evaluations of the Black confederate, r = .25, p = .18. This 
indicates that the greater relative threat response observed in 
the moral ideal (vs. obligation) was not reliably associated 
with more negative explicit evaluation of the Black 
confederate after the interaction.  
 
IAT  
 An overall IAT effect was observed among 
participants, t(24) = 3.84, p < .001, M = 0.38, indicating 
participants’ tendency to more quickly associate nonnative 
names with negative rather than positive words, and vice 
versa for native names. There was no significant effect of 
morality frame on participants’ IAT scores, F < 1. This 
finding suggests that whereas morality framing shapes 
Whites’ CV reactivity during an intergroup interaction, it 
does not affect Whites’ implicit bias. 
 
Discussion 
The findings of Study 4.1 indicate that Whites who 
were exposed to the moral ideal frame rather than the moral 
obligation frame exhibited CV reactivity that is consistent 
with greater relative threat during an (unexpected) 
interaction with a Black confederate. Morality framing did 
not influence Whites’ implicit bias, a finding which is 
consistent with the literature characterizing these automatic 





2002). Furthermore, we established that CV reactivity during 
the intergroup interaction was not related to participants’ 
evaluations of the Black confederate post-interaction. This 
suggests that CV reactivity consistent with greater threat 
during an intergroup encounter does not result in more 
negative implicit responses (i.e., IAT scores) or more 
negative evaluations of an outgroup member. Indeed, the 
latter finding is in line with the observation in past studies 
where CV reactivity consistent with threat was associated 
with more self-reported liking of an outgroup interaction 
partner (Mendes et al., 2002).    
Taken together, these results are seemingly at odds with 
findings from prior work showing that a moral ideal (vs. 
obligation) frame induces in Whites more positive 
intergroup attitudes (Does et al., 2011) and CV reactivity 
consistent with less relative threat when giving a speech 
about equality (Does et al., 2012). However, this is not 
necessarily the case. It could well be that Whites’ CV 
reactivity during intergroup contact is shaped by their 
intergroup attitudes as a function of morality framing. 
Whites’ more positive intergroup attitudes reported after 
exposure to the moral ideal rather than obligation frame 
(Does et al., 2011) may induce Whites’ CV reactivity 
consistent with greater threat during intergroup contact. In 
other words, Whites’ CV reactivity consistent with greater 
threat during intergroup contact – observed in the moral 
ideal (vs. obligation) condition—may arise as a result of 
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more positive intergroup attitudes and not in spite of these 
attitudes.  
Indeed, this reasoning is supported by Blascovich’s 
(2008) explanation of the hierarchical structure of goals as 
outlined above. As the moral ideal (vs. obligation) frame 
increases the desirability of the superordinate goal—social 
equality—engaging in an intergroup interaction (subordinate 
goal) can become more threatening because the perceived 
demands increase. When individuals are more committed to 
the goal of social equality – those exposed to the moral ideal 
rather than obligation frame—they may view intergroup 
interactions as situations which require greater effort and/or 
hold more uncertainty. Increases in perceptions of such 
situational demands (e.g., effort, uncertainty) may thus, 
according to the BPS model, result in CV reactivity 
consistent with greater threat.   
Further support of the reasoning that the moral ideal 
frame elicits more threat during intergroup contact because it 
elicits more positive intergroup attitudes than the moral 
obligation frame comes from prior research on the ideology 
of multiculturalism. This work shows that when individuals 
are more positive about cultural diversity this instills in them 
a learning orientation (e.g., greater eagerness to learn from 
cultural differences), resulting in greater investment and 
responsiveness during encounters with outgroup members 
(Vorauer & Sasaki, 2011), consistent with increased 





moral ideal (vs. obligation) frame leads to more positive 
attitudes toward cultural diversity, and if it is indeed the case 
that the latter causes individuals to exert more effort in 
intergroup encounters, then this may be the process 
underlying the CV patterns observed in Study 4.1. That is, if 
more positive attitudes toward cultural diversity encourage 
individuals to increase their effort during an intergroup 
interaction, then, according to the BPS model (Blascovich & 
Tomaka, 1996), this increases the situational demands of the 
interaction, resulting in CV reactivity consistent with greater 
threat. In other words, interacting with a Black confederate 
poses a demanding situation for Whites (e.g., Mendes et al., 
2002; Trawalter & Richeson, 2006), and may be perceived 
as more demanding, and thus more threatening, by those 
who care more about doing well – those exposed to the 
moral ideal rather than obligation frame. The data from 
Study 4.1 hint at this hypothesis, as we observed that greater 
threat as indexed by CV reactivity observed in the moral 
ideal vs. obligation condition was not associated with more 
negative explicit attitudes toward the Black confederate or 









Method Study 4.2  
With Study 4.2, we aimed to replicate the CV patterns 
observed in Study 4.1, and test the hypothesis that the 
impact of morality framing on CV reactivity is mediated by 
positive attitudes toward cultural diversity. We again 
assessed self-reports of Whites’ support for affirmative 
action, and personal and collective efficacy to bring about 
social change. The efficacy measures were included to 
examine whether the moral ideal (vs. obligation) frame 
decreases Whites’ sense of efficacy with regard to 
establishing social change. The latter would be an alternative 
explanation for the differences between conditions in CV 
reactivity indicative of threat during intergroup contact 
observed in Study 4.1. If compared to the moral obligation 
frame, the moral ideal frame decreases Whites’ belief that 
they can increase social equality then that may be the 
alternative explanation for Whites’ CV reactivity consistent 
with greater threat. Finally, and in contrast to Study 4.1, we 
informed participants up front that there would be a video-
interaction, and we expanded the intergroup interaction by 
having participants not only ostensibly introduce themselves 
to the Black confederate, but also share their thoughts on 
affirmative action. Participants’ nonverbal behavior 
indicating discomfort (e.g., blinking) and hostility during 
intergroup contact were assessed by rating the video 
recordings of participants’ interaction speeches. This 





during intergroup contact were associated with more hostile 
or anxious behavior during intergroup contact. 
 
Participants 
Our sample consisted of 51 (41 females, 10 males) 
native Dutch students6 with ages ranging from 18 to 26 years 
(M = 20.55, SD = 1.98). Because only two participants 
expressed suspicion about the realness of the interaction we 
can conclude that announcing the interaction up front, rather 
than during the experiment, indeed enhanced the credibility 
of the interaction compared to Study 4.1. Participants were 
again randomly assigned to the moral ideal or moral 
obligation frame.  
 
Procedure 
Similar to Study 4.1, a White female experimenter 
attached all the physiological apparatus required to assess 
CV reactivity, and after assessing baseline CV levels, 
participants were instructed to carefully read the bogus CBS 
article, including the moral ideal versus moral obligation 
frame. At this point, participants were reminded that they 
would later discuss these issues with a fellow-participant.  
 
                                                          
6 This was the sample after exclusion of four participants: two due 
to expressed suspicion about the realness of the interaction and 




Pre-interaction speech: Consideration of moral 
ideals vs. obligations. Identical to Study 4.1, participants 
were requested to give an oral presentation on their views on 
equality as a moral ideal (vs. obligation). Participants had 
three minutes for their speech, but could end the recording 
after one minute by pressing the ‘next’ button. After the 
speech, self-reported attitudes toward cultural diversity and 
support for affirmative action were assessed.  
 
Interaction speeches: Introduction to Black 
confederate and discussion of affirmative action. Similar 
to Study 4.1, participants were shown the prerecorded video 
of the Black confederate introducing herself, and 
subsequently, recorded their own introduction video, which 
would ostensibly be transferred to the Black confederate. 
Participants had three minutes for their introduction, but 
could end the recording after one minute by pressing the 
‘next’ button. After having introduced themselves to the 
Black confederate, participants reported their levels of 
personal and collective efficacy with regard to promoting 
social equality. To go beyond a mere introduction speech 
(Study 4.1), participants were requested to give an additional 
speech on their thoughts on affirmative action. We indicated 
that the Black confederate would do the same, and that the 
videos would be exchanged between partners so they would 
both have an idea of where each of them stands with regard 





article. Again, participants had three minutes for their 
speech, but could choose to end the recording after one 
minute by pressing the ‘next’ button. After completing the 
speech on affirmative action, participants were debriefed and 
instructed to open the door of their cubicle. The 
experimenter then came in to remove all the measuring 
equipment from participant’s torsos and fingers. Participants 





Physiological measures. All CV measures were 
recorded in the same way as in Study 4.1 and in accordance 
with psychophysiological guidelines (Sherwood et al., 
1990). Again, TPR and CO reactivity scores were combined 
in a single threat/challenge index (TCI), with lower scores 
indicating greater relative threat.   
 
Self-reports. All self-reports were assessed on 7-point 
scales, with 1 = totally disagree and 7 = totally agree. 
Positive attitudes toward cultural diversity were measured 
with three items: “I would be personally dedicated to 
cultural diversity within an organization”, “It is good to 
invest in cultural diversity”, and “Cultural diversity within 
an organization would be an enrichment for me” 
(Cronbach’s α = .78).  
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Support for affirmative action was measured with five 
items: “Because nonnative Dutch generally get less 
opportunities than native Dutch, I think affirmative action is 
a fair initiative”; “Affirmative action gives qualified 
nonnative Dutch an opportunity they might otherwise not 
get”; “Affirmative action ensures that organizations and 
companies remain competitive in a diverse society”; 
“Affirmative action could lead to organizations and 
companies having to hire unqualified people” [reverse 
coded] ; and “I think affirmative action is necessary to 
reduce the differences in opportunities between native and 
nonnative Dutch” (Cronbach’s α = .82).  
After having introduced themselves to the Black 
confederate, participants’ reported their levels of personal 
efficacy with three items: “I can personally contribute to 
promoting equal treatment of nonnative Dutch”, “I cannot 
change the inequality between native and nonnative 
Dutch”[reverse coded], and “I am confident that I can 
personally contribute to more equal opportunities for 
nonnative Dutch” (Cronbach’s α = .68). Also, collective 
efficacy was assessed using three items: “Native Dutch can 
improve the possibilities and opportunities for nonnative 
Dutch”, “I think that we, as native Dutch, can create a 
change in terms of equality”, and “I don’t think that native 
Dutch can change social inequality in the Netherlands” 
(reverse coded; Cronbach’s α = .64). To confirm that 





separate constructs, we conducted a principal component 
factor analysis, using varimax rotation, of the six items. The 
analysis yielded a 2-factor solution, which explained 65.41% 
of the total variance. Eigen values were 2.76 for the first 
factor (i.e., personal efficacy) and 1.16 for the second factor 
(i.e., collective efficacy), thus confirming our proposed 
distinction between personal and collective efficacy with 
regard to social change. 
 
Behavior. For an unobtrusive assessment of 
participants’ endorsement of multiculturalism, the content of 
their pre-interaction speech about equality as moral ideal vs. 
obligation was examined. Namely, the number of remarks 
participants signaling an appreciation of cultural differences 
(e.g., ‘enrich’ and ‘appreciate’) as well as with a learning 
orientation (e.g., ‘why’, ‘understand’, and ‘learn’; Vorauer 
& Sasaki, 2011) were counted.  
Furthermore, in line with prior work (e.g., Avery et al., 
2009) we had independent judges rate nonverbal behavior 
during the first 30 seconds of the video recordings of 
participants’ interaction speeches. Two independent judges 
who were blind to condition rated on a 7-point scale, the 
video recordings - played without sound - in terms of 
participants’ expressed hostility (three items; hostile, angry, 
and dominant) for the introduction speech (Cronbach’s α = 
.73) as well as for the speech on affirmative action 
(Cronbach’s α = .55). We assessed inter-rater reliability for 
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each item by calculating the quadratic weighted Kappa 
statistic. Inter-rater reliability for each item was excellent for 
the introduction speech: hostile, κ (w) = .91, angry, κ (w) = 
.86, and dominant, κ (w) = .97, as well as for the affirmative 
action speech: hostile, κ (w) = .84, angry, κ (w) = .84, and 
dominant, κ (w) = .89. 
To examine participants’ displays of discomfort during 
those same first 30 seconds of their interaction speeches, the 
frequency of self-touching (e.g., playing with hair, 
scratching head or face) as well as blinking were counted. 
Increased self-touching and increased blink rate have been 
associated with discomfort in prior work (Olson & Fazio, 
2007). Finally, to determine participants’ exerted effort 
during intergroup contact, we measured how long (in 
seconds) participants spoke during the introduction speech 
as well as the speech on affirmative action. 
 
Results 
Due to technical difficulties, some participants’ blood 
pressure data was not recorded and/or unscorable, thus the 
degrees of freedom in the analyses of CV reactivity are not 
always the same. Outliers were identified and handled using 
the same procedures as in Study 4.1.  
 
Physiological Measures 
Similar to Study 4.1, separate univariate tests 





conducted to determine engagement and goal relevance 
during the speech tasks. We observed significant increases in 
HR and VC (ps < .001 - .023), across conditions and speech 
tasks confirming engagement and goal relevance. There 
were no significant effects of condition on HR, all Fs < 1, or 
VC, Fs < 1 and F(1,28) = 1.55, ns, indicating equal levels of 
engagement and goal relevance across conditions and across 
speech tasks.  
 
Threat/challenge index during the pre-interaction 
speech. Similar to Study 4.1, we observed no effect of 
condition on the TCI, F < 1, during participants’ speech on 
equality in terms of moral ideals vs. obligations. Thus, 
morality framing did not significantly shape participants’ 
CV reactivity during the pre-interaction speech. 
 
Threat/challenge index during the interaction 
speeches. To examine the effect of morality framing on CV 
reactivity during the introduction speech as well as the 
affirmative action speech, and to see whether the effect of 
morality framing interacted with speech topic, we conducted 
a repeated measure analysis of variance. We observed a 
significant main effect of condition on TCI during both 
interaction speeches, F(1, 30) = 7.58, p = .01, ηp2 = .20. As 
predicted, participants exposed to the moral ideal frame had 
TCI scores consistent with greater threat (M = -0.69, SD = 
.35) than those exposed to the moral obligation frame (M = 
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0.82, SD = 0.42). There was no effect of interaction topic on 
TCI, F < 1, indicating that CV reactivity did not 
significantly differ between the introduction and affirmative 
action speech. In addition, the interaction between morality 
frame and interaction topic was not significant F < 1. Thus, 
similar to the patterns observed in Study 4.1—where the 
interaction with the Black confederate was unanticipated—
participants exposed to the moral ideal frame exhibited CV 
reactivity consistent with greater relative threat during 
intergroup interaction than those exposed to the moral 
obligation frame. These patterns in CV reactivity were 
independent of the topic of the interaction - i.e., introduction 
or affirmative action. 
 
Self-Reports7 
                                                          
7 The effects on self-reported attitudes found in Study 4.2, albeit in 
the same direction, were not statistically reliable in Studies 4.1 and 
4.3. Thus, we tested whether the same effects reported in Study 4.2 
would arise when combining the data of Study 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3 
into a single dataset (N = 146). On this combined dataset, we 
tested the main and interactive effects of Condition (moral ideal 
vs. obligation) and Study (4.1 vs. 4.2 vs. 4.3) on self-reported 
intergroup attitudes.  
On positive attitudes toward cultural diversity there was a 
marginally significant effect of Condition, F(1,140) = 3.54, p = 
.06, ηp2 = .03. As predicted, over all three studies, participants 
exposed to the moral ideal frame reported more positive attitudes 
toward cultural diversity (M = 5.23, SD = 0.91) than those exposed 
to the moral obligation frame (M = 4.93, SD = 0.97).The effect of 
Study and the interaction between Study and Condition on positive 





Positive attitudes towards cultural diversity. There 
was a significant effect of morality frame on positive 
attitudes toward cultural diversity, F(1, 49) = 4.71, p = .04, 
ηp2 = .09.  As predicted, and replicating earlier findings 
(Does et al., 2011), participants exposed to the moral ideal 
frame reported more positive attitudes towards cultural 
diversity (M = 5.40, SD = 1.02) than those exposed to the 
moral obligation frame (M = 4.82, SD = 0.86).  
 
Support for affirmative action. There was a 
significant effect of morality frame on support for 
affirmative action, F(1, 49) = 4.93, p = .03, ηp2 = .09. As 
expected, and in line with prior work (Does et al., 2011), 
participants exposed to the moral ideal frame reported more 
support for affirmative action (M = 5.24, SD = 0.84) than 
those exposed to the moral obligation frame (M = 4.68, SD = 
                                                                                                            
Similarly, over all three studies self-reported collective efficacy 
was greater after exposure to the moral ideal frame (M = 5.69, SD 
= 0.71) than to the moral obligation frame (M = 5.39, SD = 0.82), 
F(1,140) = 5.85, p = .02, ηp2 = .04, thereby supporting the results 
of Study 4.2. Further corroboration of Study 4.2’s results is the 
finding that personal efficacy did not differ between conditions, 
F<1, or studies, F(1,140) = 2.22, p = .11. On support for 
affirmative action, however, the effect of Condition was not 
reliable, F(1,140) = 1.45, p = .23. The significant interaction 
between Study and Condition on support for affirmative action , 
F(1,140) = 4.06, p = .02, ηp2 = .06, revealed that support for 
affirmative action was only significantly greater after exposure to 
the moral ideal (vs. obligation) frame in Study 4.2, and not in 




0.97). Taken together, these findings corroborate earlier 
work yielding similar positive effects of the moral ideal (vs. 
obligation) frame on Whites’ explicit attitudes toward 
diversity and support of social change (Does et al., 2011). 
Similar to Study 4.1, no differences were observed between 
conditions in terms of participants’ CV reactivity during 
their speech on equality. 
 
Personal and collective efficacy. There was no 
significant effect of morality frame on participants’ self-
reported personal efficacy, F(1, 49) = 1.63, p = .21. 
However, we did observe a marginally significant effect of 
morality frame on collective efficacy, F(1, 49) = 3.41, p = 
.07, ηp2 = .07. Participants exposed to the moral ideal frame 
reported higher levels of collective efficacy (M = 5.96, SD = 
0.64) than those exposed to the moral obligation frame (M = 
5.64, SD = 0.60). This indicates that rather than affecting 
Whites’ personal efficacy, morality frame influences 
Whites’ belief in the ability of their social group as a whole 
to bring about social change. What is more, collective 
efficacy was positively correlated with positive attitudes 
toward cultural diversity as well as support for affirmative 








Table 4.1. Study 4.2: Correlations between TCI (lower scores 
consistent with greater relative threat) and self-reported attitudes.  
 1     2     3     4     5 
1. TCI introduction  
    speech 
.709** -.475** -.264 -.269 
2. TCI affirmative  
    action speech 
 -.518** -.268 -.244 
3. Positive attitudes      
    toward  
    cultural diversity 
     .460** .428** 
4. Collective efficacy    .282* 
5. Support for   
    affirmative  action 
    
Note: * p < .05. ** p < .01 
 
These findings suggests against the alternative 
explanation that the moral ideal (vs. obligation) frame 
decreases Whites’ sense of efficacy with regard to 
establishing social change, resulting in CV patterns 
consistent with greater threat during intergroup contact. 
Indeed, collective efficacy was not reliably associated with 
CV reactivity during the interaction speeches in which 
participants introduced themselves or spoke about 
affirmative action (see Table 4.1). Thus, even though Whites 
exposed to the moral ideal frame exhibited CV reactivity 
consistent with greater threat during intergroup contact, they 
still reported greater collective efficacy with regard to social 






Content analysis of pre-interaction speech: 
Endorsement of multiculturalism. We expected that 
participants who were exposed to the moral ideal frame 
would be more appreciative of—and adopt a greater learning 
orientation with regard to—cultural differences than those 
exposed to the moral obligation frame. A significant effect 
of morality frame on endorsement of multiculturalism was 
observed, F(1, 46) = 5.36, p = .03, ηp2 = .10. We found that 
participants exposed to the moral ideal frame spontaneously 
made more remarks expressing positive attitudes toward 
cultural diversity and/or a learning orientation (M = 4.42, SD 
= 4.19) than those in the moral obligations condition (M = 
2.09, SD = 2.37). In addition, this unobtrusive assessment of 
participants’ endorsement of multiculturalism was positively 
correlated with self-reported positive attitudes toward 
cultural diversity, r = .39, p = .01, and support for 
affirmative action, r = 34, p = .02. 
 
Exerted effort during intergroup contact.  To 
examine the effect of morality framing on speech time 
during the introduction speech as well as the affirmative 
action speech, and to see whether the effect of morality 
framing interacted with speech topic, we conducted a 
repeated measure analysis of variance. There was no 
significant main effect of morality frame on how long 





did observe a significant effect of interaction topic on speech 
time, in that generally participants spoke significantly longer 
during their speech on affirmative action (M = 76.12, SD = 
5.49) than during their introduction speech (M = 38.71, SD = 
4.56), F(1,47) = 66.43, p < .001, ηp2 = .57. There was no 
interaction effect of morality frame and interaction topic on 
participants’ speech time during the interaction speeches, F 
<1.  
Because participants could choose to terminate the 
video recording of their speeches by clicking the ‘next’ 
button, which appeared after 60 seconds, we conducted 
separate univariate tests contrasting participants’ speech 
time against 60 (seconds). For the introduction speech, we 
found that, in both conditions, participants generally spoke 
significantly shorter than 60 seconds; moral ideal frame, 
t(25) = - 4.17, p < .001, M = 38.38; moral obligation frame: 
t(22) = - 3.99, p = .001, M = 36.35. Because we indicated 
very specific guidelines as to what participants should 
include in their introduction (i.e., name, age, major, and 
ethnicity) this finding may indicate participants’ compliance 
rather than their reluctance to exert effort. For the speech on 
affirmative action, we found that participants exposed to the 
moral ideal frame spoke significantly longer that 60 seconds, 
t(25) = 2.82, p = .01, M = 80.1, whereas those exposed to the 
moral obligation frame did not, t(22) = 1.44, p = .17, M = 
72.13. Taken together, these findings suggest that 
participants exposed to the moral ideal frame indeed exerted 
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more effort—i.e., spoke longer than was required—during 
intergroup contact than those exposed to the moral 
obligation frame.  
 
Discomfort and hostility during intergroup contact. 
To examine the effect of morality frame and interaction 
topic on expressed hostility, we conducted a repeated 
measures analysis of variance. There were no significant 
effects of morality frame, or interaction topic, or interaction 
effects of morality frame and interaction topic on 
participants’ expressed hostility. The same was true for 
frequency of self-touching. So although participants exposed 
to the moral ideal frame exhibited CV reactivity consistent 
with greater threat during intergroup contact than those 
exposed to the moral obligation frame, this was not 
associated with greater hostility during intergroup contact. 
We observed a significant effect of interaction topic on 
blinking, F(1, 48) = 18.79, p < . 001, ηp2 = .28, in that 
participants blinked more often during the speech about 
affirmative action (M = 14.39, SD = 0.87) than during the 
introduction speech (M = 11.40, SD = 0.71). We also 
observed a significant effect of morality frame on blinking, 
F(1, 48) = 4.77, p = .03, ηp2 = .09 during both interaction 
speeches. In line with the observed patterns in CV reactivity 
during intergroup contact, participants exposed to the moral 
ideal frame blinked more often (M = 14.46, SD = 0.97) than 





= 1.06). So although participants generally exhibited more 
discomfort during the speech about affirmative action 
compared to the introduction speech, participants exposed to 
the moral ideal frame exhibited significantly more 
discomfort during both interaction speeches than those 
exposed to the moral obligation frame. There was no 
significant interaction effect of morality frame and 
interaction topic on blinking, F < 1, and no reliable 




We hypothesized that the reason why Whites exposed 
to the moral ideal frame exhibit CV reactivity consistent 
with greater threat during intergroup contact is that they hold 
more positive intergroup attitudes—increasing the perceived 
demands—than those exposed to the moral obligation frame. 
Indeed, positive attitudes toward cultural diversity were 
significantly correlated with TCI during both interaction 
speeches (see Table 4.1). Thus, to test the mediating effect 
of positive attitudes toward cultural diversity on the 
relationship between morality frame and CV reactivity 
during the introduction speech (see Figure 4.1) and the 
affirmative action speech (See Figure 4.2) we conducted 
mediation analyses (Baron & Kenny, 1986). As predicted, 
Sobel (1982) tests indicated that the effect of morality frame 
on CV reactivity was partially mediated by attitudes toward 
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cultural diversity for the introduction speech (z = 1.71, one-
tailed p = .04; see Figure 4.1) and fully mediated for the 
affirmative action speech (z = 1.76, one-tailed p = .04; see 
Figure 4.2). Thus, the moral ideal (vs. obligation) frame 
elicited in Whites more positive attitudes toward cultural 
diversity, resulting in CV reactivity consistent with greater 









































































































































































































































































































































































































   
   
   































































































In line with prior work (Does et al., 2011), it was found 
that Whites’ self-reported attitudes toward social change 
(i.e., collective efficacy and support for affirmative action) 
and cultural diversity were more favorable after exposure to 
the moral ideal frame than after the obligation frame. The 
findings of Study 4.2 were in line with those of Study 4.1, in 
that we observed the same effect of morality frame on 
Whites’ CV reactivity during interaction with a Black 
confederate. What is more, the proposed mediating effect of 
positive attitudes toward cultural diversity on the 
relationship between morality framing and Whites’ CV 
reactivity during intergroup contact was confirmed. Framing 
equality as a moral ideal (vs. obligation) inspired more 
positive attitudes toward cultural diversity, resulting in CV 
responses consistent with greater threat during the 
introduction speech as well as the affirmative action speech 
in Whites.  
For the speech on affirmative action, participants 
exposed to the moral ideal frame spoke significantly 
longer—i.e., exerted more effort—than the required 60 
seconds, whereas those exposed to the moral obligation 
frame did not. In addition, Whites’ CV responses during the 
introduction speech did not differ from those during the 
affirmative action speech, providing further evidence that 
observed CV reactivity relates to participants’ awareness 





disadvantaged group, and cannot be accounted for by the 
unexpectedness of the interaction (i.e., Study 4.1) or the 
topic of the interaction (Study 4.2). Finally, although Whites 
who read the moral ideal frame exhibited more discomfort 
(i.e., blinking) and CV reactivity consistent with greater 
threat during intergroup contact than those who read the 
obligation frame, this was not associated with more 
expressed hostility during intergroup contact.  
To provide additional evidence that the patterns of CV 
reactivity observed in Study 4.1 and Study 4.2 are indeed 
specific to the intergroup nature of the interaction speeches 
we conducted Study 4.3. In this study, we replaced the pre-
recorded video of the Black confederate with a video of a 
White confederate, thus creating an intragroup rather than an 
intergroup interaction. Similar to Study 4.2, CV measures 
were assessed throughout the experiment and participants’ 













Study 4.3  
We conducted Study 4.3 to examine the effect of 
morality frame on CV reactivity during an intragroup 
interaction—i.e., with a White confederate. The goal was to 
provide additional evidence for our central claim that the 
effects of morality framing observed in Study 4.1 and 4.2 are 
specific to intergroup contact. To make sure that aside from 
race, the differences between the White confederate and 
Black confederate (Study 4.1 and 4.2) would be kept to a 
minimum, three White confederates recorded an introduction 
video identical to the video of the Black confederate that 
was used in Study 4.1 and 4.2. The three videos of White 
confederates and the video of the Black confederate (Study 
4.1 and 4.2) were rated by ten independent judges on 
categories such as friendliness, attractiveness, and 
intelligence (all scored on a 9-point scale; see Appendix C). 
Pairwise t-tests were conducted and indicated that ratings of 
one White confederate did not significantly differ from those 
of the Black confederate on any of the categories (see 




Sixty-four undergraduate students (38 females) with 
ages ranging from 18 to 29 years (M = 20.91, SD = 2.76) 





obligation frame. Participants were rewarded with course 
credit or money.  
 
Procedure 
Similar to Study 4.2, participants were informed prior 
to the experiment that an interaction would be part of the 
study. All CV measures were recorded in the same way as in 
Study 4.1 and 4.2 and in accordance with 
psychophysiological guidelines (Sherwood et al., 1990). A 
White female experimenter attached all the sensors required 
to measure CV reactivity, and participants again read the 
bogus article of the CBS, after which they gave a speech 
about equality in terms of moral ideals vs. obligations. Next, 
participants were informed of the upcoming interaction and 
were shown a video of a White female confederate 
introducing herself with the following scripted message:  
 
“Um, okay… So we’re going to talk about the CBS article in 
a minute. Um, I thought the differences between native and 
non-native Dutch were pretty big. And I feel like um that 
also sort of reflects on my opportunities in the workforce. 
Um, I’ll introduce myself. Hi! My name is Simone, and I’m 
21 years old. I live in Leiden and I study Psychology here. 
Originally, I am from Rotterdam um so I am native Dutch. 




After viewing the video, participants recorded their own 
introduction video, which would then be ostensibly 
transferred to their interaction partner. Participants had three 
minutes for their introduction, but could end the recording 
after one minute by clicking on the ‘next’ button. After 
introducing themselves to the White confederate, 
participants were asked to give a speech about affirmative 
action, followed by debriefing.  
Similar to Study 4.2, two independent judges who were 
blind to condition rated the first 30 seconds of participants’ 
interaction speeches in terms of perceived hostility (three 
items: hostile, angry, and dominant). However, in contrast to 
Study 4.2 - where participants interacted with a Black 
confederate - ‘dominant’ was not significantly correlated 
with ‘hostile’ and ‘angry’. Therefore, only the latter two 
items were used in the analyses; introduction speech, r = .56, 
p < .001; affirmative action speech, r = .75, p < .001. Similar 
to Study 4.2, we assessed inter-rater reliability for both items 
by calculating the quadratic weighted Kappa statistic. Inter-
rater reliability for both items was excellent for the 
introduction speech: hostile, κ (w) =.87, angry, κ (w) = .86, 
as well as for the affirmative action speech: hostile, κ (w) = 
.95, angry, κ (w) = .93. Finally, and identical to Study 4.2, 





well as speech time in seconds (i.e., exerted effort) for both 
interaction speeches8. 
Results 
Similar to Study 4.1 and 4.2, TPR and CO reactivity 
scores were combined in a single threat/challenge index 
(TCI), with lower scores indicating greater relative threat.  
Outliers were identified and handled the same way as in 
Study 4.1 and 4.2. 
 
Participant Attrition 
 Five participants indicated that they were nonnative 
Dutch and one participant had already participated in Study 
4.2 and was thus familiar with the manipulation and goal of 
the experiment. Three participants expressed suspicion about 
the realness of the interaction. We excluded these 
participants from analyses resulting in a sample of 55 native 
Dutch participants (32 females) with an average age of 20.58 
                                                          
8 Prior to the interaction, we assessed self-reported positive 
attitudes toward cultural diversity (3 items; Cronbach’s α =.80), 
and support for affirmative action (5 items; Cronbach’s α =.79). 
Post-interaction, we assessed self-reported personal efficacy (3 
items; Cronbach’s α =.78) and collective efficacy (2 items, r =.30, 
p = .03). There was a marginally significant effect of morality 
frame on collective efficacy, F(1,53) = 3.06, p = .09, ηp2 = .06. In 
line with Study 4.2, participants exposed to the moral ideal frame 
reported greater collective efficacy (M = 5.53, SD = 0.58) than 
those exposed to the moral obligation frame (M = 5.19, SD = 
0.88). There were no effects of morality frame observed on the 




years (SD = 2.51). Due to technical difficulties, some 
participants’ blood pressure data was not recorded and/or 
unscorable, thus the degrees of freedom in the analyses of 
CV reactivity are not always the same. 
 
Physiological Measures 
Similar to Study 4.1 and 4.2, separate univariate tests 
contrasting HR and VC reactivity scores to zero were first 
conducted to determine engagement and goal relevance 
during the speech tasks. For the pre-interaction speech, we 
observed significant increases in HR, p < .001, but not in 
VC, p = .38. The latter indicates insufficient goal relevance 
during the pre-interaction speech, thus threat/challenge 
analyses were not warranted for this speech task. It could be 
the case that participants’ anticipation of the upcoming 
interaction speech decreased participants’ perceptions of the 
goal relevance of the pre-speech. There was no effect of 
morality framing on VC, F < 1, indicating that (the lack of) 
goal relevance was equal for both conditions. We did 
observe a marginally significant effect of morality framing 
on HR, F(1, 25) = 3.79, p = .06, ηp2 = .13. Participants 
exposed to the moral ideal frame were marginally more 
engaged (M = 16.28, SD = 9.23) when giving the speech 
about equality than those exposed to the moral obligation 
frame (M = 9.39, SD = 8.22). However, due to the lack of 





VC—no threat/challenge analyses were conducted for the 
pre-interaction speech. 
For both interaction speeches, we did observe 
significant increases in HR and VC, all ps < .03, across 
conditions confirming engagement and goal relevance. 
There were no significant effects of morality framing on VC, 
ps > .18, indicating equal levels of goal relevance across 
conditions. There was no effect of morality frame on HR 
during the introduction speech, p = .12, but there was a 
significant effect of morality framing on HR during the 
affirmative action speech, F(1, 28) = 4.24, p = .05, ηp2 = .13. 
When giving a speech about affirmative action, Whites who 
were exposed to the moral ideal frame were more engaged 
(M = 11.24, SD = 8.41) than those exposed to the moral 
obligation frame (M = 4.34, SD = 9.93). In sum, the 
significant increases in VC and HR across conditions 
warranted threat/challenge analyses of the interaction 
speeches. 
 
Threat/challenge index during the interaction 
speeches. To examine the effect of morality framing on CV 
reactivity during the introduction speech as well as the 
affirmative action speech, and to see whether the effect of 
morality framing interacted with speech topic, we conducted 
a repeated measure analysis of variance. As predicted, we 
observed no significant effect of morality framing on TCI 
during the interaction speeches, F < 1. There was no effect 
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of interaction topic on TCI, F < 1, indicating that, similar to 
Study 4.2, CV reactivity did not significantly differ between 
the introduction and affirmative action speech. In addition, 
the interaction between condition and interaction topic was 
not significant F < 1. Thus, these findings suggest that the 
patterns in CV reactivity as a function of morality framing 
observed in Study 4.1 and 4.2 were indeed specific to the 
intergroup, rather than the merely social (Study 4.3), nature 




Exerted effort during intragroup contact. To 
examine the effect of morality framing on speech time 
during the introduction speech as well as the affirmative 
action speech, and to see whether the effect of morality 
framing interacted with speech topic, we conducted a 
repeated measure analysis of variance. There was no 
significant main effect of morality frame on how long 
participants spoke during the interaction speeches, F < 1. 
Similar to Study 4.2, we did observe a significant effect of 
interaction topic on speech time, in that participants 
generally spoke significantly longer during their speech on 
affirmative action (M = 69.04, SD = 3.05) than during their 
introduction speech  (M = 44.84, SD = 3.84), F(1,53) = 
47.15, p < .001, ηp2 = .47. There was no interaction effect of 
morality frame and interaction topic on participants’ speech 





Similar to Study 4.2, and because participants could 
choose to terminate the video recording of their speeches by 
clicking the ‘next’ button, which appeared after 60 seconds, 
we conducted separate univariate tests contrasting 
participants’ speech time against 60 (seconds). Similar to 
Study 4.2, it was observed that for the introduction speech, 
participants generally spoke significantly shorter than 60 
seconds; moral ideal frame, t(30) = - 3.39, p < .01, M = 
43.84; moral obligation frame: t (23) = - 2.29, p = .03, M = 
45.83. In line with Study 4.2, we interpret this finding as 
indicating participants’ compliance with the specific 
guidelines we provided for this speech task (i.e., state your 
name, age, major, and ethnicity) rather than a general 
reluctance to exert effort.  In contrast to Study 4.2, we found 
that for the speech on affirmative action participants in both 
conditions spoke significantly longer than 60 seconds; moral 
ideal frame, t(30) = 1.97, p = .06, M = 67.42; moral 
obligation frame: t(23) = 2.16, p = .04, M = 70.67. The latter 
provides additional evidence for the interpretation of the 
finding in Study 4.2 that participants exposed to the moral 
obligation frame were not motivated to exert more effort 
during intergroup contact, whereas those exposed to the 
moral ideal frame—who spoke longer than required during 
their speech about affirmative action—were.  
 
Discomfort and hostility during intragroup contact. 
To examine the effect of condition and interaction topic 
147 
 
(introduction vs. affirmative action) on expressed hostility, 
we conducted a repeated measures analysis of variance. 
There was a significant effect of condition on expressed 
hostility during the interaction speeches, F(1, 53) = 4.36, p = 
.04, ηp2 = .08. Participants exposed to the moral obligation 
frame expressed more hostility during interaction (M = 2.25, 
SD = 0.14) than those exposed to the moral ideal frame (M = 
1.87, SD = 0.12). There was no effect of interaction topic, 
F(1, 53) = 2.37, p = .13, ηp2 =.04, indicating that expressed 
hostility did not differ between the introduction speech and 
the speech on affirmative action. The interaction between 
morality frame and interaction topic was significant, F(1, 
53) = 3.98, p = .05, ηp2 = .07. Simple main effect analyses 
revealed that participants exposed to the moral obligation 
frame expressed more hostility (M = 2.50, SD = 0.18) than 
those exposed to the moral ideal frame (M = 1.84, SD = 
0.16) during the introduction speech, but not during the 
affirmative action speech. 
Similar to Study 4.2, we conducted a repeated measures 
analysis of variance to examine the effect of morality 
framing and interaction topic on the frequency of self-
touching during the interaction speeches. The results 
revealed a marginally significant effect of morality frame on 
frequency of self-touching, F(1, 53) = 3.63, p = .06, ηp2 = 
.06. Participants who were exposed to the moral ideal frame 
self-touched more often (M = 0.97, SD = 0.23) than those 





during interaction speeches. Thus, participants displayed 
more discomfort after exposure to the moral ideal frame than 
after exposure to the moral obligation frame. There was no 
effect of interaction topic, or interaction effects of morality 
frame and interaction topic on the frequency of self-
touching, Fs < 1.   
Similar to Study 4.2, a repeated measures analysis of 
variance revealed a significant effect of interaction topic on 
blinking, F(1, 53) = 13.21, p = .001, ηp2 = .20. Participants 
blinked more often during the speech about affirmative 
action (M = 15.46, SD = 1.01) than during the introduction 
speech (M = 12.76, SD = 0.94). Thus, participants displayed 
more discomfort during their speech on affirmative action 
than during their introduction speech. There was no 
significant effect of morality framing, F(1, 53) = 1.20,          
p = .28, ηp2 = .02, or interaction effect between morality 
framing and interaction topic on blinking, F < 1. 
Taken together, these findings corroborate our central 
argument that the differences in CV reactivity between the 
moral ideal and obligation frame observed in Study 4.1 and 
4.2 are indeed specific to intergroup contact. During 
intragroup contact, we observed no significant differences 
between morality frames in Whites’ CV reactivity in terms 
of threat and challenge. We did observe marginally 
significant effects of morality framing on participants’ CV 
reactivity in terms of engagement. Namely, participants 
exposed to the moral ideal frame exhibited CV reactivity 
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consistent with greater engagement during the speech about 
equality and affirmative action compared to those exposed to 
the moral obligation frame. In sum, these findings 
corroborate our reasoning that the patterns in Whites’ CV 
reactivity as a function of morality framing observed in 
Study 4.1 and 4.2 were indeed specific to the intergroup, 




The current research corroborates findings from Does 
and colleagues (2011), as it was found that presenting 
equality as a moral ideal (vs. obligation) increased White 
participants’ support for affirmative action, positive attitudes 
toward cultural diversity, and sense of collective efficacy to 
bring about social change (Study 4.2). Furthermore, it was 
found that during intergroup (Study 4.1 and 4.2) but not 
intragroup (Study 4.3) contact, morality framing shapes 
Whites’ CV reactivity. Namely, when interacting with a 
Black confederate, exposure to the moral ideal (vs. 
obligation) frame induced CV reactivity consistent with 
greater threat among White participants (Study 4.1 and 
Study 4.2). The relationship between morality framing and 
CV reactivity during intergroup contact was mediated by 
positive attitudes toward cultural diversity (Study 4.2). 
Importantly, CV reactivity consistent with greater threat as 





not associated with more negative evaluations of the Black 
confederate post-interaction (Study 4.1) or more nonverbal 
displays of hostility (Study 4.2). Taken together then, these 
findings suggest that Whites exhibiting greater CV reactivity 
in line with threat responses during intergroup contact may 
be a necessary step toward actual social change. No 
differences in CV reactivity were found between morality 
frames when White participants interacted with a White 
confederate (Study 4.3), corroborating our reasoning that 
morality framing shapes Whites’ CV reactivity in an 
intergroup rather than an intragroup context. 
The findings outlined here suggest that physiological 
responses during intergroup contact may, under some 
circumstances, stem from Whites’ positive attitudes toward 
cultural diversity (Study 4.2). More specifically, the current 
work suggests that as people become more positive toward 
cultural diversity—in this case after exposure to the moral 
ideal rather than obligation frame—this increases their 
perceived situational demands of the interaction, thereby 
resulting in CV reactivity consistent with greater 
experienced psychological threat (Study 4.1 and Study 4.2). 
Thus, because the moral ideal frame elicits more positive 
attitudes toward cultural diversity, it also increases the 
perceived demands of an intergroup interaction, resulting in 
CV reactivity consistent with greater threat compared to the 
moral obligation frame. In line with the observed patterns in 
CV reactivity, it was found that Whites exposed to the moral 
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ideal frame displayed more discomfort during intergroup 
contact—assessed by more blinking—than after exposure to 
the moral obligation frame, and exerted more effort than was 
required (Study 4.2). Also, Whites exposed to the moral 
ideal frame reported equal levels of personal efficacy and 
even higher levels of collective efficacy with regard to social 
change compared to those exposed to the moral obligation 
frame (Study 4.2). 
Although morality framing significantly impacted on 
Whites’ CV reactivity and blinking during intergroup 
contact (Study 4.1 and Study 4.2), and their intergroup 
attitudes (Study 4.2), it was not associated with explicit 
evaluations of the Black confederate (Study 4.1), implicit 
outgroup bias (Study 4.1), or expressed hostility during 
intergroup contact (Study 4.2). Thus, Whites’ threat 
responses during intergroup contact do not necessarily have 
negative consequences. In fact, such physiological reactivity 
may actually constitute constructive responses in an 
intergroup context (see also Vorauer & Sasaki, 2011) 
stemming from a greater willingness to promote equality and 
learn about other cultures (Study 4.2; Does et al., 2011). 
We aimed to assess the effect of morality framing on 
various aspects we deem relevant to understanding the 
dynamics of intergroup contact (i.e., CV reactivity consistent 
with psychological threat/challenge, nonverbal behavior and 
exerted effort). Given the complexity of the processes 





of our studies, not all the effects we found were equally 
powerful. However, we argue, when these results are 
considered conjointly rather than in isolation, they paint a 
coherent picture of the impact of morality framing on 
attitudes and Whites’ responses to intergroup contact. 
Framing social equality as a moral ideal (vs. obligation) 
results in greater support for social change and more positive 
attitudes toward cultural diversity among Whites. In turn, 
more positive attitudes toward cultural differences increase 
Whites’ perceived demands of an intergroup interaction, 
resulting in CV reactivity consistent with greater threat. 
Importantly, as this increased threat response was caused by 
more positive intergroup attitudes, it was not associated with 
greater hostility during the intergroup interaction or more 
negative evaluations of the Black confederate.    
 
Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
The effects of morality frame on positive attitudes 
toward cultural diversity and support for affirmative action 
in Study 4.2 replicate earlier findings (Does et al., 2011) and 
were generally similar in pattern to the results of Study 4.1 
and 4.3, with the exception of support for affirmative action 
in Study 4.3. However, the effects of morality frame on 
intergroup attitudes did not reach significance in Study 4.1 
and Study 4.3. We suspect that this might be due to 
differences in the experimental procedures between 
studies focusing on self-reported attitudes (Does et al., 
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2011), versus studies designed to capture 
psychophysiological responses (such as the current 
work). The assessment of cardiovascular responses affects 
the way participants are approached and treated throughout 
the experimental session. Additional instructions (the request 
to keep still body parts attached to electrodes), the awareness 
of being attached to monitoring equipment (e.g. the 
requirement to wear a finger cuff on the index-finger of the 
non-dominant hand during the entire experiment), 
and the interaction with the experimenter (having a stranger 
apply electrodes directly on one's torso) all result in 
conditions that may be suboptimal to assess subtle changes 
in self-reported attitudes. It is inevitable in such a setup that 
participants are keenly aware of the psychophysiological 
measures that are taken. This is likely to draw their explicit 
attention away from the self-report measures ("this is not 
what the study is really about"), thus making it less easy to 
find reliable effects of experimental condition on self-
reports. This could explain why the effect of condition on 
intergroup attitudes did not reach significance in Study 4.1 
and 4.3, separately.  
Because in Study 4.1 and Study 4.3 the patterns of the 
means were generally as predicted, we ran additional 
analyses by combining the self-reported data of Study 4.1, 
4.2 and 4.3 into a single dataset. Analyses on this combined 
dataset did yield the predicted effect of condition on positive 





and the former replicates findings by Does et al. (2011). In 
sum, based on prior work (Does et al., 2011), the results on 
self-reported attitudes in Study 4.2, as well as the results 
from the analyses of the combined dataset of Study 4.1, 4.2, 
and 4.3, we are confident that Whites’ intergroup attitudes 
are more favorable after exposure to the moral ideal frame 
than the moral obligation frame. Future work may examine 
how exactly the environment and equipment necessary to 
assess cardiovascular reactivity and other physiological 
markers may impact on self-reported measures. 
Furthermore, it is not yet clear why the effect of 
morality framing on Whites’ CV pattern while verbalizing 
their thoughts on social equality as a moral ideal versus 
obligation observed in prior work (Does et al., 2012) was not 
observed in the studies outlined above. Whereas prior work 
has found that the moral ideal frame elicits less threat during 
a speech about equality than the moral obligation frame 
(Does et al., 2012), no effect of morality framing was found 
in terms of CV reactivity during the pre-interaction speeches 
about equality in the current studies. This can potentially be 
explained by differences in procedures between prior and the 
current work, such as experimenters’ race and salience of the 
upcoming interaction, indicating that subtle contextual 
differences matter when it comes to framing effects. Future 
research might further test the robustness of the effect of 
morality framing on Whites’ CV reactivity when giving a 
155 
 
speech about equality by specifying the impact of procedural 
differences.  
The current work points to the importance of studying, 
with a multi-method approach, the interplay between 
different aspects of intergroup relations vs. considering these 
aspects in isolation. Indeed, much work has been done on 
prejudice, attitudes toward social change, and intergroup 
contact, yet very little work has examined the interplay 
between these different aspects (for exceptions see Dixon, 
Durrheim, & Tredoux, 2007; Saguy, Tausch, Dovidio, & 
Pratto, 2009). The current research underscores the complex 
nature of the interrelationships between these different 
aspects of intergroup relations, as it shows that more positive 
intergroup attitudes can result in CV reactivity consistent 
with greater threat during intergroup contact. In addition, we 
would also like to point out that had we not included CV 
measures, or assessed nonverbal behavior, we would have 
been oblivious to important parts of the process. Explicit, 
more controlled measures (e.g., self-reports) reflected solely 
beneficial effects of the moral ideal frame compared to the 
moral obligation frame on intergroup attitudes. It was only 
by including the CV measures and ratings of nonverbal 
behavior, that we were able to delineate differences between 
the moral ideal and obligation frame during intergroup 
contact.  
Namely, exposure to the moral ideal frame elicited in 





discomfort as assessed by increased blinking compared to 
exposure to the moral obligation frame. At the same time, it 
was found that Whites exposed to the moral ideal frame 
reported more positive intergroup attitudes, and exerted 
more effort than was required during intergroup contact. CV 
reactivity consistent with greater threat as a function of 
morality framing was reliably associated with more positive 
attitudes toward cultural diversity, but not with greater 
hostility expressed during intergroup contact, thereby 
suggesting that—at least under some conditions—threat may 
be an adaptive response. In sum, we echo other scholars 
(e.g., Mendes et al., 2002) by strongly encouraging the 
inclusion of multiple measures in future examinations of 
intergroup processes generally, and of intergroup 
interactions in particular. 
 
Implications for Practice 
In terms of practical implications, our data suggest that 
Whites’ increased displays of anxiety during intergroup 
contact can be indicative of ‘wanting to do well’ during an 
intergroup interaction, rather than being a sign of racial bias 
or prejudice. The moral ideal (vs. obligation) frame raised 
Whites’ support for social change and positive attitudes 
toward cultural diversity, while also raising displays of 
anxiety (i.e., blinking) during intergroup interaction. While 
in some cases increased anxiety may well be indicative of 
greater racial bias, our data suggest that in some cases 
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displays of anxiety can be epiphenomena of increased effort 
to maximize the intergroup encounter. However, at the same 
time, Whites’ displays of anxiety during an interracial 
interaction may be misinterpreted by Blacks as signs of 
racial bias (Dovidio et al., 2002). Thus, whereas a moral 
ideal frame seems an effective intervention to increase 
Whites’ commitment and willingness to promote equality 
compared to the moral obligation frame, additional 
interventions may be required to facilitate the navigation of 
intergroup encounters.  
One example of such an additional intervention is to 
provide individuals with behavioral scripts during intergroup 
contact. There is recent work showing that providing 
behavioral scripts to individuals in an intergroup interaction 
is an effective way to reduce intergroup anxiety. Namely, 
behaviorally scripted (i.e., interviewer and applicant) 
compared to unscripted (i.e., conversation partners) contexts 
were found to mitigate the intergroup anxiety and discomfort 
often observed in Whites during intergroup contact (Avery 
et al., 2009). Avery and colleagues (2009) theorized that the 
scripted context provides more norms and cues to guide 
appropriate speech and behavior, which in turn, reduce 
uncertainty and anxiety during intergroup contact. Thus, 
combining a moral ideal frame—which increases Whites’ 
commitment to social change—with a more concrete, 





highly effective in establishing not only more positive 
intergroup contact, but also social change more broadly.  
 
Conclusion 
The current findings support our prediction that aside 
from intergroup attitudes, morality framing also impacts on 
the way White individuals experience and behave during 
intergroup interactions. Framing equality as a moral ideal 
(vs. obligation) elicits more positive attitudes toward cultural 
diversity, thereby increasing the perceived demands of 
intergroup contact, resulting in CV reactivity consistent with 
“threat”. Importantly, increased threat during the interaction 
was not associated with more negative evaluations of the 
outgroup interaction-partner or with more negative behavior 
during intergroup interaction. Thus, and perhaps counter-
intuitively, Whites displaying a certain degree of threat 
during intergroup interaction may actually be an optimistic 
sign. Indeed, the findings outlined in the current work 
suggest that, among dominant group members, experiences 
of threat during contact with subordinate group members 
may—at least under some circumstances—be a necessary 




For Study 4.3, ten judges rated the videos of White 
confederates A, B, and C, and the Black confederate (used in 
Study 4.1 and 4.2) on the categories listed below. Pairwise t-
tests were conducted for each category contrasting ratings of 
White confederates’ videos with those of the Black 
confederate’s video, and t values are listed in the table 
below. On the basis of these analyses, we selected White 
confederate C for Study 4.3, as this confederate did not 
significantly differ from the Black confederate on any of the 
categories. 
 






Category White A White B White C 
Friendly    2.67*  - 0.77   2.01 
Attractive  - 1.73  - 1.63 - 0.61 
Enthusiastic  - 0.73  - 1.31   2.04 
Dominant  - 5.54**  - 2.10 - 0.61 
Nervous    3.08*    1.54   0.92 
Uncomfortable    4.52**    1.03   0.90 
Calm  - 0.16  - 0.34   0.47 























The central goal of this dissertation was to identify an 
effective psychological intervention to increase dominant 
group members’ commitment to social change toward a 
more equal society. I focused on the perspective of dominant 
group members, because they are potentially valuable allies 
in the struggle toward more equality as their group often has 
more power than minority groups. At the same time, 
dominant group members are more likely than subordinate 
group members to oppose social change, thereby 
perpetuating their group’s privilege and power. I theorized 
that if redressing inequality becomes a way for dominant 
group members to boost their group’s moral standing (i.e., as 
fair and just), resistance to social change among these group 
members will decrease, thereby increasing opportunities for 
social change.  
Evidence from moral psychology research suggests that 
framing an issue as a moral one might be an effective 
strategy to render support and commitment. People want to 
be perceived as moral agents, and they want to belong to 
groups that are perceived as moral. What is more, people are 
more motivated by moral evaluations than by evaluations 
pertaining to competence and sociability (Ellemers, Pagliaro, 
Barreto, & Leach, 2007; Leach, Ellemers, & Barreto, 2007). 
Paradoxically, because morality is such an important part of 
people’s self-concept, dominant group members can also 
become defensive, and/or deny the existence of inequality, 
when their group’s morality is being questioned. Thus, I 
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proposed that presenting equality as the ingroup’s moral 
ideal rather than moral obligation should improve dominant 
group members’ attitudes and motivation toward social 
change, and their responses during intergroup interactions. 
Below, I will outline the main hypotheses and findings per 
chapter and then discuss their combined implications for 
theory and practice. 
 
Chapter 2: Hypotheses and Main Findings 
In Chapter 2, I hypothesized that presenting equality as 
a moral ideal rather than an obligation would pose less threat 
to dominant group members’ social identity and inspire 
more positive intergroup attitudes. In addition, I was 
interested in examining how morality framing would shape 
advantaged group members’ goal attainment strategies in 
terms of approach relative to avoidance. Results of the 
studies outlined in Chapter 2 corroborated my predictions. In 
line with regulatory focus theory (Higgins, 1997), findings 
from Study 2.1 indicate that presenting equality as a moral 
ideal versus obligation focused Whites more on positive 
things they can do—do’s —and less on negative things they 
can avoid—don’ts—to increase equality. In Study 2.2 it was 
found that Whites who read the moral ideal frame were more 
supportive of affirmative action that those who read the 
moral obligation frame. Among White employees who 
participated in Study 2.3.1, the moral ideal frame led to more 





greater prioritization of equality. Furthermore, it was found 
that White employees who read the moral obligation frame 
reported more threat to their social identity than those who 
read the moral ideal frame. Thus, Study 2.2 and Study 2.3.1 
provided the first evidence of the moral ideal frame having 
greater persuasive power than the moral obligation frame 
when it comes to increasing Whites’ commitment to redress 
inequality.  
Study 2.3.2 was conducted to exclude the alternative 
explanation that the observed differences in intergroup 
attitudes were merely a function of positive versus negative 
framing. Thus, in this study, the ideal/obligation distinction 
was applied to a nonmoral domain - competence. As 
predicted, no effects were found on dominant group 
members’ attitudes when framing equality in terms of 
competence obligations versus ideals, thus supporting the 
claim that the effects observed in Study 2.1 through Study 
2.3.1 were indeed specific to morality framing.  
The results from these four studies corroborate the 
prediction that presenting a moral ideal rather than an 
obligation frame of equality elicits more favorable 
intergroup attitudes, including increased support for 
affirmative action, among dominant group members. Thus, 
the moral ideal frame seems to be superior to the moral 
obligation frame in the extent to which it persuades 
members of dominant groups to value equality and cultural 
diversity. These effects were found in populations consisting 
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of White students as well as White employees. To my 
knowledge, this work represents the first demonstration of 
the impact of morality framing on Whites’ intergroup 
attitudes. 
 
Chapter 3: Hypotheses and Main Findings 
The central aim of Chapter 3 was to examine, beyond 
self-reported intergroup attitudes (Chapter 2), the impact of 
morality framing on Whites’ more automatic, less 
consciously controlled responses. I hypothesized that, when 
giving a speech about increasing social equality, exposure to 
the moral ideal and obligation frame would elicit 
physiological arousal (i.e., cardiovascular reactivity 
indicative of goal relevance) in Whites. More importantly, I 
expected that exposure to the moral ideal (vs. obligation 
frame) would elicit cardiovascular reactivity consistent with 
less relative “threat”, and greater relative “challenge” in 
Whites. As stated previously in this dissertation, the 
biopsychosocial model (Blascovich & Tomaka, 1996) posits 
that threat (vs. challenge) states result from individuals’ 
evaluations of situational demands, such as perceived effort, 
uncertainty, and danger, compared to their personal 
resources, such as knowledge and social support. When 
appraised resources outweigh the demands, cardiovascular 
reactivity consistent with challenge arises, but when the 
appraised demands outweigh the resources this results in 





Results of Study 3 corroborated the predictions. Giving 
a speech about social equality in moral terms—i.e., in both 
conditions—elicited cardiovascular reactivity consistent 
with goal relevance and engagement in Whites, indexed by 
increased ventricular contractility and heart rate, 
respectively. Further analyses revealed that during their 
speech about equality as a moral ideal (vs. obligation), 
Whites’ cardiovascular reactivity was consistent with greater 
relative challenge—and thus less relative threat. Finally, it 
was found that Whites spoke significantly faster, indicating 
greater eagerness and less vigilance, when speaking about 
equality as a moral ideal rather than an obligation.  
The findings outlined above advance our understanding 
of how morality framing shapes Whites’ motivational 
tendencies when it comes to increasing social equality. 
Namely, when Whites’ speak about equality in terms of 
moral ideals rather than obligations, this decreases the 
perceived situational demands, thereby resulting in less 
relative threat. I theorize that Whites’ appraisals of the 
situational demand component “danger” —which can be 
either physical or psychological—were particularly 
influenced by the morality frames during the speech task. I 
base this interpretation on two findings in Chapter 2 in 
particular. First, in Study 2.1 it was found that after reading 
the moral obligation (vs. ideal) frame, Whites’ reported 
more prejudice-avoidance actions when they were asked 
how they could personally contribute to more equality. This 
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greater focus on avoiding prejudice caused by the moral 
obligation rather than the ideal frame, could be indicative of 
a greater concern with the psychological danger of being 
(perceived as) prejudiced. Second, and perhaps more 
directly, in Study 2.3.1 it was found that the moral obligation 
frame elicited more self-reported social identity threat—i.e., 
more psychological danger—in Whites than the moral ideal 
frame. Thus, this suggests that greater psychological danger 
was evoked when asking Whites to give a speech about 
equality in terms of moral obligations than in terms of moral 
ideals, consistent with the observed cardiovascular reactivity 
associated with greater relative threat. 
In conclusion, the results of Chapter 3 corroborate the 
beneficial effects of the moral ideal (vs. obligation) frame on 
intergroup attitudes outlined in Chapter 2, and suggest 
against mere lip service. By examining Whites’ less 
controlled, more automatic responses—in terms of 
cardiovascular reactivity—and their goal attainment strategy 
- in terms of behavioral eagerness and vigilance - these 
results point to a genuine shift in goal achievement strategy 
caused by presenting equality as a moral ideal versus 
obligation.  
 
Chapter 4: Hypotheses and Main Findings 
In Chapter 4, the goal was to examine the effects of 
morality framing during intergroup contact. Specifically, I 





behavioral responses to the moral ideal versus obligation 
frame during interaction with a Black confederate. Based on 
the results observed in Chapter 2 and 3, I wanted to explore 
whether morality framing also influences Whites’ 
motivational tendencies and behavior during intergroup 
contact, and I examined this in several ways.   
In Study 4.1, I examined whether morality framing 
shapes Whites’ CV reactivity during intergroup contact and 
their implicit bias (assessed with an IAT). As theorized in 
the discussion of Chapter 3 above, I expected morality 
framing to shape threat/challenge responses due to its 
influence on Whites’ perceptions of the situational demands 
(e.g., danger, perceived effort) of an intergroup interaction. 
After giving a speech about equality as a moral ideal versus 
obligation, White participants were shown a video of a 
Black confederate introducing herself. Ostensibly, the Black 
confederate was a fellow-participant in another cubicle with 
whom participants would later discuss a newspaper article 
about inequality. After seeing the video, White participants 
gave a speech in which they introduced themselves to a 
Black confederate – thus engaging in intergroup contact. 
After the introduction speech, participants completed an 
IAT, which was introduced as a test measuring how well 
participants were able to attain the ideal versus meet the 
obligation of equality, depending on condition. In contrast to 
Chapter 3 where Whites merely verbalized their views on 
equality as a moral ideal versus obligation, it was found that 
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during intergroup contact exposure to the moral ideal (vs. 
obligation) frame induced CV reactivity consistent with 
greater relative threat in Whites. So, although the moral ideal 
(vs. obligation) frame elicits more positive attitudes toward 
cultural diversity, more support for affirmative action 
(Chapter 2 and 4), and less relative threat when giving a 
speech about equality (Chapter 3), it also elicits greater 
relative threat during intergroup contact (Study 4.1). 
Morality framing had no effect on participants’ IAT scores, 
suggesting that whereas morality framing shapes Whites’ 
explicit intergroup attitudes (Chapter 2 and 4), implicit 
associations remain unaltered.  
The procedure of Study 4.2 was similar to Study 4.1, 
with the addition of a more meaningful intergroup contact 
situation. Namely, after the introduction speech White 
participants also gave a speech about affirmative action, in 
which they addressed the Black confederate. Replicating the 
findings from Study 4.1, it was again found that exposure to 
the moral ideal frame induced greater relative threat in 
White participants during intergroup contact than exposure 
to the moral obligation frame. The topic of speech—i.e., 
introduction or affirmative action—did not matter, as the 
moral ideal frame elicited greater relative threat than the 
moral obligation frame during both speeches. 
Replicating the findings from Chapter 2, participants 
exposed to the moral ideal frame reported more positive 





obligation frame. What is particularly noteworthy is that 
even though Whites exposed to the moral ideal (vs. 
obligation) frame exhibited greater relative threat during 
intergroup contact, they reported greater collective 
efficacy—i.e., were more likely to believe that their group 
could increase social equality—which was assessed post-
interaction.  
Morality framing was also found to predict Whites’ 
behavior during intergroup contact. During the affirmative 
action speech, Whites spoke significantly longer than was 
required after exposure to the moral ideal frame, but not 
after exposure to the moral obligation frame. The latter can 
be interpreted as Whites’ willingness to exert additional 
effort during intergroup contact, but only after reading the 
moral ideal frame. In addition, we observed a significant 
effect of morality framing on the frequency of blinking, such 
that in line with CV patterns, Whites’ exposed to the moral 
ideal frame blinked more often during the interaction than 
those exposed to the moral obligation frame. Finally, 
morality framing did not predict expressed hostility during 
intergroup contact, nor was there a reliable association 
between CV patterns and expressed hostility. The latter 
finding demonstrates that CV reactivity in line with greater 
threat during intergroup contact does not necessarily result 
in more expressed hostility during said contact. 
To examine the process underlying Whites’ CV 
reactivity during intergroup contact, mediation analyses 
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were conducted. It was found that the effect of morality 
framing on CV reactivity was mediated by positive attitudes 
toward cultural diversity. Namely, the moral ideal (vs. 
obligation) frame induced more positive attitudes toward 
cultural diversity, which paradoxically resulted in CV 
reactivity consistent with greater relative threat during 
contact with the Black confederate. In other words, the more 
positive Whites become toward equality, the more they 
exhibit CV reactivity consistent with threat during 
intergroup contact. So, why is it that ascribing greater value 
to cultural diversity and equality results in more relative 
threat during contact with a subordinate group member?  
This question can probably be best answered with 
reference to Blascovich’s (2008) explanation of the 
hierarchical structure of goals. He explains that in order to 
achieve a desirable superordinate goal (e.g., increased social 
equality) individuals may be required to approach a series of 
subordinate goals (e.g., engage in intergroup interaction). 
These subordinate goals can prove threatening to reach when 
they entail a situation in which perceived demands outweigh 
the perceived resources. However, because the superordinate 
goal is perceived as desirable, individuals will still approach 
the threatening subordinate goal. In this light, the moral ideal 
(vs. obligation) frame can be seen as increasing the 
desirability of the superordinate goal – increased equality – 
as indicated by Whites’ increased support for affirmative 





attitudes toward cultural diversity (Chapter 2 and 4). This 
may be the reason why giving a speech about ways to attain 
the superordinate goal (Chapter 3) is less demanding (e.g., 
less perceived danger) and thus more relatively challenging 
and less relatively threatening. Yet, engaging in an 
intergroup interaction (subordinate goal) may be more 
threatening after exposure to the moral ideal frame because 
this frame increases the perceived demands (e.g., perceived 
effort) compared to the moral obligation frame. It seems 
plausible to assume that those who find the superordinate 
goal of increased equality less desirable – i.e., those exposed 
to the moral obligation frame – may perceive the demands of 
subordinate goals such as engaging in intergroup interactions 
as less demanding than those exposed to the moral ideal 
frame. For example, a student who desires a high-end job 
after graduation (superordinate goal) may be more 
threatened during a difficult exam (subordinate goal) than a 
student who does not aspire to such a job after graduation. 
Similarly, interacting with a Black confederate poses a 
demanding situation for Whites (e.g., Mendes et al., 2002; 
Trawalter & Richeson, 2006), and may be perceived as more 
demanding, and thus more threatening, by those who care 
more about doing well – those exposed to the moral ideal 
rather than obligation frame.  
To test the reasoning that differences in CV reactivity 
and behavior caused by the moral ideal versus obligation 
frame were specific to the intergroup nature of the 
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interaction in Study 4.1 and 4.2, an intragroup contact 
situation was used in Study 4.3. After giving a speech about 
equality as a moral ideal (vs. obligation), White participants 
were shown a video of a White confederate introducing 
herself. Participants then gave a speech in which they 
introduced themselves and another one stating their views on 
affirmative action. As was anticipated and consistent with 
our reasoning, there were no differences observed in Whites’ 
CV reactivity during the interaction speeches. Furthermore, 
in contrast to what was found in the case of an intergroup 
interaction (Study 4.2), no differences were found between 
conditions in terms of Whites’ exerted effort (i.e., duration 
of speech) during their speech on affirmative action. These 
findings corroborate the hypothesis that morality framing 
indeed influences Whites’ perceived demands of an 
intergroup, but not of an intragroup interaction.  
 
Theoretical Implications and Contributions 
There are several contributions and implications of the 
current work with regard to theory, and I will outline each 
below. First, the findings reviewed in this dissertation 
contribute to the understanding of moral motivation. There is 
a growing body of research which demonstrates that moral 
motivation is distinct from nonmoral motivation in critical 
properties, such as intensity and predictive value for 
behavior (Bauman & Skitka, 2009; Ellemers et al., 2008; 





such examinations notwithstanding, the research outlined in 
this dissertation significantly expands the literature by 
demonstrating the distinct persuasive power of two specific 
morality frames. What is more, special attention was given 
to the interplay between self-reported attitudes and 
unobtrusive, more implicit measures of motivation as a 
function of morality framing and to the way these processes 
develop during different stages of (sub)goal achievement 
(Chapter 3 and 4). In sum, although both moral frames are 
aimed at motivating advantaged group members toward 
social change, the results in Chapter 2 and 4 indicate that the 
moral ideal frame is most effective in doing so. By showing 
how experimentally induced moral foci shape attitudes 
toward social equality, our research builds on, and expands, 
prior work delineating the differences between two types of 
morality (i.e., prescriptive versus proscriptive morality; 
Janoff-Bulman et al., 2009). The framing effects outlined in 
this dissertation demonstrate that moral issues are not 
inherently proscriptive or prescriptive, but that the same 
moral goal can be framed both ways. Based on our findings 
and those of the work by Janoff-Bulman and colleagues 
(2009), it seems that the duality of morality can have 
substantial practical implications and considering this 
duality is of great importance for future examinations of 
moral psychological processes. 
Second, the findings from Chapter 2 and 4 extend 
previous findings which indicate that dominant group 
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members have a general tendency to oppose affirmative 
action concerned with negative material outcomes for the 
ingroup (e.g., Lowery et al., 2006). Namely, even in the face 
of material cost for the ingroup (i.e., a traineeship offered 
exclusively to subordinate group members; Study 2.2), there 
were still significant differences between the moral ideal and 
obligation condition in terms of Whites’ willingness to 
redress inequality. Whites who were exposed to the moral 
ideal frame were more supportive of affirmative action, even 
though the policy was presented as excluding members of 
their own group, than those exposed to the obligation frame. 
Thus, even though material cost to the ingroup remained 
constant across conditions, these framing effects reveal that 
there is important scope in including Whites’ moral, in 
addition to material, concerns when addressing their 
attitudes toward equality.  
Third, the current work contributes to social identity 
theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Social identity theory (Tajfel 
& Turner, 1986) posits that people are motivated to protect 
the relative status of their group because they derive part of 
their self-esteem from the groups with which they identify. 
They do so, at least in part, by making positive comparisons 
between their own group (e.g., Whites) and outgroups (e.g., 
Blacks). Along these lines, members of dominant groups are 
threatened in their social identity when the relative standing 
of their group is at stake (Scheepers & Ellemers, 2005), as is 





ladder. However, such examinations have mainly focused on 
the consequences of intergroup comparisons with regard to 
social or material status. As outlined elsewhere in this 
dissertation, prior work suggests that the moral dimension 
may be an even more important source for a positive social 
identity than dimensions of competence and sociability 
(Ellemers et al., 2008; Leach et al., 2007).  
The current work suggests that by explicitly including 
the morality dimension—by presenting equality in moral 
terms— dominant group members may shift their focus from 
the ingroup’s potential loss in the competence domain (i.e., 
material outcomes) to the ingroup’s potential gain in 
morality (i.e., being fair and tolerant). The findings in this 
dissertation demonstrate that when redressing inequality is 
presented as a way for dominant group members to boost 
their group’s value – in terms of morality - resistance to 
social change among these group members decreases. Thus, 
presenting the advancement of subordinate outgroups as 
holding potential moral gains (vs. material losses) for the 
dominant ingroup may be an effective way to motivate 
dominant group members to embrace, rather than oppose, 
the societal advancement of subordinate groups.  
 
Practical Implications and Contributions 
There are important implications of the current work for 
legal scholars, as well as communication and policy 
professionals. Because international human rights law is 
177 
 
grounded in the principle of non-discrimination (Amnesty 
International, 2012), many countries have in place laws 
prohibiting different forms of discrimination. Such laws are, 
by definition, framed as obligations and/or prohibitions 
rather than ideals. Law, including antidiscrimination law, 
serves to define transgressions and regulates human conduct 
primarily through the threat of sanctions (Shavell, 2002). At 
the same time, the results in this dissertation suggest that a 
moral ideal rather than an obligation frame elicits more 
favorable attitudes toward equality and equality-promoting 
policy among dominant group members. From a legal 
perspective, language used to define regulation is aimed at 
clearly defining rules and sanctions, and not much attention 
is given to the psychological implications of this language 
for behavioral change. Thus, an interdisciplinary approach of 
social psychology and law may produce new insights and 
address issues of equality and non-discrimination more 
effectively. Findings from the current research may serve to 
inform the translation of antidiscrimination law into 
supplemental behavioral guidelines framed in terms of ideals 
and gains instead of obligations and prohibitions. Such 
guidelines may serve to motivate people, beyond inhibiting 
discrimination, to take steps to promote equity. For example, 
communicating the goal and commitment to increase the 
percentage of female professors in Dutch academia to 30% 
as an obligation may raise significant resistance, and thus 





suggest that it may be more effective to frame the goal of 
creating a gender-balanced academia as a yet-to-be obtained 
moral ideal. Based on the current research, I would expect 
the latter to inspire individuals to become more positive 
about gender diversity and to embrace, rather than oppose, 
policies targeting female scholars. 
Although primarily directed at uncovering 
psychological processes underlying distinct moral foci, the 
findings outlined in this dissertation have very concrete 
implications for professionals in areas such as diversity 
management, policy development, and human resources 
because framing was used to manipulate such foci. The 
current findings demonstrate the importance of seemingly 
small differences in the way that equality is communicated, 
regardless of the praiseworthiness of equality goals. For 
example, when communicating an organization’s policy on 
cultural diversity and equal opportunity, our results suggest 
that presenting equality as the organization’s moral ideal 
rather than obligation, will elicit more support and 
commitment to such policies among the organization’s 
employees. Although putting in place policies such as 
affirmative action will increase the entrance of ethnic 
minorities into any given organization, it does not ensure 
that cultural diversity will be embraced. To the end of the 
latter, an organization needs to elicit broader support among 
its employees, and create positive attitudes toward 
(increasing) cultural diversity. Although the language used 
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to introduce or explain equality-promoting policies may 
seem of little importance compared to the content of such 
policies, the current research demonstrates the potentially 
far-reaching consequences of such language use in terms of 
generating support and/or compliance among people. Thus, 
advocates of equality from areas such as business, politics, 
and education, will strengthen the persuasive power of their 
egalitarian message by presenting equality as a moral ideal 
rather than an obligation. 
In a similar vein, morality framing may also shape 
attitudes and motivation with regard to societal issues other 
than social equality. Although data reported in this 
dissertation support the claim that people report more 
positive intergroup attitudes when exposed to a moral ideal 
rather than moral obligation frame (Chapter 2 and 4), I do 
not expect that these mechanisms are restricted to social 
equality attitudes. For example, if the goal is to stimulate 
people to make environmentally conscious decisions or to 
donate to a charity targeting poverty, framing a clean 
environment or the reduction of poverty, respectively, as 
moral ideals that can be attained may also prove more 
effective than framing them as moral obligations that should 
be met. Indeed, framing goals as moral ideals rather than 
obligations can be an effective way to elicit support for a 







Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
The main aim of the current research was to chart the 
effects of morality framing across contexts (e.g., intergroup 
interaction, in the laboratory, in the field) and by taking a 
multi-method (cardiovascular measures, self-reports, content 
analyses, coding of verbal and nonverbal behavior) 
approach. Although the current work consistently 
demonstrates that the moral ideal frame is more effective in 
establishing support for social change than the moral 
obligation frame, there are some limitations to this work.  
The studies in this dissertation did not include a control 
“no frame “condition and thus, based on these data I cannot 
conclusively state whether the moral ideal frame increases 
or the moral obligation frame decreases Whites’ support for 
social change. However, there is research suggesting that in 
the absence of an explicit frame, the “default” mode in 
which Whites approach intergroup contexts is a prevention 
focus aimed at avoiding prejudice (Trawalter & Richeson, 
2006). This default mode more closely resembles the moral 
obligation than the moral ideal frame, which hints at the 
likelihood that it is the moral ideal frame that increases 
commitment to social change among Whites. Future 
research comparing both moral frames to a no frame-
condition will thus further our understanding of how exactly 
morality framing influences group members. 
In addition, still little is known about potential 
mediators, such as group-based emotions, and moderators, 
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such as group identification, of the process outlined in 
previous chapters. Future research could for example 
examine whether there are specific emotions, such as group-
based guilt (e.g., Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 
2006) and/or sympathy (Iyer, Leach, & Crosby, 2003) that 
are influenced by morality framing and whether these 
emotions predict the attitudes and behavior relevant to the 
current work. Furthermore, both the moral ideal and the 
moral obligation frame pertain to dominant group members’ 
social (vs. personal) identity by stressing the moral 
responsibility of the ingroup to increase equality. Thus, in 
line with social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), it 
seems likely that the persuasive power of the moral ideal (vs. 
obligation) frame will be most pronounced in intergroup 
attitudes held by high-, rather than low-identified group 
members. Future research can test this reasoning by taking 
into account group identification, and assessing whether the 
effect of morality framing on dominant group members’ 
intergroup attitudes is indeed moderated by the extent to 
which group members identify with the dominant group. 
Another limitation of the current work is that it is not 
yet clear why the effect of morality framing on Whites’ CV 
pattern while verbalizing their thoughts on social equality as 
a moral ideal versus obligation observed in Chapter 3 was 
not observed in Chapter 4. That is, in Chapter 3 it was 
demonstrated that Whites giving a speech about equality as a 





consistent with greater relative challenge, and thus less 
relative threat. Although Chapter 4 was aimed at examining 
the effect of morality on Whites’ CV reactivity during 
intergroup contact—a fundamentally different context than 
that of Study 3—the studies also included an initial speech 
task similar to the one in Chapter 3 prior to the interaction 
speeches. However, in the research reported in Chapter 4 
morality framing did not shape Whites’ CV reactivity during 
their speeches about equality as a moral ideal versus 
obligation. This can potentially be explained by differences 
in procedure and/or experimenter race altering the 
experimental contexts of the speech task in Chapter 3 versus 
Chapter 4 in important ways.  
For instance, participants in Study 4.2 and 4.3 were 
informed ahead of time that they would engage in a webcam 
interaction with a fellow-participant, whereas participants in 
Study 3 received no such information. The knowledge that 
an interaction was to follow the speech about equality as a 
moral ideal vs. obligation may have changed the perceived 
nature of that speech, rendering direct comparison between 
Chapter 4 and Chapter 3 difficult. Evidence in support of 
this hypothesis is that in Study 4.3 Whites’ CV reactivity 
indicated goal relevance was insufficient, i.e., CV reactivity 
was not significantly greater than zero, suggesting that 
participants in this study did not perceive the speech as goal 
relevant as opposed to participants in Study 3. An additional 
difference between Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 is that the 
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experimenter in Study 3 was Black, whereas experimenters 
in the studies of Chapter 4 were White. Could it be that the 
presence of a Black experimenter (Study 3) created a 
fundamentally different experimental context than a White 
experimenter (Study 4.1 and 4.2)? We cannot provide 
conclusive answers to these questions based on the data 
available at this stage. Nevertheless, it is clear that subtle 
differences in the context of framing matter and future 
research might further test the robustness of the effects 
observed in Chapter 3 by disentangling the potential effects 
of experimenter race and specifying the impact of the 
procedural differences described above.  
In the studies reviewed in this dissertation I took a 
dominant group perspective, focusing on the effect of 
morality framing on the attitudes, behavior and motivation 
of White students and employees. Expanding the current 
work by examining the effect of morality framing on 
subordinate group members (e.g., women, Blacks) would be 
a valuable step toward creating a more holistic, balanced 
framework which takes into account both minority and 
majority perspectives. Indeed, there is research showing that 
minority and majority group members differ substantially in 
their concerns during intergroup contact. Whereas majority 
group members are mostly concerned with being perceived 
as moral, minority group members are mostly concerned 
with being perceived as competent (Bergsieker et al., 2010). 





morality framing is similar for members belonging to 
subordinate versus dominant groups. Additionally, morality 
framing may also have detrimental consequences for 
intergroup relations when taking into account the perspective 
of the minority group. More specifically, it could be the case 
that making morality salient among minority as well as 
majority group members may elicit intergroup comparisons 
resulting in claims of moral superiority of the ingroup (Iyer, 
Jetten, & Haslam, 2012). Insofar as the quality of intergroup 
relations depend on whether minority and majority groups 
work from a similar moral goal, it is thus important to also 
examine how morality framing influences minority group 
members as well as actual intergroup interactions.   
Furthermore, the findings in the current work are based 
on a strict distinction between framing equality as the 
ingroup’s moral ideal versus moral obligation. However, in 
real-life communications surrounding equality, these frames 
may be used intertwined, inconsistently, and/or stem from 
outgroup rather than ingroup sources. For instance, a policy 
aimed at increasing cultural diversity within an organization 
can be framed in terms of a moral obligation (e.g., “We want 
to adhere to the principle of non-discrimination”) as well as 
a moral ideal (e.g., “We want everyone to feel equally 
respected”). How does such a combined perspective, of 
moral ideals as well as obligations, influence individuals 
when thinking about equality? Could it be the case that 
combining the moral ideal and obligation frames into a 
185 
 
single frame is even more persuasive and effective in 
eliciting support for equality than the moral ideal frame 
alone? Furthermore, will the moral ideal (vs. obligation) 
frame still be persuasive when the source of the information 
represents the outgroup (e.g., nonnative Dutch) instead of 
the ingroup (e.g., native Dutch)?  Prior research has shown 
that information is generally more persuasive when it is from 
an ingroup rather than an outgroup source. In some cases 
outgroup appeals produce no changes in group members’ 
attitudes, even in the presence of strong arguments (Mackie, 
Gastardo-Conaco, & Skelly, 1992). Thus, future research 
might further specify how the beneficial effects of the moral 
ideal (vs. obligation) frame hold up compared to a mixed 
frame focusing on both moral ideals and obligations, and/or 
when coming from an outgroup-source. 
Lastly, there is a perhaps more mundane interpretation 
of why the moral obligation frame was found to be less 
persuasive than the ideal frame among dominant group 
members. It could be that when it comes to increasing social 
equality, dominant group members by default more readily 
perceive action by the ingroup as a moral gain (attaining the 
moral ideal), than they do inaction as a moral loss (not 
meeting the moral obligation). Prospect theory (Kahneman 
& Tversky, 1979) posits that losses will loom larger than 
gains when individuals have to choose between two options 
containing losses versus gains of similar magnitude. As 





persuasive than gain-frames (for a review see Levin, 
Schneider, & Gaeth, 1998). At first glance, the findings in 
this dissertation thus seem to be at odds with the principle of 
“loss aversion”, in the sense that the potential moral gains 
(ideal frame) were more persuasive than the potential moral 
loss (obligation frame). I propose that this is not necessarily 
the case. It could well be that the moral ideal frame is more 
persuasive than the obligation frame, not because the former 
focuses individuals on gains rather than losses, but because 
those potential gains are more readily accepted as such, and 
thus more motivating, than are the potential losses. In other 
words, individuals may have been reluctant to fully consider 
the psychologically threatening possibility of not meeting a 
moral obligation, which may have diminished the moral 
obligation frame’s persuasive power compared to the moral 
ideal frame. Based on the data presented in this dissertation, 
I cannot conclusively state whether the process outlined 
above occurred, but these considerations imply that future 
framing research may gain additional insights into these 
issues by determining which looms larger, gains or losses. 
Such research should take into consideration the readiness 









In times of attempts at bringing about social change 
toward a more equal society, members of dominant groups 
(e.g., Whites) may be reluctant to get on board, motivated to 
protect their group’s superior standing. I theorize that 
dominant group members’ opposition to social change 
decreases when redressing inequality is presented as a way 
for dominant group members to boost their group’s value—
in terms of morality. In this dissertation, I demonstrated that 
framing equality as a moral ideal rather than a moral 
obligation inspires Whites to focus on the potential benefits 
of cultural diversity, thereby increasing their commitment to 
increase social equality, including greater support for 
affirmative action. Furthermore, giving a speech about social 
equality as a moral ideal rather than obligation elicited CV 
(cardiovascular) responses consistent with greater relative 
challenge (rather than threat) in Whites.  
Counter-intuitively, Whites interacting with a Black 
confederate exhibited CV reactivity consistent with greater 
threat after exposure to the moral ideal frame compared to 
the moral obligation frame. Nevertheless, it was found that 
this heightened threat, at least in part, resulted from Whites’ 
positive attitudes toward cultural diversity. Heightened 
threat during intergroup contact may thus indicate the 
psychological cost of caring, and with regard to bringing 
about social change, may even be categorized as a desirable 





research in this dissertation—with its multi-method 
approach and examination of distinct populations—furthers 
the understanding of the complex interplay between self-
reported attitudes, physiological responses, and behavior 
during intergroup contact. As a result, this dissertation can 
help inform psychological interventions and policy aimed at 
increasing the commitment to social change among unlikely 
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The central goal of this dissertation was to identify an 
effective psychological intervention to increase dominant 
group members’ (e.g., Whites) commitment to social 
equality. I focused on the perspective of dominant group 
members, because they are potentially valuable allies in the 
struggle toward more equality as their group often has more 
power than minority groups. At the same time, dominant 
group members are more likely than subordinate group 
members to oppose social change, thereby perpetuating their 
group’s privilege and power. I theorized that if redressing 
inequality becomes a way for dominant group members to 
boost their group’s moral standing (i.e., as fair and just), 
resistance to social change among these group members 
might decrease, thereby increasing opportunities for social 
change. To test this hypothesis, I examined the effect of 
morality framing—i.e., presenting social equality as a moral 
ideal versus a moral obligation—on Whites’ responses to 
social inequality. 
 
In Chapter 2, I established that Whites who read the moral 
ideal frame were more supportive of affirmative action, 
more positive about cultural diversity, and less threatened in 
their social identity, than those who read the moral 
obligation frame. Furthermore, these effects were not 





non-moral domain—i.e. competence—thus supporting the 
claim that the effects observed in Chapter 2 were indeed 
specific to morality framing. To my knowledge, these 
studies are the first to establish that a moral ideal frame is 
more effective than a moral obligation frame in increasing 
commitment toward social equality among Whites. 
 
The central aim of Chapter 3 was to examine, beyond self-
reported intergroup attitudes (Chapter 2), the impact of 
morality framing on Whites’ more automatic, less 
consciously controlled responses. Based on the 
biopsychosocial model (Blascovich & Tomaka, 1996), I 
predicted that Whites’ cardiovascular responses after reading 
the moral ideal (compared to the obligation) fame would be 
consistent with greater challenge (rather than threat). Indeed, 
it was found that when giving a speech about equality as a 
moral ideal (rather than as a moral obligation), Whites’ CV 
(cardiovascular) reactivity was consistent with greater 
relative challenge—and thus less relative threat. Also, it was 
found that Whites spoke significantly faster, indicating 
greater eagerness and less vigilance, when speaking about 
equality as a moral ideal rather than an obligation. These 
findings corroborate the beneficial effects of the moral ideal 
(vs. obligation) frame on intergroup attitudes outlined in 




In Chapter 4, the goal was to examine the effects of 
morality framing on Whites’ responses during intergroup 
contact. After having read the moral ideal or obligation 
frame, Whites’ self-reported attitudes, as well as their 
behavioral and CV responses during an interaction with a 
Black confederate were assessed. It was found that although 
the moral ideal (vs. obligation) frame elicits more positive 
attitudes toward cultural diversity, more support for 
affirmative action (Chapter 2 and 4), and less relative threat 
when giving a speech about equality (Chapter 3), it also 
elicits greater relative threat during intergroup contact 
(Chapter 4). Furthermore, Whites’ CV reactivity did not 
differ between moral frames during interaction with a White 
confederate (Chapter 4), in line with the notion that these 
effects are specific to intergroup contact. 
 
Mediation analyses help explain these paradoxical findings. 
Namely, it was found that the more positive attitudes toward 
cultural diversity—elicited by the moral ideal (vs. 
obligation) frame—induced CV reactivity consistent with 
greater relative threat during contact with the Black 
confederate. Heightened threat during intergroup contact 
may thus indicate the psychological cost of caring. With 
regard to bringing about social change, such responses may 
even be categorized as a desirable, as they can be indicative 






Finally, morality framing did not predict expressed hostility 
during intergroup contact, nor was there a reliable 
association between CV patterns and expressed hostility. 
The latter finding demonstrates that CV reactivity in line 
with greater threat—as was observed during intergroup 
contact—does not necessarily result in more negative 
behavior during said contact.  
 
Taken together, the research in this dissertation—with its 
multi-method approach and examination of distinct 
populations (i.e., White employees and students)—furthers 
the understanding of the complex interplay between self-
reported attitudes, physiological responses, and behavior 
during intergroup contact. As a result, this dissertation can 
help inform psychological interventions and policy aimed at 
increasing the commitment to social change among unlikely 
allies: Those benefiting from the status quo.  
 







































































Summary in Dutch  
 
Het centrale doel van dit proefschrift was het vinden van een 
effectieve psychologische interventie gericht op het 
vergroten van de toewijding aan sociale gelijkheid onder 
leden van een sociale meerderheidsgroep (zoals autochtone 
Nederlanders). Ik richtte mij op het perspectief van de 
meerderheidsgroep omdat leden van deze groep potentieel 
waardevolle bondgenoten kunnen zijn in de strijd voor meer 
gelijkheid, mede gezien het feit dat deze groep vaak meer 
macht heeft dan minderheidsgroepen. Tegelijkertijd zijn 
leden van meerderheidsgroepen vaker dan leden van 
minderheidsgroepen geneigd zich te verzetten tegen sociale 
verandering, omdat ze de privileges en macht van hun groep 
willen behouden. Ik voorspelde dat de weerstand tegen 
sociale verandering onder leden van de meerderheidsgroep 
zou afnemen wanneer het tegengaan van sociale 
ongelijkheid een manier zou zijn om de morele status van 
hun groep (i.e., als eerlijk en rechtvaardig) te versterken. 
Hiermee zouden de kansen op het realiseren van sociale 
verandering kunnen toenemen. Om deze hypothese te 
toetsen onderzocht ik het effect van moraliteitsframing—
door sociale gelijkheid hetzij als moreel ideaal hetzij als 
morele verplichting te presenteren—op de attitudes van 






In Hoofdstuk 2 toonde ik aan dat het presenteren van 
sociale gelijkheid als moreel ideaal onder autochtone 
Nederlanders leidde tot meer steun voor positieve actie, 
meer positieve attitudes ten aanzien van culturele diversiteit 
en minder ervaren sociale identiteitsbedreiging dan het 
presenteren van sociale gelijkheid als morele verplichting. 
Deze verschillende reacties op idealen vs. verplichtingen 
waren niet zichtbaar wanneer sociale gelijkheid werd 
gepresenteerd in termen die niet naar moraliteit verwezen 
(namelijk competentie). Dit ondersteunt de veronderstelling 
dat de effecten uit Hoofdstuk 2 inderdaad uniek zijn voor 
moraliteitsframing. Voor zover ik weet, zijn dit de eerste 
studies die laten zien dat het presenteren van sociale 
gelijkheid als een moreel ideaal—in plaats van een morele 
verplichting—effectiever is in het versterken van de 
toewijding van autochtone Nederlanders aan gelijkheid. 
 
Het centrale doel van Hoofdstuk 3 was om—naast de 
zelfgerapporteerde attitudes van autochtone Nederlanders—
de effecten van moraliteitsframing op hun meer 
automatische, minder bewust gestuurde, reacties te bepalen. 
Op basis van het biopsychosociale model (Blascovich & 
Tomaka, 1996), voorspelde ik dat de cardiovasculaire (CV) 
reacties van autochtone Nederlanders na presentatie van 
sociale gelijkheid als moreel ideaal (in plaats van als morele 
verplichting) het optreden van positieve uitdaging zouden 
indiceren—in plaats van negatieve bedreiging. De resultaten 
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toonden inderdaad aan dat tijdens het houden van een betoog 
over sociale gelijkheid als moreel ideaal (in plaats van 
morele verplichting), autochtone Nederlanders CV 
reactiviteit vertoonden die indicatief was voor meer relatieve 
uitdaging—en dus minder relatieve bedreiging. Ook lieten 
de resultaten zien dat autochtone Nederlanders significant 
sneller spraken als zij een betoog hielden over gelijkheid als 
moreel ideaal in plaats van als morele verplichting, hetgeen 
erop duidt dat zij vooral enthousiast (i.p.v. waakzaam) waren 
tijdens deze taak. Deze bevindingen bevestigen de gunstige 
effecten van het presenteren van sociale gelijkheid als een 
moreel ideaal (in plaats van een morele verplichting) op 
intergroepsattitudes, zoals uiteengezet in Hoofdstuk 2. Ze 
laten ook zien dat deze effecten verder gaan dan het 
aangeven van goede bedoelingen en positievere 
intergroepsattitudes—aangezien ze zichtbaar zijn in 
impliciete fysiologische reacties en gedrag. 
 
In Hoofdstuk 4 was het doel de effecten van 
moraliteitsframing op de reacties van autochtone 
Nederlanders tijdens intergroepscontact te onderzoeken. Na 
de beschrijving van sociale gelijkheid als moreel ideaal of 
morele verplichting, werden de zelfgerapporteerde attitudes 
evenals het gedrag en de CV reacties van autochtone 
Nederlanders bepaald in reactie op het frame, en tijdens de 
interactie met een allochtone Nederlander. De presentatie 





leidde tot meer positieve attitudes ten aanzien van culturele 
diversiteit, en tot  meer steun voor positieve actie (zoals in 
Hoofdstuk 2). In Hoofdstuk 3 was gebleken dat de 
presentatie van het morele ideaal (vs. verplichting) leidt tot 
minder relatieve bedreiging tijdens het houden van een 
betoog over gelijkheid. De resultaten van Hoofdstuk 4 laten 
zien dat wanneer men daadwerkelijk in contact treedt met 
een allochtone Nederlander, de presentatie van gelijkheid 
als moreel ideaal (vs. verplichting) juist leidt tot meer 
relatieve bedreiging. De twee moraliteitsframes resulteerden 
niet in verschillende CV reacties van autochtone 
Nederlanders wanneer zij interacteerden met een autochtone 
Nederlander (Hoofdstuk 4). Dit laat zien dat de gevonden 
effecten uniek zijn voor intergroepscontact. 
 
Mediatie analyses verklaren deze paradoxale bevindingen. 
Het blijkt namelijk dat de positieve attitudes ten aanzien van 
culturele diversiteit onder autochtone Nederlanders die 
werden opgeroepen door het morele ideaal (vs. verplichting) 
frame, tegelijkertijd ook resulteerden in CV reactiviteit die 
duidt op verhoogde relatieve bedreiging tijdens contact met 
een allochtone Nederlander. Deze verhoogde bedreiging 
tijdens intergroepscontact lijkt te duiden op de 
psychologische prijs van betrokkenheid bij het doel van 
sociale gelijkheid. In het proces van bewerkstelligen van 
sociale verandering kan deze reactie zelfs beschouwd 
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worden als een respons die wijst op een versterkt streven 
naar gelijkheid.  
 
Tot slot bleek in dit hoofdstuk dat het moraliteitsframe geen 
invloed had op uitingen van vijandigheid tijdens 
intergroepscontact. Ook waren uitingen van vijandigheid 
tijdens intergroepscontact niet gerelateerd aan de 
geobserveerde CV patronen. Deze laatste bevinding geeft 
aan dat indicaties van verhoogde bedreiging—die te zien 
zijn in CV reactiviteit van autochtone Nederlanders tijdens 
intergroepscontact—niet noodzakelijkerwijs resulteren in 
meer negatief gedrag tijdens dat contact. 
 
Samengevat brengt het onderzoek in dit proefschrift—
dankzij de multimethodische aanpak en het onderzoeken van 
verschillende populaties (autochtone medewerkers en 
studenten)—ons begrip van de complexe wisselwerking 
tussen zelfgerapporteerde attitudes, fysiologische reacties en 
gedrag tijdens intergroepscontact weer een stap verder. Dit 
proefschrift kan helpen bij het ontwikkelen van 
psychologische interventies en beleid dat is gericht op het 
versterken van de toewijding aan sociale verandering onder 
onwaarschijnlijke bondgenoten, namelijk degenen voor wie 
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